Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1610-12T3
02-07-2014
UNIVERSAL MISSIONARY PENTECOSTAL ASSEMBLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NJ CONFERENCE OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS, INC., Defendant-Respondent, and FABLEV, LLC, and LIFE CENTER ACADEMY, Defendants.
Harold Poltrock, P.C., attorneys for appellant (Dara L. Poltrock, on the brief). Matthew T. Bach, attorney for respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fisher and Espinosa.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-1637-11.
Harold Poltrock, P.C., attorneys for appellant (Dara L. Poltrock, on the brief).
Matthew T. Bach, attorney for respondent. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Universal Missionary Pentecostal Assembly commenced this action on April 21, 2011, against defendant NJ Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, and others, seeking damages as a result of a dispute about possession of real property in Plainfield. The merits of the action are not before us because the judge dismissed the action on procedural grounds. We reverse and remand.
The complaint also names Fablev, LLC, and Life Center Academy as defendants. Because the complaint was dismissed in its entirety, we assume that finality was achieved in the trial court even though these other defendants apparently have yet to participate.
The record reveals that plaintiff's corporate charter was revoked in 1987. Defendant successfully argued that this circumstance deprived plaintiff of the right to sue, resulting in entry of an order of dismissal in defendant's favor on September 14, 2012. On September 21, 2012, plaintiff obtained the reinstatement of its corporate charter and moved, on October 15, 2012, pursuant to Rule 4:49-2, for reconsideration. The motion judge denied plaintiff's motion solely because it was filed beyond Rule 4:49-2's twenty-day limit, a time-bar that may not be enlarged, Rule 1:3-4(c).
In its appellate brief, plaintiff does not appear to argue the judge's disposition - as far as it went - was erroneous. Instead, plaintiff refers to the brief it filed in response to defendant's opposition to reconsideration, in which plaintiff, for the first time, urged Rule 4:50-1 as authority for the relief sought and argues the motion judge erred by failing to mention or consider plaintiff's right to relief under Rule 4:50-1. Defendant argues the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to consider Rule 4:50-1 because plaintiff's reply brief contained the first invocation of that Rule.
We commence examination of the order under review - the order denying reconsideration of the order of dismissal - by considering the scope of Rule 4:49-2, which provides a litigant with the opportunity to convince a trial court that it should reconsider its ruling based on "a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred." As we held in Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401-02 (Ch. Div. 1990)), the Rule encompasses only those circumstances that "fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." In short, Rule 4:49-2 provides a litigant with the opportunity to convince the trial court that a critical mistake was made based on what was before the trial court at the time of the ruling. The Rule does not present an occasion for a litigant to offer newly-discovered evidence or proof of a subsequent change in circumstances that militates against allowing the prior ruling to stand; these are matters to be considered by way of a Rule 4:50 motion, which expressly encompasses those circumstances. Rule 4:50-1(b) permits relief from a final judgment or order based on "newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial[.]" And Rule 4:50-1(e) permits relief when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application," a provision that authorizes relief when subsequent events have altered the status quo and rendered inequitable the continued enforcement of the prior order. See Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 285-86 (1994); Jersey City Mgmt. v. Garcia, 321 N.J. Super. 543, 545-46 (App. Div. 1999).
Our point in distinguishing the scope of Rules 4:49-2 and 4:50-1 is to demonstrate that plaintiff's motion - the goal of which was to undo the dismissal order because plaintiff's right to sue had been subsequently restored - was not cognizable by way of the former rule, only the latter. Consequently, although the trial judge was certainly correct in determining that plaintiff's right to seek Rule 4:49-2 relief had expired, that ruling was irrelevant.
We also pause to recognize the difference between a judge's reconsideration of a final order and the authority of a judge to revisit an interlocutory order at any time in the interest of justice prior to entry of final judgment. The former is governed by Rule 4:49-2, and its intractable time frame, while the latter is governed by Rule 4:42-2, which has no time limit so long as finality is not achieved in the trial court, and may be invoked at any time for a host of reasons. See Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 534-35 (2011).
Although plaintiff proceeded under the wrong rule, the judge's obligation was to consider the substance of the motion, not its label. See Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 390 (1984) (finding, in similar circumstances, a litigant's failure to "mention" Rule 4:49-2 was not a bar to the trial court's consideration of that Rule because the motion "in substance" incorporated the grounds for relief permitted by that Rule); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garden State Surgical Ctr., L.L.C., 413 N.J. Super. 513, 523-24 (App. Div. 2010); Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 348-49 (Ch. Div.), aff'd o.b., 33 N.J. 72 (1960). Plaintiff sought relief from the prior order based on the retroactive restoration of its corporate status. That event occurred after the judge's prior ruling. Whether viewed as newly-discovered evidence or a change in circumstances, the application should have been governed by Rule 4:50-1; the judge's denial of Rule 4:49-2 relief, although legally correct, is not dispositive.
In essence, our approach to the court rules should be guided by the sage advice of Marcus Aurelius: "Of everything that presents itself unto thee, to consider what the true nature of it is, and to unfold it, as it were, by dividing it into that which is formal; that which is material" and, ultimately, to ascertain "the true use or end of it." Marcus Aurelius Meditations Book XII, paragraph xiv.
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As we have noted, the judge made no mention of Rule 4:50-1 in his written decision. Although we would ordinarily remand for the judge's examination of plaintiff's application in light of that Rule, we find, on the present record, no rational ground for denying plaintiff's application. But we also recognize the matter was never addressed in the trial court and, in fairness to defendant, plaintiff's late invocation of Rule 4:50-1 may have deprived defendant of the opportunity to present grounds for denial of that relief. We thus remand for further consideration of that Rule's application.
In remanding, however, we first reject any contention that plaintiff failed to move expeditiously for relief in the trial court. Plaintiff's motion was filed on October 15, 2012, thirty-one days after the action was dismissed. Plaintiff provided proof of the restoration of its corporate status — revocation was the only ground for dismissal — and N.J.S.A. 14A:4-5(7) declares that such a restoration "relates back to the date of issuance of the proclamation revoking the certificate of incorporation or the certificate of authority and shall validate all actions taken in the interim." In short, plaintiff had its standing to sue restored retroactively and it moved rapidly for relief.
We also note the absence of any competing policy that would suggest plaintiff's claim should be forever lost as a result of the past revocation of its corporate status. To the contrary, the Legislature's clear declaration that a restoration of corporate status is to be given retroactive application constitutes a strong public policy in favor of the relief plaintiff sought that ought not easily be overcome. But a consideration of plaintiff's application, in light of Rule 4:50-1(e), requires a further determination of whether the denial of relief "will result in 'extreme' and 'unexpected' hardship." Hous. Auth. of Morristown, supra, 135 N.J. at 285 (internal citations omitted). The record on appeal precludes any clear understanding of what would be lost to plaintiff if summary judgment was not vacated or how defendant would be injured — beyond the obvious but irrelevant fact that it might be required to further defend and litigate this case on its merits — if relief were granted. We, thus, remand for a consideration of the parties' relative hardships.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION