Opinion
CRIMINAL NO. 11-00046-CB.
April 19, 2011
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss the indictment filed by Defendant Caleb Ryan Adams and on the government's response thereto. (Docs. 25 34.) The indictment charges the Defendant with "receiv[ing], in and affecting commerce, a firearm" after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). As one basis for his motion to dismiss, Defendant points out that the "prior conviction" alleged in the indictment was actually a youthful offender adjudication in Alabama state court. The question presented is whether that adjudication qualifies as a prior conviction. For reasons discussed below, the Court finds that it does not.
Defendant also argues that the indictment should be dismissed because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional in light of District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), an argument that is clearly without merit. In Heller, the Supreme Court stated that "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons. . . ." Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. "Thus, statutory restrictions of firearm possession, such as § 922(g)(1), are a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people." United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010).
The government acknowledges that the predicate offense charged in the indictment resulted in a youthful offender adjudication and not in an adult felony conviction.
The Defendant is charged with violation of a Federal firearms statute which makes it unlawful "for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of [] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to possess in or affecting commerce any firearm or ammunition or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). "What constitutes a conviction [for purposes of § 922(g)(1)] shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held." 18 U.S.C. § 921(20).
Alabama law leaves no room for doubt — a youthful offender adjudication is not a conviction. First, it is not a conviction because that is what the Alabama Youthful Offender Act says. According to the statute, a youthful offender adjudication "shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime." Ala. Code § 15-19-7 (1975). Both state and federal courts agree that the statute means what it says — an adjudication is not a conviction. In United States v. Robinson, 518 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (M.D. Ala. 2007), the court held that the defendant's Alabama youthful offender adjudication did not count as a conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (ACCA). Relying on both the language of the Youthful Offender Act and on a survey of Alabama case law, the Robinson court noted: "Alabama courts have repeatedly held that youthful offender adjudications may not be considered prior convictions under Alabama law." Robinson, 518 F. Supp.2d at 1344 (and cases cited therein). Addressing habeas claims related to Alabama's youthful offender statute, the Eleventh Circuit observed that "[t]he most central consequence of [the] statute . . . is that the adjudication . . . may not be considered a prior felony conviction as contemplated by the [Alabama] Habitual Offender Act." Gordon v. Nagle, 2 F.3d 385, 387 (11th Cir. 1993); cf. United States v. Lee, 265 Fed. Appx. 763 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (concluding that Alabama youthful offender adjudication did not qualify as adult felony conviction under ACCA).
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the motion to dismiss is due to be GRANTED. DONE and ORDERED.
Furthermore, the government has been unable to cite any authority — state or federal — to support the proposition that a youthful offender adjudication qualifies as a conviction.