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Urena v. New York City Transit Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 2, 1998
248 A.D.2d 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)

Opinion

March 2, 1998

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.).


Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

The plaintiff alleged that he was injured when he slipped on ice while exiting the street-level subway station on Bogart Street in Brooklyn at approximately 8:00 A.M. on January 18, 1994. The exit where the accident occurred was closed overnight from 8:00 P.M. until 6:30 A.M. According to the plaintiff, at the time of his accident, ice extended into the station from the exit. He did not notice any ice in the station the previous day, during which a storm was in progress. Climatological data presented by the parties showed that precipitation, including snow and ice pellets, commenced at about 10:00 A.M. on January 17, 1994, and continued until approximately 4:00 A.M. on January 18, 1994.

The plaintiff claimed that he fell on ice inside the station doorway. Neither the New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the TA) nor the plaintiff offered any evidence to refute the City's contention that the TA was responsible for maintenance of the subway station pursuant to the terms of its lease with the City. The plaintiff's contention that the icy condition inside the station was caused by the melting and refreezing of water from accumulated ice, which the City failed to remove from the adjacent public sidewalk for several days, is based entirely on speculation and provides no basis for imposing liability on the City (see, Jornov v. Ace Suzuki Sales Serv., 232 A.D.2d 855; see also, Simmons v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.2d 972; Grillo v. New York City Tr. Auth., 214 A.D.2d 648).

To establish a prima facie case of negligence as to the TA, the plaintiff must establish that the TA had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and a reasonably sufficient time from the end of the storm which created the condition to remedy it (see, Fuks v. New York City Tr. Auth., 243 A.D.2d 678; Bertman v. Board of Mgrs., 233 A.D.2d 283; Boyko v. Limowski, 223 A.D.2d 962; Arcuri v. Vitolo, 196 A.D.2d 519). On this record, any finding that the ice was present either at 4:00 A.M. when the storm ceased, or at 6:30 A.M., when a TA employee unlocked the Bogart Street exit, would be based on speculation (see, Bertman v. Board of Mgrs., supra; see also, Simmons v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra). Even assuming that the TA had notice of the icy condition when the storm ceased, we agree with the Supreme Court that, as a matter of law, the TA did not have a reasonably sufficient time to remedy the condition prior to the plaintiff's accident at 8:00 A.M. in view of the fact that the storm ended at approximately 4:00 A.M. and this particular station entrance was not opened until 6:30 A.M.

O'Brien, J. P., Sullivan, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Urena v. New York City Transit Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 2, 1998
248 A.D.2d 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
Case details for

Urena v. New York City Transit Authority

Case Details

Full title:JUAN URENA, Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al.…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Mar 2, 1998

Citations

248 A.D.2d 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
669 N.Y.S.2d 662

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