Opinion
Index No. 850240/2014
04-04-2023
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE, ON BEHALF OF THE HOLDERS OF THE HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-1 MORTGAGE LOAN PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-1, Plaintiff, v. ELIZABETH HAZAN, REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS GROUP, L.D.C., MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC..ACTING SOLELY AS A NOMINEE FOR AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER, THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE SPENCER CONDOMINIUM, NLG, LLC,NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS SUCCESSOR TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWHEQ REVOLVING HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2005-M, 1 EAST62ND STREET APT 1A LLC,AARONSON SCHANTZ BEILEY P.A., NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O/B/O INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, JOHN DOE #1 THROUGH JOHN DOE #10, THE LAST TEN NAMES BEING FICTITIOUS AND UNKNOWN TO THE PLAINTIFF, THE PERSON OR PARTIES INTENDED BEING THE PERSONS OR PARTIES, IF ANY, HAVING OR CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN OR LIEN UPON THE MORTGAGED PREMISES DESCRIBED IN THE, Defendant.
Unpublished Opinion
PRESENT: HON. FRANCIS A. KAHN, III Justice.
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION
FRANCIS A. KAHN, III, A.J.S.C.
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 007) 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY.
Upon the foregoing documents, the motion and cross-motion are determined as follows:
The within action is to foreclose on a mortgage encumbering a parcel of residential real property located at 1 East 62nd Street, Unit 1A, New York, New York. The mortgage secures a loan with an original principal amount of $1,500,000.00 memorialized by an adjustable-rate note. The note and mortgage, both dated December 22, 2005, were given by Defendant Elizabeth Hazan ("Hazan") to non- party Countrywide Bank, NA. By deed dated August 15, 2011, Hazan transferred her entire interest in the premises to non-party Raymond Houle ("Houle"). On December 9, 2011, Houle deeded his interest in the premises to non-party 9221-0228 Quebec, Inc. ("Quebec"). On July 13, 2013, Quebec deeded its interest in the premises to Defendant Real Estate Holdings Group LDC ("Holdings"). On January 2, 2018, Holdings deeded the premises to non-party 1 East 62nd Street Apt 1A NYC New York LLC ("NYC"). Finally, NYC deeded the property to Defendant 1 East 62nd Street Apt 1A LLC ("1 East") on' March 7, 2019.
Plaintiff commenced its first action to foreclose on the mortgage at issue in 2008 (US Bank NA v Hazan, NY Cty Index No 104990/2008). By order dated November 4, 2010, Justice Carol E. Huff dismissed the action for failure to satisfy the pre-foreclosure notice provisions in the mortgage. Plaintiff j commenced this action on July 1, 2014. Justice Judith R. McMahon dismissed this action on May 8, 2018, via an oral decision on the record order finding this action was time barred. The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Justice McMahon holding that the commencement of the 2008 action never validly accelerated the mortgage debt based upon Plaintiffs failure to serve a contractual pre-foreclosure notice (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Hazan, 176 A.D.3d 637 [1st Dept 2019]).
By order of this Court dated January 24, 2022, Plaintiffs motion to file an amended complaint was granted and Plaintiff filed an amended pleading which included a third cause of action to reform the condominium rider to the mortgage. Defendants Hazan and Holdings answered jointly and pled forty-two [42] affirmative defenses, including lack of standing, failure to satisfy contractual conditions precedent and statute of limitations. Defendant 1 East answered and pled six [6] affirmative defenses, including statute of limitations.
Now, Plaintiff moves for, inter alia, summary judgment against all appearing Defendants, striking their answers and affirmative defenses, a default judgment against all non-appearing parties, to appoint a Referee to compute and to amend the caption. Defendants Hazan and Holdings oppose the motion. Defendant 1 East also files opposition.
In moving for summary judgment on its foreclosure cause of action, Plaintiff was required to establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law though proof of the mortgage, the note, and evidence of Defendants' default in repayment (see U.S. Bank, N.A. v James, 180 A.D.3d 594 [1stDept 2020]; Bank of NY v Knowles, 151 A.D.3d 596 [1st Dept 2017]; Fortress Credit Corp, v Hudson' Yards, LLC, 78 A.D.3d 577 [1st Dept 2010]). Since Defendant Hazan raised lack of standing and failure to provide a contractual pre-foreclosure notice in the answer, Plaintiff was required to demonstrate its standing (see eg Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Tricario, 180 A.D.3d 848 [2nd Dept 2020]) as well as its substantial compliance with the requisites under paragraph 22 of the mortgage (see eg Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v McKenzie, 186 A.D.3d 1582, 1584 [2d Dept 2020]).
Proof supporting a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment must be in admissible form (see CPLR §3212[b]; Tri-State Loan Acquisitions III, LLC v Litkowski, 172 A.D.3d 780 [1st Dept 2019]). A plaintiff may rely on evidence from persons with personal knowledge of the facts, documents in admissible form and/or persons with knowledge derived from produced admissible records (see eg U.S. Bank N.A. v Moulton, 179 A.D.3d 734, 738 [2d Dept 2020]). No particular set of business records must be proffered, as long as the admissibility requirements of CPLR 4518[a] are fulfilled and the <records evince the facts for which they are relied upon (see eg Citigroup v Kopelowitz, 147 A.D.3d 1014, 1015 [2d Dept 2017]).
Plaintiff s motion was supported with an affidavit from Sherry Benight ("Benight"), an officer of Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("SPS"), the alleged servicing agent and attorney-in-fact for Plaintiff. Benight's affidavit laid a proper foundation for the admission of SPS's records into evidence under CPLR §4518 (see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Gordon, 171 A.D.3d 197 [2d Dept 2019]). The records of other entities were also admissible since Benight sufficiently established that those records were received from the makers and incorporated into the records SPS kept and routinely relied upon such documents in its business (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Kropp-Somoza, 191 A.D.3d 918 [2d Dept 2021]). Further, annexed to the motion were records referenced by Lozano (cf. Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Kirschenbaum, 187 A.D.3d 569 [1st Dept 2020]) as well as a power of attorney, dated December 7, 2011, demonstrating the authority of SPS to act on behalf of Plaintiff (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Silverman, 178 A.D.3d 898,901 [2d Dept 2019]).
Benight's affidavit and the referenced documents sufficiently evidenced the note and mortgage. As to the Mortgagor's default, it "is established by (1) an admission made in response to a notice to admit, (2) an affidavit from a person having personal knowledge of the facts, or (3) other evidence in admissible form" (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v McGann, 183 A.D.3d 700, 702 [2d Dept 2020]). Here, Benight's review of the attached account records demonstrated that the Mortgagor defaulted in repayment under the note (see eg ING Real Estate Fin. (USA) LLC v Park Ave. Hotel Acquisition, LLC, 89 A.D.3d506 [1st Dept 2011]).
As to standing in a foreclosure action, the note is the dispositive instrument (Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Taylor, 25 N.Y.3d 355, 361-362 [2015]). "'Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and the mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident'" (U.S. Bank N.A. v Carnivale, 138 A.D.3d 1220, 1221 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Onewest Bank, F.S.B. v Mazzone, 130 A.D.3d 1399, 1400 [2d Dept 2015]). However, "mere physical possession of a note at the: commencement of a foreclosure action is insufficient to confer standing or to make a plaintiff the lawful holder of a negotiable instrument for the purposes of enforcing the note" (U.S. Bank N.A. v Moulton, 179 A.D.3d 734, 737 [2d Dept 2020]). "Holder status is established where the plaintiff possesses a note that, on its face or by allonge, contains an indorsement in blank or bears a special indorsement payable to the order of the plaintiff' (Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Ostiguy, 127 A.D.3d 1375, 1376 [2d Dept 2015] [citations omitted]). The indorsement must be made either on the face of the note or on an allonge "so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof' (UCC §3-202[2]). "The attachment of a properly endorsed note to the complaint may be sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff is the holder of the note at the time of commencement" (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Webster, 142 A.D.3d 636, 638 [2d Dept 2016]; cf JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Grennan, supra).
In this case, Plaintiff annexed a copy of the note to the complaint which contained two endorsements in on its face. One endorsement transfers the note from Countrywide Bank, NA to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The other endorsement is in blank and is executed by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. This is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff was the holder of the note when the action was commenced (see Bank of NY v Knowles, supra at 597; cf U.S. Bank N.A. v. Rozo-Castellanos, 201 A.D.3d 995, 999 [2d Dept 2022]).
As to the contractual pre-foreclosure notice, paragraph 22 of the mortgage, a ubiquitous provision in residential mortgages, provides that as a prior to acceleration of the note, the lender must send a notice containing the information specified in paragraph 22[b][l] - [6] in the manner described in paragraph 15 of the mortgage. That section provides that all notices must be in writing and "is considered given to [Mortgagor] when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to my notice address if sent by other means . . . The notice address is the address of the Property unless I give notice to Lender of a different address". Paragraph 8 of the note also states that required notices will be given by delivering it... at the Property Address above or at a different address if I give the Note Holder a notice of my different address". That section also provides that "any notice that must be given to the Note Holder under this Note will be given by delivering it or by mailing it... to the Note Holder at the address stated in Section 3(A)".
The Court of Appeals has "has long recognized a party can establish that a notice or other document was sent through evidence of actual mailing or-as relevant here-by proof of a sender's routine business practice with respect to the creation, addressing, and mailing of documents of that nature" (Cit Bank N.A. v Schiffman, 36 N.Y.3d 550, 556 [2020][internal citations omitted]). Fulfillment of this requirement can raise a presumption that the required notice was sent and received by the projected addressee (id.). A satisfactory office practice giving rise to the presumption "must be geared so as to ensure the likelihood that [the] notice ... is always properly addressed and mailed" (Nassau Ins. Co. v Murray, 46 N.Y.2d 828, 830 [1978]). An affidavit from the person who performed the actual mailing is not necessary (see Bossuk v Steinberg, 58 N.Y.2d 916, 919 [1983]). Proof from a person with "personal knowledge of the practices utilized by the [sender] at the time of the alleged mailing" is sufficient (Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v Donnelly, 22 N.Y.3d 1169, 1170 [2014]). Here, Benight attested to personal knowledge of SPS's notice practices and procedures and, in this case, described the process of mailing default notices in adequate detail (United States Bank Trust, N.A. v Mehl, 195 A.D.3d 1054 [2d Dept 2021]; Citimortgage, Inc. v Ustick, 188 A.D.3d 793, 794 [2d Dept 2020]).
Regarding reformation of the condominium rider to the mortgage, "'[w]here there is no mistake about the agreement and the only mistake alleged is in the reduction of that agreement to writing, such mistake of the scrivener, or of either party, no matter how it occurred, may be corrected"' (Harris v Uhlendorf 24 N.Y.2d 463, 467 [1969], citing Born v Schrenkeisen, 110 NY 55, 59 [1888]). Therefore, "'[a] party seeking reformation of a contract by reason of mistake must establish, with clear and convincing evidence, that the contract was executed under mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake induced by the other party's fraudulent misrepresentation'" (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Zolotnitsky, 195 A.D.3d 659, 661 [2d Dept 2021], citing Yu Han Young v Chiu, 49 A.D.3d 535, 536 [2d Dept 2008]). Here, Plaintiff proffered evidence to support a mutual mistake occurred when the document identified the condominium project where the premises in located as "THE STERLING", rather than "The Spencer Condominium".
In opposition, the Defendants' arguments concerning standing are without merit. Since a copy of the note, with endorsements on its face, was annexed to the complaint, any assertions regarding the validity and timing of the assignments or physical delivery of the note are unavailing (see Mortgage Stanley Private Bank, N.A. v Ceccarelli, 210 A.D.3d 478 [1st Dept 2022] JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Weinberger, 142 A.D.3d 643 [2d Dept 2016]).
Defendants' Hazan and Holdings assertions that Hazan's bankruptcy discharge completely "wiped out" the mortgage lien is meritless. "Although a bankruptcy discharge extinguishes one mode of enforcing a note-namely, an action against the debtor in personam, it leaves intact another-namely, an action against the debtor in rem" (Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Arns, v Vitellas, 131 A.D.3d 52, 63 [2d Dept 2015]). As such, Hazan's "discharge in bankruptcy did not impair the plaintiffs ability to bring an action to foreclose the mortgage' (JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v Cantwell, 212 A.D.3d 720, 721 [2d Dept 2023]).
Hazan and Holdings' argument that Plaintiff was required by the loan documents to serve the pre-foreclosure notice at a location other than the mortgaged premises fails. Both the note and mortgage expressly provide that any required notice was to be served at the "address of the Property", which is the mortgaged premises. Further, Hazan and Holdings proffered no evidence that notice of a different address was served on the Mortgagee as provided in Section 8 of the mortgage. The claim that the "front page of the subject Note makes it quite clear that the address at which Defendant Hazan was to receive notice was 3201 NE 183rd Street, Aventura, FL" is not supported by that document. The Court could not find that address anywhere in the note. To the extent Hazan and Holdings were referring to the mortgage rather than the note, that document lists the above Aventura, Florida location as Hazan's address, but does not state that it is the property address or the notice address.
Hazan's single sentence argument that Plaintiffs action is barred by unclean hands and equitable estoppel fails as entirely conclusory.
Defendant 1 East posits that Plaintiff has not submitted admissible documentary evidence that Hazan defaulted in 2007. This argument is misplaced since the Appellate Division, First Department held that the dismissal of the prior action, which occurred on November 4, 2010, "invalidated the prior acceleration of the mortgage". Thus, installment defaults occurred continuously from 2007 until the debt was finally accelerated when this action was commenced in 2014. Since SPS began servicing this loan in 2011, Hazan's default in payment transpired, at least partially, while it SPS was the servicer, and its records are evidence of same.
1 East's claim that it is a bona fide purchaser value not bound by a judgment in this matter is without merit. Defendant 1 East claims that since it took title by a deed dated March 7, 2019, within the period when the matter was on appeal from Justice McMahon's dismissal, its title is not subject to the outcome of this litigation. This argument entirely misconstrues the process for cancellation of a notice of pendency under Article 65 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
As explained by the Court of Appeals "[o]nce the litigation has terminated in a final judgment dismissing the complaint, the status of the notice of pendency is governed by CPLR 6514 (a), which provides for its mandatory cancellation, 'upon motion of any person aggrieved,' when either the time for appealing has expired or, notwithstanding the pendency of a timely taken appeal, the enforcement of the adverse judgment or order has not been stayed pursuant to CPLR 5519" (Da Silva v Musso, 76 N.Y.2d 436, 440 [1990]; see also 551 W. Chelsea Partners LLC v 556 Holding LLC, 40 A.D.3d 546, 549 [1st Dept 2007]). Here, Plaintiff timely took, perfected, and succeeded on its appeal. Further, Defendant did not seek nor did Justice McMahon order cancellation of the notice of pendency. As such, the notice of' pendency never lapsed, Defendant 1 East took title with it subsisting and is bound by a judgment in this litigation.
1 East also argues that Plaintiffs third cause of action for reformation of the condominium rider to the mortgage is time barred and raises an issue of fact. The cause of action pled in the amended complaint seeks to correct an error in the condominium rider to the mortgage which incorrectly identifies the condominium project where the premises is located as "THE STERLING", rather than "The Spencer Condominium", its rightful name. Defendant is correct that "[a] cause of action seeking reformation of an instrument on the ground of mistake, including an alleged scrivener's error, is governed by the six-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 213 (6), which begins to run on the date the mistake was made" (Lopez v Lopez, 133 A.D.3d 722, 723 [2d Dept 2015]). In this case, the condominium rider, like the mortgage was executed on December 22, 2005, and this cause of action was not asserted until 2022, some 17 years later, making it untimely. Resort to the relation-back theory under CPLR §203 [f] is unavailable since the reformation cause of action still would have been time barred when the action was initially commenced in 2014 (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v McAvoy, 188 A.D.3d 808, 810 [2d Dept 2020]). Thus, least raised an issue of fact exists as to whether the third cause of action is time barred.
Nevertheless, Defendant 1 East does not explain how the reformation cause of action being time barred raises an issue of fact which precludes summary judgment on the foreclosure claim. The error is not in the note nor the mortgage per se, but in an addendum which delineates additional covenants which the borrower and lender must adhere to concerning the condominium project. Nowhere in any of the documents is the description of the property being foreclosed incorrect. Even in the condominium j rider, the address of the encumbered unit is accurate.
As to the branch of the motion to dismiss Defendants' affirmative defenses, CPLR §3211 [b] provides that '"[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the ground that a defense is not stated or has no merit". For example, affirmative defenses that are without factual foundation, conclusory or duplicative cannot stand (see Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v Vorobyov, 188 A.D.3d 803, 805 [2d Dept 2020]; Emigrant Bank v Myers, 147 A.D.3d 1027, 1028 [2d Dept 2017]). When evaluating such a motion, a "defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable intendment of its pleading, which is to be liberally construed. If there is any doubt as to the availability of a defense, it should not be dismissed" (Federici v Metropolis Night Club, Inc., 48 A.D.3d 741, 743 [2d Dept 2008]).
As pled, all the affirmative defenses, except certain of those related to statute of limitations, are entirely conclusory and unsupported by any facts in the answer. As such, these affirmative defenses are nothing more than unsubstantiated legal conclusions which are insufficiently pled as a matter of law (see Board of Mgrs. of Ruppert Yorkville Towers Condominium v Hayden, 169 A.D.3d 569 [1st Dept 2019]; see also Bosco Credit V Trust Series 2012-1 v. Johnson, 177 A.D.3d 561 [1st Dept 2020]; 170 W. Vil. Assoc, v. G &E Realty, Inc., 56 A.D.3d 372 [1st Dept 2008]; see also Becher v Feller, 64 A.D.3d 672 [2d Dept 2009]; Cohen Fashion Opt., Inc. v V & M Opt., Inc., 51 A.D.3d 619 [2d Dept 2008]). Further, to the' extent that specific legal arguments were not proffered in support of any affirmative defense, those defenses were abandoned (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Gonzalez, 172 A.D.3d 1273, 1275 [2d Dept 2019]; Flagstar Bank v Bellafiore, 94 A.D.3d 1044 [2d Dept 2012]; Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A v Perez, 41 A.D.3d 590 [2d Dept 2007]).
To the extent that the second affirmative defense pled by 1 East and the affirmative defense under paragraph 6 of Hazan and Holding's answer relate to the timeliness of Plaintiff s third cause of action to reform the condominium rider, those defenses are viable for the reasons stated supra. However, any affirmative defense that the cause of action for foreclosure is entirely barred by the statute of limitations fails based upon the determination of the First Department in U.S. Bank N.A. v Hazan, supra.
Concerning 1 East's first affirmative defense and East and the affirmative defense under paragraph 7 of Hazan and Holding's answer, these plead that certain installment payments and interest = thereon are barred by the statute of limitations. Based upon the determinations in the 2008 action and; the First Department herein, the Defendants have established, for pleading purposes, that the mortgage i debt may not have been accelerated until this action was commenced. Plaintiff claims that Hazan's ; default in repayment began on July 1, 2007. Given this action was commenced on July 1, 2014, it is conceivable that if no intervening acceleration occurred, installment payments and interest due before July 1, 2008, are time barred (see eg Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Limtcher, 193 A.D.3d 686 [2d Dept 2021]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Singer, 192 A.D.3d 1182 [2d Dept 2021]). Nevertheless, these affirmative defenses do not preclude summary judgment as they only relate to the amount due and owing (see 1855 E. Tremont Corp, v Collado Holdings LLC, 102 A.D.3d 567, 568 [1st Dept 2013]).
The branch of Plaintiff s motion for a default judgment against the non-appearing parties is granted (see CPLR §3215; SRMOFII2012-1 Trust v Telia, 139 A.D.3d 599, 600 [1st Dept 2016]).
The branch of Plaintiff s motion to amend the caption is granted (see generally CPLR §3025; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Laszio, 169 A.D.3d 885, 887 [2d Dept 2019]).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded summary judgment against the appearing parties and a default judgment against the non-appearing defendants; and it is further
ORDERED that all the affirmative defenses of Defendants Hazan, Holdings and 1 East are stricken except 1 East's first and second affirmative defenses as well as the affirmative defenses under paragraphs six and seven of Hazan and Holding's answer; and it is further
ORDERED that that Clark Whitsett, Esq., 108-26 Myrtle Avenue, Richmond Hill, NY 11418-1235 (718) 850-0003 is hereby appointed Referee in accordance with RPAPL § 1321 to compute the amount due to Plaintiff and examine whether the tax parcel can be sold in parcels; and it is further
ORDERED that in the discretion of the Referee, a hearing may be held, and testimony taken; and it is further
ORDERED that by accepting this appointment the Referee certifies that he is in compliance with Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Judge (22 NYCRR Part 36), including, but not limited to §36.2 (c) ("Disqualifications from appointment"), and §36.2 (d) ("Limitations on appointments based upon compensation"), and, if the Referee is disqualified from receiving an appointment pursuant to the provisions of that Rule, the Referee shall immediately notify the Appointing Judge; and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to CPLR 8003(a), and in the discretion of the court, a fee of $350 shall be paid to the Referee for the computation of the amount due and upon the filing of his report and the Referee shall not request or accept additional compensation for the computation unless it has been fixed by the court in accordance with CPLR 8003(b); and it is further
ORDERED that the Referee is prohibited from accepting or retaining any funds for himself or paying funds to himself without compliance with Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge; and it is further
ORDERED that if the Referee holds a hearing or is required to perform other significant sendees in issuing the report, the Referee may seek additional compensation at the Referee's usual and customary hourly rate; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff shall forward all necessary documents to the Referee and to defendants who have appeared in this case within 30 days of the date of this order and shall promptly respond to every inquiry made by the referee (promptly means within two business days); and it is further
ORDERED that if defendant(s) have objections, they must submit them to the referee within 14 days of the mailing of plaintiff s submissions; and include these objections to the Court if opposing the motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale; and it is further
ORDERED the failure by defendants to submit objections to the referee shall be deemed a waiver of objections before the Court on an application for a judgment of foreclosure and sale; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff must bring a motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale within 30 days of receipt of the referee's report; and it is further
ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to meet these deadlines, then the Court may sua sponte vacate this order and direct plaintiff to move again for an order of reference and the Court may sua sponte toll interest depending on whether the delays are due to plaintiff s failure to move this litigation forward; and it further
ORDERED that the caption of this action be further amended by removing the "John Doe #1" through "John Doe #10" defendants; and it is hereby further
ORDERED that the caption shall read as follows:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE, ON BEHALF OF THE HOLDERS OF THE HARBORVIEW MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-1 MORTGAGE LOAN PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-1, Plaintiff, -against
ELIZABETH HAZAN, REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS GROUP, L.D.C., MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., ACTING SOLELY AS A NOMINEE FOR AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER, THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS SUCCESSOR TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWHEQ REVOLVING HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2005-M, THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE SPENCER . CONDOMINIUM, NLG, LLC, NEW YORK CITY ; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, 1 EAST 62ND STREET APT 1A LLC,
AARONSON SCHANTZ BEILEY P.A., NEW YORK CITY ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL BOARD, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O/B/O INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendants.
Index No. 850240/2014
and it is further
ORDERED that counsel for plaintiff shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon the County Clerk (60 Centre Street, Room 141B) and the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street, Room 119), who are directed to mark the court's records to reflect the parties being removed pursuant hereto; and it is further
ORDERED that such service upon the County Clerk and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office shall be made in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the "E-Filing" page on the court's website at the address (www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh)]; and it is further
All parties are to appear for a virtual conference via Microsoft Teams on August 3, 2023, at 10:40 a.m. If a motion for judgment of foreclosure and sale has been filed Plaintiff may contact the Part Clerk Tamika Wright (tswright@,nycourt.gov) in writing to request that the conference be cancelled. If -a motion has not been made, then a conference is required to explore the reasons for the delay.