Opinion
No. C-07-04427 RMW.
July 25, 2008
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [Re Docket Nos. 17, 18]
Plaintiff Eisha Ur-Rahman moves for leave to submit a first amended complaint. Defendant RadioShack Corp. opposes the request. The court has read the moving and responding papers and considered the arguments of counsel. For the following reasons, the court grants the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 12, 2007, Ms. Ur-Rahman filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. See Decl. of Shanna McDaniel, Ex. A. In her complaint, Ms. Ur-Rahman alleged that her employer, RadioShack, laid her off and denied her pregnancy accommodation because "[she] took FMLA and have 2 small children." Id. On April 27, 2007, the Department closed Ms. Ur-Rahman's file and granted her a right-to-sue letter. Id. Ms. Ur-Rahman's lawyer then filed the current complaint in Santa Clara County Superior Court on May 18, 2007, alleging that Ms. Ur-Rahman had been unfairly terminated based on her gender and because RadioShack preferred to employ men. See id., ¶¶ 6-7. RadioShack removed the case to this court on August 27, 2007. See Docket No. 1.
The court held its initial case management conference on January 25, 2008. In preparation, the parties filed a joint case management conference statement, which asserted that "Plaintiff does not expect to amend her complaint at this time." See Docket No. 10, at 2 (Jan. 18, 2008).
Less than a month later, Ms. Ur-Rahman's counsel began seeking to amend the complaint. On February 21, 2008, he mailed a letter to opposing counsel requesting that the parties stipulate to allow him to assert additional retaliation claims based on Ms. Ur-Rahman's leave of absence from work under the Family and Medical Leave Act. See Reply Decl. of Peter Lamberto, Ex. B. Ms. Ur-Rahman's counsel informed RadioShack regarding his desire to amend the pleadings prior to any depositions, and he offered to permit additional written discovery. Id. RadioShack did not respond to the request. Id. ¶ 3.
On April 18, 2008, Ms. Ur-Rahman's counsel filed the pending motion for leave to amend the complaint. See Docket No. 15. By this point, the parties had exchanged written discovery and appear to have conducted two depositions. See McDaniel Decl. ¶¶ 4, 8, 9.
II. ANALYSIS
"[A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). RadioShack failed to respond to Ms. Ur-Rahman's request for consent and now opposes her request for leave from the court. Rule 15 instructs the court to "freely give leave when justice so requires." Id. Various factors may support denying leave to amend, but prejudice to the defendant is the most important consideration. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (suggesting that courts consider any "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc."). To be clear, Rule 15 requires the court to give leave "with extreme liberality." Id.
Despite this "extreme liberality" standard, RadioShack opposes Ms. Ur-Rahman's motion. RadioShack argues that she has unduly delayed in seeking to amend her complaint, and that permitting amendment after this delay will substantially prejudice RadioShack. RadioShack begins by pointing out that Ms. Ur-Rahman knew she had taken medical leave before she was laid off and even mentioned it as what she believed caused her termination in her complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. Despite this knowledge, it took her almost a year to recognize that she had not alleged a claim for wrongful termination based on her leave.
RadioShack relies on various Ninth Circuit decisions affirming the denial of leave to amend where a party was aware of the need to amend its claims for more than eight months. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951-54 (9th Cir. 2006); Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1991). The court does not find those cases persuasive because the facts of AmerisourceBergen and Texaco differ markedly from Ms. Ur-Rahman's case. In Texaco, the movant had waited "eight months after the district court granted summary judgment against it, and nearly two years after filing the initial complaint." 939 F.3d at 798-99. In this case, the complaint has been on file for slightly more than a year and the court has not made any substantive rulings. In AmerisourceBergen, the court determined that the movant had known of the requisite facts for over 15 months and done nothing. 464 F.3d at 953. Here, only ten months had passed when Ms. Ur-Rahman began to seek leave to amend her complaint. The AmerisourceBergen case involved allegations of new facts toward the end of a lawsuit, and exploring new facts would have prejudiced the defendants. See id. at 953-54. As explained below, that is not the case here. While Ms. Ur-Rahman could have alleged her claims in her first complaint, the court does not believe that her delay in doing so is "undue."
RadioShack also argues that it will be unfairly prejudiced if Ms. Ur-Rahman is allowed to amend her complaint because it may have to conduct additional discovery. The court has no sympathy for this argument. Prior to taking any depositions, RadioShack knew Ms. Ur-Rahman sought to amend her complaint and refused to respond to her request. Nevertheless, RadioShack could have explored these topics in the depositions. RadioShack also complains that it "has exhausted court imposed limits on written discovery." This is irrelevant because Ms. Ur-Rahman offered to permit additional discovery in her initial request to RadioShack. Moreover, it is within the court's power to permit additional discovery.
In passing, RadioShack suggests that allowing amendment would be "futile," but also suggests that the motion is "an attempt to avoid RadioShack's motion for summary judgment." First, these two arguments are irreconcilable. If the amendment were futile, RadioShack could still obtain summary judgment. If Ms. Ur-Rahman's amendment truly would avoid summary judgment, it cannot be said that the amendment would be "futile." Second, RadioShack has not yet filed a motion for summary judgment. It is difficult to conceive how Ms. Ur-Rahman could "avoid" something that does not yet exist.
Based on Ms. Ur-Rahman's delay in asserting her new claim, the court cannot conclude that RadioShack's refusal to consent to her request to amend her complaint was objectively unreasonable. Nonetheless, this is a dispute that did not have to happen, and any prejudice that has redounded to RadioShack is of its own making.