Opinion
2017–09285 Index No. 22751/06
09-30-2020
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, etc., respondent, v. Danielle MOSS, etc., appellant, et al., defendants.
Brody, O'Connor & O'Connor, New York, N.Y. (Scott A. Brody of counsel), for appellant. Reed Smith, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Brian P. Matthews and Diane A. Bettino of counsel), for respondent.
Brody, O'Connor & O'Connor, New York, N.Y. (Scott A. Brody of counsel), for appellant.
Reed Smith, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Brian P. Matthews and Diane A. Bettino of counsel), for respondent.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., HECTOR D. LASALLE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Danielle Moss appeals from a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Paul J. Baisley, Jr., J.), dated June 22, 2017. The judgment of foreclosure and sale, upon an order of the same court also dated June 22, 2017, granting the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale, inter alia, directed the sale of the subject property.
ORDERED that the judgment of foreclosure and sale is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the doctrine of the law of the case did not warrant denial of the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale. "The doctrine of law of the case seeks to prevent litigation of issues of law that have already been determined at an earlier stage of the proceeding" ( Brownrigg v. New York City Hous. Auth., 29 A.D.3d 721, 722, 815 N.Y.S.2d 681 ; see Wolf Props. Assoc., L.P. v. Castle Restoration, LLC, 174 A.D.3d 838, 842, 106 N.Y.S.3d 313 ). The law of the case doctrine applies "only to legal determinations that were necessarily resolved on the merits in a prior decision" ( Brownrigg v. New York City Hous. Auth., 29 A.D.3d at 722, 815 N.Y.S.2d 681 ; see Ramanathan v. Aharon, 109 A.D.3d 529, 530, 970 N.Y.S.2d 574 ) and "to the same questions presented in the same case" ( Erickson v. Cross Ready Mix, Inc., 98 A.D.3d 717, 717, 950 N.Y.S.2d 175 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Ramanathan v. Aharon, 109 A.D.3d at 530, 970 N.Y.S.2d 574 ). The doctrine "forecloses reexamination of [an issue previously determined] absent a showing of newly discovered evidence or a change in the law" ( Kaygreen Realty Co., LLC v. IG Second Generation Partners, L.P., 116 A.D.3d 667, 669, 983 N.Y.S.2d 293 ).
Here, the plaintiff demonstrated a change in the law subsequent to the Supreme Court's order dated May 13, 2014, denying the plaintiff's motion to vacate an order of reference dated February 5, 2007, to substitute a newly proffered affidavit of merit in place of the affidavit of merit submitted with the plaintiff's motion for an order of reference, and for a new order of reference (see U.S. Bank v. Eaddy, 109 A.D.3d 908, 971 N.Y.S.2d 336 ; see also U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Steele, 142 A.D.3d 1161, 39 N.Y.S.3d 178 ; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Lawson, 134 A.D.3d 760, 20 N.Y.S.3d 624 ).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a judgment of foreclosure and sale.
LEVENTHAL, J.P., LASALLE, BRATHWAITE NELSON and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.