Opinion
NO. 2019-CA-000648-MR NO. 2019-CA-000889-MR
03-20-2020
UNIVERSITY RADIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.S.C.; UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, INC.; AND MICHAEL GOODE APPELLANTS v. RONALD SATTENBERG, M.D. APPELLEE AND UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, INC. APPELLANT v. RONALD SATTENBERG, M.D. APPELLEE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: Clay M. Stevens Kristen H. Fowler K. Shay Owens Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: William D. Nefzger Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BRIAN C. EDWARDS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 12-CI-003326 OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
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BEFORE: COMBS, KRAMER AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES. KRAMER, JUDGE: On August 12, 2011, Dr. Ronald Sattenberg allegedly tripped over exposed cords and sustained injuries in the office space on the premises of the Department of Radiology at the University Medical Center (UMC). At the time, he was employed by both University Radiological Associates, P.S.C. ("URA") and the University of Louisville ("U of L"). He filed a negligence and premises liability action in Jefferson Circuit Court against UMC on June 14, 2012, and later amended his complaint on August 13, 2012, to add additional defendants, including U of L and URA. He also sought workers' compensation benefits from both employers, which U of L voluntarily paid. URA denied his claim by asserting that his injuries occurred outside the scope of his URA employment.
URA initially sought summary judgment from the circuit court on February 14, 2014, contending it was immune from tort liability pursuant to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act because an employer-employee relationship existed between itself and Sattenberg and because URA had secured workers' compensation insurance at the time of Sattenberg's alleged injuries. Its motion was granted in a final and appealable order of August 11, 2014. However, this Court reversed. Specifically, we explained that for the exclusive remedy provision to have properly applied, Sattenberg's injuries must also have been related to his work for URA; and we directed the circuit court to address, on remand, the question of whether Sattenberg's injuries were clearly sustained within the course and scope of his employment with URA. See Sattenberg v. Radiological Assoc's., P.S.C., 2016-CA-000053-MR, 2017 WL 652133 at *2-3 (Ky. App. Feb. 17, 2017) (unpublished).
Following remand, URA renewed its summary judgment motion. Additionally, appellees UMC and Michael Goode filed their own motion for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to exclusive remedy immunity via the up-the-ladder provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Michael Goode was employed exclusively by UMC at the time of the events at issue.
In Kentucky, "up-the-ladder immunity" refers to a contractor's immunity from tort lawsuits where the plaintiff was injured at work and workers' compensation benefits are the plaintiff's exclusive remedy under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.690. See General Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579, 585 (Ky. 2007) ("If premises owners are 'contractors' as defined in KRS 342.610(2)(b), they are deemed to be the statutory, or 'up-the-ladder,' employers of individuals who are injured while working on their premises and are liable for workers' compensation benefits unless the individuals' immediate employers . . . have provided workers' compensation coverage. If deemed to be 'contractors,' the owners, like any other employers, are immune from tort liability [exclusive remedy immunity] with respect to work-related injuries whether or not the immediate employer actually provided workers' compensation coverage.").
But, the circuit court denied their motions. With respect to URA's motion, the circuit court reiterated in the relevant part of its March 25, 2019 order that "the ultimate question here is whether the record reflects the existence of undisputable evidence that Dr. Sattenberg was acting under the course and scope of his employment with URA when he was injured." Holding that summary judgment was improper, it further explained there was "controverted evidence regarding the scope of Dr. Sattenberg's employment at the time of his fall and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, the Court must therefore deny" URA's motion.
With respect to UMC's and Goode's motion, which the circuit court disposed of by way of a May 15, 2019 order, the circuit court noted the prerequisites for applying up-the-ladder immunity. And, it stated in the relevant part of its order that the evidence conflicted in that respect, explaining "there are issues of material fact regarding UMC's workers' compensation insurance on the day that Dr. Sattenberg was injured, and whether UMC hired doctors as contractors in the 'regular and recurrent' manner that the legislature intended when enacting KRS 342.610(2)(b)."
Thereafter, both URA and UMC appealed. Upon review, we dismiss their appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
Sattenberg has moved to dismiss these appeals on jurisdictional grounds, but his reasoning somewhat differs from what has been discussed herein. Regardless, the matter of our appellate jurisdiction is an issue we are required to raise sua sponte, "as it cannot be acquired by waiver, consent, or estoppel." Doe v. Golden & Walters, PLLC, 173 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Ky. App. 2005) (footnote omitted).
An order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory in nature. It is not a final order, and it is therefore generally not appealable. See Battoe v. Beyer, 285 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Ky. 1955). There are some exceptions to this rule. For example, a circuit court's denial of a claim of immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable "'final decision' . . . notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (adopted by Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 886-87 (Ky. 2009)). However, in the context of any such exception, the decision embodied in the interlocutory order must, to be subject to our review, "conclusively determine the disputed question," and that question must involve a "clai[m] of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action[.]" Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 2816 (citation omitted).
With that said, a circuit court does not conclusively determine any disputed question, resolve any right, or otherwise provide this Court with anything to review where its interlocutory order denies a claim of immunity or any other kind of claim on the basis that, in its view, further discovery is needed or material facts remain in dispute. Here, in both of its orders at issue in this consolidated matter, the circuit court did not make a finding as a matter of law on the issue of workers' compensation immunity, which we could review. Rather, the circuit court found that genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute, making these appealed orders interlocutory, which we cannot review. We have repeatedly held that such interlocutory orders are not appealable under any exception and thus are not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. See Farris v. Columbia, No. 2015-CA-000448-MR, 2017 WL 464798, at *1 (Ky. App. Feb. 3, 2017); Hyden-Leslie Water Dist. v. Jessie Hoskins & Perry Const., Inc., No. 2010-CA-000599-MR, 2011 WL 919818, at *2 (Ky. App. Mar. 18, 2011); Adair Cty. v. Stearman, No. 2010-CA-001953-MR, 2011 WL 4103137, at *2 (Ky. App. Sept. 16, 2011). Moreover, binding precedent mandates this result. See Chen v. Lowe, 521 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Ky. App. 2017). Based on the foregoing, these appeals are hereby DISMISSED.
For this proposition of law, we find these non-published cases persuasive and proper to cite pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.28(4)(c). --------
ALL CONCUR. ENTERED: March 20, 2020
/s/_________
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: Clay M. Stevens
Kristen H. Fowler
K. Shay Owens
Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: William D. Nefzger
Louisville, Kentucky