Opinion
CASE NO. 1:16-CR-161
07-20-2017
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. TIMOTHY ANDREW YOUNG, Defendant
MEMORANDUM
I. Introduction
Defendant Timothy Andrew Young has been representing himself since his initial appearance, with court-appointed standby counsel from the Office of the Federal Public Defender. He has expressed a desire to continue to represent himself in these criminal proceedings and at his upcoming trial. For the reasons that follow, however, the court will terminate Defendant's self-representation and appoint standby counsel to represent him in this matter. II. Background
On June 22, 2016, Defendant was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. 3). He was arrested pursuant to a warrant and appeared initially before the court on July 22, 2016. (Doc. 9). That day, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson ordered Defendant detained pending a detention hearing to be held on July 26, 2016. (Doc. 10).
On July 25, 2016, the Government filed a motion to determine Defendant's competency to stand trial. (Doc. 14). In that motion, the Government averred the following:
On July 22, 2016, the defendant was arrested pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. During the transport between the defendant's residence and the courthouse the defendant spoke about the Corporation of America and claimed the Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania ordered a "hit" on him. When the defendant was being brought into the courtroom, he refused to proceed through the gate claiming that he couldn't enter the bar. . . . At the initial appearance the defendant was disruptive, argumentative[,] and interruptive. The defendant did not recognize the authority of the Court or the Chief Magistrate Judge presiding over his appearance. Indeed, the defendant kept asking the Chief Magistrate Judge for his documents providing him with the authority to address the defendant's case. . . . The defendant declined defense counsel.(Id. at 1-2 (paragraph numbering and formatting omitted)). The Government's motion for a competency evaluation was granted the following day after Defendant's detention hearing. (Doc. 17). Defendant was also ordered detained pending trial, and the Federal Public Defender was conditionally appointed as standby counsel, as Defendant expressed a desire to represent himself. (Docs. 16, 18).
Beginning July 26, 2016, Defendant began filing multiple—often nonsensical—pro se notices and letters. Many of these filings reference the so-called "sovereign citizen" ideology and call into question the court's authority and the charges against him. (See, e.g., Docs. 19, 20, 23, 38, 40, 41, 52). Many of Defendant's filings also include the allegation that he has no prior felony conviction, and thus he is innocent of the instant charges against him and must be released immediately. (See, e.g., Docs. 23, 38, 41).
As just one example, Defendant filed a "Billing Notice" in regard to the court-ordered competency evaluation, in which he demanded prepayment of $777,000,000 before he would cooperate with the evaluation. (Doc. 22).
See Charles E. Loeser, Sovereign Citizens: A Reasoned Response to the Madness, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1106, 1119-26 (2015) (providing a thorough explanation and history of the sovereign citizen ideology).
Although not required, the Government provided a formal response to Defendant's allegations regarding the absence of a prior felony conviction. The Government explained that although Defendant had been convicted of a state-law "misdemeanor" for making terroristic threats, his crime was a misdemeanor of the first degree under Pennsylvania law that carried with it a potential term of imprisonment of up to five years. (Doc. 39). Therefore, under the plain language of the federal criminal statute at issue, and pursuant to well-settled case law, Defendant could indeed be classified as a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because "the Supreme Court has clearly established that it is the potential sentence that controls and not the one actually imposed." (Id. at 4 (quoting United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 113 (1983)))).
The Government further averred that Defendant had also previously been convicted of the federal offense of receipt of a firearm while under indictment, 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). (Doc. 39 at 3). --------
On November 3, 2016, the Government filed a status report indicating that the court-ordered forensic mental health evaluation had been completed. (Doc. 27). The comprehensive forensic report noted that although Defendant appeared to adhere to the sovereign citizen ideology, there was no objective evidence to show that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial. (Doc. 35 at 6-11). Both the Government and standby counsel for Defendant agreed with this assessment. (Doc. 27 at 2; Doc. 30 at 2).
In light of the examination results, Defendant was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea to the indictment, again expressing his desire to represent himself. (Docs. 31, 32). Trial was scheduled for early 2017, but the Government and standby counsel filed several motions to continue, delaying trial for several months until the current trial date of August 7, 2017, was set. (Docs. 36, 42, 44, 47, 48).
On June 14, 2017, the court held a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), to confirm, on the record, Defendant's desire to waive his right to counsel and proceed to trial pro se, and also to confirm his understanding of the potential implications of such a choice ("Faretta hearing"). Defendant's behavior at the Faretta hearing, which will be discussed in more detail below, and his behavior at the previous initial appearance, have convinced this court that Defendant has effectively waived his right to represent himself. Therefore, the court will terminate Defendant's self-representation, and will appoint standby counsel to represent him. III. Discussion
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to decline court-appointed counsel and conduct their own defense. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 819 (1975). This right, however, is not absolute. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 160 (2000). A trial judge may terminate self-representation, even over a defendant's objection, when the defendant "deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)); Thomas v. Carroll, 581 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2009). Repeated pretrial obstructionist behavior can provide a strong indication of a defendant's likely conduct at trial, and thus can be grounds for termination of self-representation. See United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir. 1998). "[W]hen a defendant's obstreperous behavior is so disruptive that the trial cannot move forward, it is within the trial judge's discretion to require the defendant to be represented by counsel." Id. at 1079. In such circumstances, standby counsel may be ordered to represent the defendant. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (citation omitted).
The case of United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077 (7th Cir. 1998), is instructive for the matter at hand. There, pro se defendant Michael Brock ("Brock") repeatedly denied that any court-appointed attorney was authorized to represent him, and filed multiple pro se motions requesting a "Bill of Particulars" and seeking to represent himself. Id. at 1078. When the court tried to conduct a hearing to determine whether Brock wished to waive his right to counsel, he "refused to answer the [c]ourt's questions or to cooperate in any way with the proceedings." Id. Instead, Brock repeatedly demanded a Bill of Particulars and challenged the court's authority. Id.
In the following days, at the direction of the trial court, a magistrate judge again attempted to hold a Faretta hearing. Id. at 1079. The magistrate judge, however, was met with the same obstructionist conduct and was unable to get Brock to answer any questions regarding his desire to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Id. The following month, prior to trial, the court held another hearing to reconsider Brock's pro se status, and Brock "continued to challenge the [c]ourt's jurisdiction and made repeated demands for a Bill of Particulars." Id. The court concluded that Brock had "forfeited" his right to self-representation, and appointed standby counsel to serve as his attorney. Id.
After Brock was convicted at trial, he appealed, arguing that the trial court had violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Id. The Seventh Circuit disagreed. Citing Brock's repeated obstructionist conduct, it found that Brock had "made it practically impossible to proceed." Id. at 1080. The court noted that Brock's repeated disruptive behavior in the courtroom "was sufficient to allow the district judge to conclude that there was a strong indication that Brock would continue to be disruptive at trial." Id. It concluded, "Brock's steadfast refusal to answer the court's questions made it extremely difficult for the court to resolve threshold issues, such as whether the defendant would be represented by counsel. Brock did not simply refuse to prepare for trial, he refused to cooperate, even minimally, with the court." Id. at 1081. As such, the court held that the district court had not abused its discretion by terminating Brock's pro se status. Id.
Defendant's situation is much like that in Brock. Since the outset of his criminal case, he has continually challenged the authority of the court, and has refused to meaningfully cooperate in courtroom proceedings. As the Government's motion for a competency evaluation recounts, Defendant was argumentative and disruptive at his initial appearance, and repeatedly challenged the authority of the court and the magistrate judge. Defendant has also filed multiple letters and notices indicating that he does not believe this court has authority over him, and alleging that the federal government is perpetrating fraud against him.
Defendant continued and intensified this course of obstructionist conduct at the June 14, 2017 Faretta hearing. The following details provide a sample of Defendant's obstreperous behavior at that proceeding.
Less than two minutes into the hearing, Defendant began interrupting the court. (Doc. 55, Tr. of Representation Hr'g [hereinafter "Doc. 55"], at 4). Despite multiple warnings, Defendant's disruptive conduct persisted unabated over the course of the hearing, interrupting the court approximately thirty-eight times. (See Doc. 55 at 4-10, 14-23, 25-29).
Defendant also repeatedly refused to answer simple questions, often replying with obstinate or unresponsive dialogue. (See id. at 7, 8, 10, 15, 19). For example, when asked whether he understood the nature of the charges against him, he responded, "No, I do not. I believe they're fraudulent." (Id. at 15). When the court pressed Defendant about whether he at least understood what the charges were, he continued, "I don't understand anything, sir. I stand on my rights. What part of this has not been made clear to this court?" (Id.) When asked a short time later whether he understood that the charges in his indictment carried up to a ten-year prison sentence, Defendant responded, "I do not understand anything, sir. I stand on my rights. This case is a fraud being perpetrated against one of the people." (Id. at 18-19).
In that same vein, Defendant continually claimed that he was being prosecuted in bad faith or defrauded by the federal government. Throughout the thirty-minute hearing, Defendant alleged fraud and bad-faith prosecution over fourteen times. (See id. at 4-6, 9-12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26, 28). For example, Defendant claimed that "[t]hese are fraudulent charges. These guys are bringing a public law into the private. This public law does not hold water in the private, sir, and you are well aware of that." (Id. at 15). At another point, he simply stated that "[t]his court is a fraud" because of the absence of a jury. (Id. at 28).
Throughout the hearing, Defendant also continuously raised nonsensical and meritless arguments based on his sovereign citizen ideology. (Id. at 9-11, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29). Some of his stranger comments bear repeating verbatim. At one point, Defendant began questioning whether the court was proceeding under "District of Columbia law," and then explained that the United States flag in the courtroom represented "admiralty maritime jurisdiction, which is the international law of the seas, sir, and I stand on the land, and this building is firmly planted in American soil and not District of Columbia soil, which is owned by the Britains [sic]." (Id. at 11). Later, Defendant maintained that he was "not a citizen" of the United States because he did not hold public office and was not a member of the military. (Id. at 17). Referring to the case caption on court documents, he continued, "That all capital letter name you have on that record might be a citizen. That was created by Roosevelt." (Id.) When the Assistant United States Attorney informed Defendant that it was not he, but the United States government, that was prosecuting him, Defendant replied, "Well, then please have the United States take the stand, sir. How are you going to get a bucket of dirt to say I caused it harm?" (Id. at 24). Finally, referring to his standby counsel from the Federal Public Defender's Office, Defendant oddly claimed, "This woman is a British accreditation registry associate. Why in the world would I be using a British operative who has sworn allegiance to the crown of the British, of District of Columbia to represent me to begin with?" (Id. at 28).
Lastly, throughout the Faretta hearing, Defendant demonstrated an inability to adhere to courtroom decorum and procedure. In addition to continually interrupting the court and the Government, Defendant also exhibited disrespect to the court and used his hearing as an opportunity to elocute his beliefs to the gallery. For instance, when Defendant was warned that he should let the court handle the proceeding, he responded, "I'm telling you you're not handling it correctly." (Id. at 18). He continually questioned the court rather than answering the questions asked of him, and accused the court of "trying to subvert his rights" and "subvert[ing] every oath, every code of judicial conduct that [the court has] sworn to uphold." (Id. at 19, 22).
Near the end of the proceeding, Defendant engaged in repeated outbursts regarding his belief that he was being wrongly prosecuted. (Id. at 22, 25, 26-29). At one point, Defendant turned to the gallery, exclaiming, "Why is a criminal case, sir, not made public record for everybody? What are you people afraid of? You won't certify the charges. You won't post bond. You won't bring forward a man or woman who can claim that I caused them any damages." (Id. at 27). After being warned that he was disrupting the proceeding, he continued, "Sir, with all due respect you're not allowing me to have my rights. . . . That's mutinous." (Id.) Finally, due to Defendant's argumentative and disruptive behavior, the court ended the proceeding. (Id. at 28-29).
In light of the foregoing facts, it is plainly evident to this court that Defendant has waived his right to represent himself in this case by his persistent obstructionist and disruptive conduct. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46; Thomas, 581 F.3d at 125. Although Defendant has unequivocally expressed a desire to represent himself, (see id. at 8), he has likewise demonstrated, through pretrial conduct that has made it practically impossible to proceed, that he has waived this right. Brock, 159 F.3d at 1080. As such, the court will terminate Defendant's self-representation and appoint standby counsel to represent Defendant. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. IV. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, the court will terminate Defendant's self-representation and will appoint standby counsel, Heidi R. Freese, of the Federal Public Defender's Office, to represent him. An appropriate order will follow.
/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge