Opinion
EP-06-CA-285-PRM.
October 16, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Alfonso Urias's ("Urias") "Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus" ("Petition") [Docket No. 1], filed through counsel on August 15, 2006. In his Petition, Urias raises one ground for relief, asserting that Texas's Eighth Court of Appeals unreasonably determined that evidence of a purported extraneous offense was part of the charged offense. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will dismiss Urias's Petition.
I. BACKGROUND A. Urias's State Trial Proceedings
State v. Urias, No. 20030D02995 (34th Impact Court, El Paso County, Tex. June 24, 2003).
On June 24, 2003, an El Paso County grand jury indicted Urias for the unlawful possession of marijuana in an amount greater than fifty pounds, but less than two thousand pounds. The indictment was based upon a May 12, 2003, occurrence involving approximately 340 pounds of marijuana.
Pl.'s Supp. Mem. of Facts Law, App. Ex. 5.
At trial, over Urias's objection, the court admitted testimony provided by an undercover agent for the Texas Department of Public Safety ("DPS"), Sergeant Jose Sanchez ("Sanchez"). In his testimony, Sanchez described a May 12, 2003, mid-day meeting with Urias and two co-defendants. Sanchez posed as a truck driver willing to transport approximately five hundred pounds of marijuana from El Paso, Texas, to Ohio. Sanchez suggested packing the marijuana in duffel bags to facilitate loading and unloading. Urias claimed the meeting's participants never reached an agreement regarding this marijuana shipment:
Id. at 7.
Urias v. State, 2006 WL 429584 at *5 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, pet. ref'd).
Id. at *1.
Id.
[N]o agreement was ever made . . . as to the price undercover officer Sanchez was to be paid for delivering a truckload of marihuana from El Paso, Texas to an unspecified location in Ohio. Further, undercover officer Sanchez' [ sic] testimony reveals that the parties were unable at this point to agree as to the size of the load of marijuana Sanchez would deliver or on the date and time Sanchez was to deliver the load to Ohio.
Pl.'s Supp. Mem. of Facts Law at 6.
In his objection at trial to Sanchez's testimony, Urias argued that since the participants failed to reach an agreement, the prosecution could not connect the meeting with the charged marijuana offense. Urias asserted that under Texas law, evidence of an extraneous wrongful act was not admissible to prove the character of a defendant or establish that a defendant acted accordingly regarding an alleged offense. Thus, according to Urias, evidence of his extraneous meeting with the undercover agent was inadmissible.
Urias, 2006 WL 429584 at *5.
Id.; see TEX. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon timely request by the accused in a criminal case, reasonable notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in the State's case-in-chief such evidence other than that arising in the same transaction."); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 386 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Lazcano v. State, 836 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, pet. ref'd).
Urias, 2006 WL 429584 at *5; Pl.'s Supp. Mem. of Facts Law at 7, 8.
The State countered that evidence of the meeting did not relate to an extraneous offense, but was instead part of the charged offense. The State also noted that according to Texas law, evidence which logically served such purposes as "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident" is relevant beyond its tendency to prove conforming character.
Pl.'s Supp. Mem. of Facts Law at 10.
Urias, 2006 WL 429584 at *6; TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387; Lazcano, 836 S.W.2d at 657.
Trial testimony also revealed that after Urias's meeting with Sanchez, a surveillance unit followed Urias and his two co-defendants to a house on El Paso's west side. A short time later, the unit watched Urias drive to a Ross Department Store and return to the house with a shopping bag containing duffel bags. The surveillance unit then observed Urias and a co-defendant loading five or six full duffel bags into a car. They watched as Urias drove the car a short distance to a red 1992 Nissan 2400 SX with Chihuahua license plates and unloaded the duffel bags into the car. About an hour later, the surveillance unit saw a green Camaro arrived at the house and the driver went inside. Shortly thereafter, Urias, the Camero's driver, and another man were seen leaving the house. At 2:24 p.m., the surveillance unit watched as the Camaro's driver got into the Nissan and left. DPS troopers followed and stopped the Nissan on I-10 East after observing the driver commit a traffic violation. Upon approaching the vehicle, a trooper observed three duffle bags and smelled a strong odor of fresh marijuana.
Urias, 2006 WL 429584 at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
A jury found Urias guilty as charged in the indictment on October 25, 2004. State Impact Court Judge Herb Cooper sentenced Urias to four years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. B. The Eighth Court of Appeals Opinion
Pl.'s Supp. Mem. of Facts Law, Ex. 1.
Id.
Urias v. State, No. 08-04-00343-CR, 2006 WL 429584 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, pet. ref'd).
On direct appeal, Urias argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Urias's meeting with the undercover officer. Urias claimed testimony concerning the meeting with Sanchez constituted inadmissible extraneous offense evidence. In its February 23, 2006, opinion, the Eighth Court of Appeals rejected Urias's argument, reasoning, "the trial court could have reasonably inferred that the negotiation which took place that morning was directly connected to the charged offense . . ." The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the evidence of the meeting was relevant, and that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value. The Court of Criminal Appeals refused Urias's petition for discretionary review on June 21, 2006. C. Urias's Petition for Relief From a Conviction or Sentence by a Person in State Custody
Pl.'s Supp. Mem. of Facts Law at 8.
Urias, 2006 WL 429584 at *6.
Id.; see TEX. R. EVID. 401 ("`Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); TEX. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
Urias v. State, Case No. PD-0484-06, (Tex.Crim.App. Jun. 21, 2006, pet. ref'd).
In his instant Petition, Urias raises but one ground for relief. He asserts the Court of Appeals based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts by finding an extraneous offense (the meeting with the undercover agent) was part of the charged offense (possession of marijuana).
Pl.'s Pet. at 6.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") comprehensively overhauled federal habeas corpus legislation, including 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Amended subsections 2254(d)(1) and (2) contain revised standards of review for questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions of law and fact. Provided that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits, a federal district court reviews pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact under section 2254(d)(1), and questions of fact under section 2254(d)(2).
Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000).
As to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, section 2254(d)(1) allows for relief if a federal court finds that a relevant decision of the convicting or sentencing state court hinged upon an unreasonable application of established federal law. "Under subpart (d)(1) of § 2254, `unreasonable' does not mean merely incorrect. `[A]n application [by the state court] of clearly established Supreme Court precedent must be incorrect and unreasonable to warrant federal habeas relief.'" Thus, a federal court must defer to the state court's decision unless it "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." The United States Supreme Court has explained:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (West 2006).
Garcia v. Dretke, 388 F.3d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis and bracketed text in original; internal and end citations omitted).
§ 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses have independent meaning. A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court may grant relief under the "unreasonable application" clause if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [ v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (citations omitted).
Section 2254(d)(2)'s provisions reflect a second method by which a petitioner may seek habeas relief. "Section 2254(d)(2) addresses pure questions of fact. Under this subsection, federal courts must give deference to state court findings of fact unless they are based on an unreasonable interpretation of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." To prevail under section 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must rebut by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that a state court's factual findings are correct. Thus, a state tribunal's factual findings are presumed to be correct, and a federal court will defer to the state court's decision unless it "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."
Brewer v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal and end citations omitted).
Foster v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 776 (5th Cir. 2002); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)) (providing that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.").
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ; see also Hill, 210 F.3d at 485 ("[W]e will give deference to the state court's decision unless it `was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'").
In Jackson v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit set forth a standard to measure whether habeas relief can be granted based on the erroneous admission of evidence at trial. The Jackson court held:
194 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 1999).
In habeas actions, [a federal court does] not sit to review the admissibility of evidence under state law unless erroneous evidentiary rulings were so extreme as to result in a denial of a constitutionally fair proceeding. Thus, the erroneous admission of prejudicial testimony does not justify habeas relief unless the evidence played a "crucial, critical, and highly significant" role in the jury's determination.III. ANALYSIS
Id. at 656 (citation omitted); see Bryson v. State of Ala., 634 F.2d 862, 865 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining that an erroneous evidentiary ruling permitting the introduction of evidence of prior criminal acts was a "crucial, critical, highly significant factor" in the jury's decision to impose a sentence thirty years greater than the statutory minimum thereby entitling petitioner to habeas corpus relief from the sentence).
In his Petition, Urias challenges the appellate court's determination that the trial court reasonably inferred that the meeting between Urias, his co-defendants, and a DPS undercover agent directly related to the charged marijuana offense. Urias's challenge raises a question of fact, and the Court must defer to the state court's findings of fact unless Urias can show by clear and convincing evidence that the findings are based by an unreasonable interpretation of the evidence.
Foster, 293 F.3d at 776.
The evidence shows that immediately following the meeting with Sanchez, Urias obtained duffel bags for packing marijuana in the manner Sanchez suggested. Further, Urias loaded the duffel bags, containing 340 pounds of marijuana, into a vehicle for delivery that same afternoon. The trial court could reasonably infer that Urias's meeting with Sanchez was directly connected to the charged offense.
Even assuming the trial court erred, the State presented substantial other evidence showing Urias exercised care, custody, control and management of a significant amount of marijuana on the date alleged in the indictment. DPS surveillance units observed Urias leave a house, drive to a department store, and return with duffle bags. A short time later, they observed Urias again leave the house with six filled duffel bags, load them into a car, and drive them to a nearby red Nissan. Urias then transferred the duffel bags into the Nissan. Still later, troopers following the Nissan stopped the car and discovered it contained duffle bags emitting the strong odor of fresh marijuana.
The Court concludes Urias has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the trial court based the challenged ruling on an unreasonable interpretation of the evidence. Further, the Court concludes that given the immense quantity of incriminating evidence presented at trial, the testimony concerning the meeting was not "crucial, critical, or highly significant" to the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the Court concludes Urias's extrinsic-offense claim does not entitle him to federal habeas relief.
Jackson, 194 F.3d at 656 (denying habeas relief where, in addition to the disputed testimony, the prosecutor presented other evidence concerning whether the defendant would continue to threaten society); Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432, 1445 (5th Cir. 1985) (denying habeas relief where, given the immense quantity of incriminating evidence presented at trial, the disputed evidence could hardly be considered a "crucial, critical, highly significant factor" in defendant's conviction).
IV. CONCLUSIONS ORDERS
After carefully reviewing the Petition in this cause, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the state court's findings and evidentiary rulings are correct. Accordingly, the Court enters the following orders:
1. Petitioner Alfonso Urias's "Petition for Relief From a Conviction or Sentence by a Person in State Custody" [Docket No. 1], filed on August 15, 2006, is summarily DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. All pending motions in this cause, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.
SO ORDERED.