Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-11665-DPW
April 9, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
At issue in this proceeding is whether a 1959 sale of land by the federal government to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts will be respected. The parcel was included in the 1945 federal taking directed by the Congress to create the Parker River National Wildlife Refuge in Essex County, Massachusetts. The parcel was also subject to a 1948 statute designed to reduce the area of the Refuge by eliminating certain sections of the 1945 taking. Over a half century after the federal taking was recorded, a competing claimant came to this court seeking to establish ownership in this parcel. I decline to divest the Commonwealth of the property it purchased from the federal government over forty years ago.
I. THE PROPERTY AND ITS DISPOSITION IN UNITED STATES V. 12,367.47 MORE OR LESS OF LAND SITUATED IN ESSEX COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, NO. 7010 (D. MASS. JAN. 2, 1945)The Groveland, Massachusetts, property involved in this action, Lot 95, was included in the Crane Pond portion of the Refuge. Lot 95 was owned by William Merrill when he died in 1937. There are two lines of interest in the property. One flows from the action of the Town of Groveland, which in 1939 took a tax title deed in Lot 95 for taxes unpaid by Merrill and his representatives. The other flows from the action of the United States in 1945 taking Lot 95 by eminent domain for the Parker River National Wildlife Refuge, as reflected by the Judgment of Declaration of Taking (the "Judgment") issued by this Court on January 2, 1945 in the eminent domain proceeding styled United States v. 12,367.47 More or Less of Land Situated in Essex County, Massachusetts, No. 7010 (D.Mass. Jan. 2, 1945).
In 1948, Congress enacted a statute, Pub.L. No. 80-579, 62 Stat. 293, reducing the area taken in the Refuge by eliminating the Crane Pond Area, including Lot 95. Section 2(b) of the 1948 Act (the "Exclusion Act") "authorized and directed" the Attorney General of the United States to exclude from the pending condemnation proceeding lands for which compensation had not been paid "to the prior owners thereof." The United States had not paid compensation for Lot 95 before the effective date of the Exclusion Act in 1948 and, indeed, has never paid anyone compensation for Lot 95.
In 1949, the Town of Groveland recorded an affidavit to foreclose the tax title in Lot 95 and a deed purporting to grant Lot 95 to Ralph A. Esty in consideration of two hundred dollars. Ralph A. Esty was a member of the Board of Selectmen for the Town of Groveland. He was familiar with the exclusion mechanism established by the 1948 Act. Nine months earlier he had executed a stipulation of exclusion with respect to another parcel of land which, like Lot 95, had been taken in 1945 for the Refuge and released by the 1948 Act.
In 1952, this Court ordered that the owner of Lot 95 be served with an order of notice regarding the exclusion. In 1953, the U.S. Marshal made hand service on the heirs of William Merrill by serving their attorney of record, Robert F. Metcalf; on the Tax Collector and Town Treasurer of Groveland; and on the Massachusetts Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation.
In 1953, Ralph Esty executed a deed to Lot 95 to his three sons, the Estys, as joint tenants. The Estys paid taxes on Lot 95 for fiscal year 1955. It appears, although no documentation has been adduced, that they also paid taxes on Lot 95 for several years thereafter.
On March 20, 1956, there was a compensation hearing in this Court for the Crane Pond Division and neither the heirs of William Merrill nor the Estys appeared at that hearing. Final judgment was entered by Judge Aldrich fixing just compensation for Lot 95 at $368.95. Apparently, no one has claimed any portion of this amount.
In February 1959, Judge Aldrich entered an order terminating "the period for exclusion of condemned lands." On June 1959, the United States conveyed land, including Lot 95, from the 1945 taking to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Since 1959, the Commonwealth has maintained Lot 95 as a wildlife management area for conservation purposes. The Estys have not paid taxes on Lot 95 since 1960.
II. THE CURRENT PROCEEDING
In 1998, the Estys applied to this Court, apparently without notice to the Commonwealth, "to exclude Lot 95 or to vacate judgment regarding Lot 95." In the absence of objection by the United States, which, in fact, undertook to stipulate to exclusion but apparently failed to provide notice to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to which it had conveyed its interest in Lot 95 nearly four decades earlier, I issued a Judgment of Exclusion on March 31, 1999. After the Commonwealth learned of this Judgment of Exclusion, Assistant Attorney General Irene Guild sent a letter to Arthur K. Ross, counsel to the Estys, stating that the Commonwealth was asserting title to Lot 95. I thereafter vacated the Judgment of Exclusion and permitted the Commonwealth to intervene in this case. The Commonwealth has presented a motion for summary judgment to establish its right to Lot 95.
III. DISCUSSION
Now having been presented with an adversarial context in which to address this matter, I find that the Estys stumble at the threshold because they do not have an interest in Lot 95 recognized under the applicable federal statutes. I find the federal government did have such an interest which it could and did properly transfer to the Commonwealth in 1959 following the termination of the decade-long period for exclusion. Under the circumstances, the Estys' claim does not justify disturbing the Commonwealth's interest more than forty years after it was validly acquired.
A. The Source of the Interest the Estys' Claim Was Extinguished in 1945
In the motion initiating this action, the Estys sought exclusion of Lot 95 from the taking. This relief necessarily requires vacating the 1959 order terminating the period for exclusion. Putting to one side the question whether a proper procedural vehicle exists by which such relief may be obtained, I turn first to Estys' claim that they have been record title holders of Lot 95 since 1949.
Although they do not indicate explicitly the procedural vehicle they are purporting to deploy, the Estys are presumably pursuing their claim through Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). But even the open-ended subsections of Rule 60(b) require filing within a reasonable time. See generally Farm Credit Bank of Baltimore v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 2003). Given (a) the length of the Estys' delay, (b) the lack of justification, and (c) the prejudicial disruption of the Commonwealth conservation efforts at the locus for the past more than 40 years, I find no extraordinary circumstances justifying invocation of Rule 60(b) in this setting to divest the Commonwealth of its title in Lot 95. See generally Claremont Flock Corp. v. Alm, 281 F.3d 297 (1st Cir. 2002).
The heirs of William Merrill held a right of redemption for Lot 95 at the time of the 1945 taking, while the Town of Groveland held tax title to the lot. Consequently, I confront the question whether the taking extinguished that tax title by vesting full fee simple title to Lot 95 in the United States.
In Massachusetts, the holder of a tax title is a lien holder until the right of redemption is extinguished. Brown v. City of Boston, 353 Mass. 740, 742-43 (1968). Unless and until that right is extinguished, the holder of the right of redemption is considered the owner of the property. Id. at 743.
Under the federal Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258a, title in fee simple absolute, or in any lesser interest or estate specified in the declaration of taking, vests in the United States upon the filing of a declaration of taking and the depositing in the court of funds marked as just compensation for the prior owners of the lands condemned. 40 U.S.C. § 258a; see United States v. 125. Acres of Land, 732 F.2d 239, 242-43 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943)).
I note that the aberrational case of Prescott v. Watt, No. 82-2357-MC (D.Mass. Mar. 8, 1988) is distinguishable. The claimants there asserted an interest from a "prior owner" who had apparently received no notice of the taking. In any event, the Prescott case was resolved not through litigation on the merits but by stipulation of the United States, after the Commonwealth had been dismissed from the case, when Judge Aldrich allowed an agreement for judgment divesting title to Lot 333 from the United States and revesting it in the condemnees.
Once the United States acquires fee simple title to land "[t]he fact that the land may be subject to a lien has no bearing on the condemnation." Washington Water Power Co. v. United States, 135 F.2d 541, 543 (9th Cir. 1943) (concluding that the United States does not have to pay the taxes that existed on land it condemned); see United States v. 111,000 Acres of Land, 155 F.2d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1946) (holding the United States not liable for taxes due on land taken by eminent domain); accord Collector of Taxes v. Revere Building, Inc., 276 Mass. 576, 580 (1931) (stating that a lien for taxes upon land is purely statutory and is extinguished by the taking of land by eminent domain by the taxing municipality) (citations omitted).
The Town of Groveland did not file an affidavit in the Essex Registry of Deeds to foreclose tax title of Lot 95 until 1949. At the time of the federal taking, the Town of Groveland had not extinguished the right of redemption held by the Merrill heirs. For that reason, I find that the heirs of William Merrill, and not the Town of Groveland, owned Lot 95 at the time of the taking in 1945. Fee simple title to Lot 95, subject to several easements but free of liens and encumbrances, vested in the United States on January 2, 1945. Accordingly, I find that the Town of Groveland's tax lien on Lot 95 was extinguished at that time and that the Town of Groveland did not have an interest in Lot 95 at the time of the conveyance to Ralph Esty. Therefore, Ralph Esty had no interest to convey to his sons in 1953.
B. This Court Properly Terminated the Power to Exclude Lot 95
Section 2(b) of the 1948 Exclusion Act authorized and directed the Attorney General of the United States to exclude from the taking certain lots for which compensation had never been paid, in accordance with 40 U.S.C. § 258f, "within 90 days following the date of enactment of this Act or within such additional period as the court . . . may determine to be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Act." Pub.L. No. 80-579, § 2(b), 62 Stat. 293.
The Estys contend that the Act required the Attorney General of the United States to exclude Lot 95 from the taking because the United States never paid compensation for that lot.
Consequently, they argue the United States District Court had no power to do anything with Lot 95 except exclude it from the taking. Under these circumstances, they contend, "it is impossible as a matter of law for Lot 95 to have been conveyed by the Commonwealth."
The plain language of the Act contradicts the Estys' assertion that exclusion was the only disposition it contemplated. Section 2(c) provides that if title could not be returned to the prior owners, then the Secretary of the Interior "shall" dispose of such lands "in such manner and at such prices" as he deems in the best interests of the United States. Pub.L. No. 80-579, § 2(c), 62 Stat. 293. Commonsense also supports this reading: if only exclusion were allowed, then title to many tracts of land in the taking would remain in limbo until increasingly remote owners applied to the court for exclusion.
The Estys, for example, waited nearly forty years before they took action. This approach does not encourage the stability necessary for orderly and productive use of land. Furthermore, the inclusion of the word "prices" in Section 2(c) contemplates sale as an allowable method of disposition. Consequently, I find that exclusion was not the only disposition allowed by the Act with respect to land for which compensation had not yet been paid. Sale at a price the Secretary deemed in the best interest of the United States was also available when, after over a decade, no record holder of an interest in Lot 95 at the time of the taking had come forward to seek exclusion. I decline to accept the Estys' argument that the Secretary did not have the power to sell Lot 95 to the Commonwealth in 1959.2
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the Estys did not have an interest in Lot 95 at the time of the taking, they may not invoke the Exclusion Act to void the sale of Lot 95 to the Commonwealth. Moreover, I find the period of Exclusion was properly terminated by Judge Aldrich in 1959. I find no reason to disturb the Commonwealth's interest in Lot 95. Accordingly, I grant summary judgment to the Commonwealth against the claim of the Estys (as set forth in the Estys' "Motion to Exclude Lot 95 or to Vacate Judgment Regarding Lot 95") and dismiss as moot the Commonwealth's counterclaim.
It is further Ordered that the parties provide the court on or before April 22, 2003, with a joint status report, proposing what further action, if any, is necessary to dispose of the outstanding claim of the Rogers to Lot 312.