Opinion
CRIMINAL ACTION No. 15-10 SECTION I
01-05-2021
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Gross Williams's ("Williams") motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The government opposes the motion and Williams has filed a reply in support of the motion.
R. Doc. No. 223.
Williams's motion is titled "Rule 60(b)(a) motion." Id. However, Williams's reply requests that the Court construe the motion as a Rule 60(b)(2) motion. R. Doc. No. 226, at 1.
R. Doc. No. 225.
R. Doc. No. 226.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) states that motions under Rule 60(b) "must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(c)(1); see also Torns v. Mississippi, 648 F. App'x 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (agreeing with district court that a "Rule 60(b)(2) motion was untimely because it was filed more than a year after judgment); Worldwide Detective Agency, Inc. v. Cannon Cochran Mgmt. Servs., 622 F. App'x 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (rejecting untimely Rule 60(b)(2) motion); Smith v. Kukua, 487 F. App'x 145, 146 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (upholding a district court's denial of a Rule 60(b)(2) for non-timeliness reasons on the basis motion was untimely).
The instant motion attacks the Court's rulings on Williams's first habeas petition (and a discovery motion related to it), which were entered—along with the relevant judgment—on May 29, 2019. And the instant motion was postmarked November 20, 2020—more than a year later.
R. Doc. Nos. 212-14.
The Court is mindful of Williams's pro se status and would normally consider the propriety of excusing such untimeliness. But Rule 6(b)(2) explicitly states that "[a] court must not extend the time to act under Rule[] . . . 60(b)." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 6(b)(2); see, e.g., Nowlin v. Shannon, No. 15-778, 2017 WL 8790963, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 13, 2017) (reaching the same conclusion and noting that "the limitation period cannot be extended by the court"); McKnight v. Neven, 366 F. App'x 841, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (concluding that, given Rule 6(b)(2), "regardless of whether the one-year limit is 'jurisdictional,' it must be strictly enforced"); In re Rumsey Land Co., 944 F.3d 1259, 1277 (10th Cir. 2019) ("Rule 60(c)(1)'s limitations period is absolute." (internal quotation omitted)). And the Court cannot construe this as a motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s catch-all provision because "[t]he reason for relief set forth under 60(b)(6) cannot be the reason for relief sought under another subsection of 60(b)." Solis v. Dretke, 436 F. App'x 303, 306 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 643 (5th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Williams's motion for discovery in support of the instant motion is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
R. Doc. No. 227.
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 5, 2021.
/s/ _________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE