Opinion
01 Civ. 7677 (SAS) (HBP)
October 2, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
By letter dated August 5, 2002, plaintiff seeks reconsideration of my discovery orders in this matter dated July 16, 2002. Plaintiff's application is denied.
Motions for reconsideration are appropriate only in limited circumstances.
Motions for reargument "are granted when new facts come to light or when it appears that controlling precedents were overlooked." Weissman v. Fruchtman, 658 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The proponent of such a motion is not supposed to treat the court's initial decision as the opening of a dialogue in which that party may then use [Local Civil Rule 6.3] to advance new facts and theories in response to the court's rulings. The purpose of the rule is "to ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters." Lewis v. New York Telephone, No. 83 Civ. 7129, slip op. at 2, 1986 WL 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) cited in Carolco Pictures Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).McMahan Co. v. Donaldson, Lufkin Jenrette Securities Corp., 727 F. Supp. 833, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
"[T]o be entitled to reargument under Local [Civil Rule 6.3], [a party] must demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before the Court on the underlying motion."American Alliance Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 163 F.R.D. 211, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 92 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 1996),citing Ameritrust Co., N.A. v. Dew, 151 F.R.D. 237, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);Fulani v. Brad, 149 F.R.D. 501, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd sub nom., Fulani v. Bentsen, 35 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1994); East Coast Novelty Co. v. City of New York, 141 F.R.D. 245, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); B.N.E. Swedbank, S.A. v. Banker, 791 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Novak v. National Broad, Co., 760 F. Supp. 47, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Ashley Meadows Farm, Inc. v. American Horse Shows Ass'n, 624 F. Supp. 856, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Thus, "a party in its motion for reargument `may not advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the court.'" In re Integrated Resources Real Estate Limited Partnerships Sec. Litig., 850 F. Supp. 1105, 1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), quoting Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 6447, 1989 WL 162315 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1989). Accord Caribbean Trading Fidelity Corp. v. Nigerian Nat'l. Petroleum Corp., 948 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Woodard v. Hardenfelder, 845 F. Supp. 960, 966 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Motions for reargument should not be used to permit a party "to reargue those issues already considered when a party does not like the way the original motion was resolved." In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Plaintiff fails to cite any controlling factual or legal matters that were overlooked in my oral decisions of July 15, 2002 and written Order dated July 16, 2002. Thus, plaintiff has failed to show any valid basis for reconsideration.
One aspect of plaintiff's motion does, however, deserve brief comment. Plaintiff objects to that portion of my Order directing the production of tax returns on the ground that I improperly ordered the creation of document in response to a Rule 34 request. Curiously, plaintiff cites no federal authorities in support of its position. Nevertheless, assuming without deciding, that New York law and federal law on this point is identical, see Stevens v. Omega Protein, Inc., Civ. A. 00-3326, 2002 WL 1022507 at *3 (E.D. La. May 16, 2002); Ralph Oldsmobile Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 99 Civ. 4567 (AGS), 2002 WL 362796 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2002); Harris v. Athol-Royalston Regional Sch. Dist. Comm., 200 F.R.D. 18, 20 (D. Mass. 2001), I do not believe my ruling is improper. The obligation to create the tax returns does not arise from my ruling; it arises independently from the requirements of Internal Revenue Code. My ruling merely affects when the plaintiffs must comply with their independent legal obligation to prepare and file tax returns, or, stated differently, prevents the plaintiffs from relying on extensions issued by the Internal Revenue Service to avoid their discovery obligations. Since my Order merely affects the timing of the preparation of the tax returns and does not create an independent obligation to prepare the returns, I have not ordered plaintiffs to produce documents that they would otherwise have not duty to prepare.