Opinion
6:16-CR-06118 EAW
10-13-2020
UNITED STATES of America, v. Allan J. WATSON, Defendant.
Robert Marangola, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, for United States of America. Michael Patrick Schiano, The Schiano Law Office, Rochester, NY, for Defendant.
Robert Marangola, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, for United States of America.
Michael Patrick Schiano, The Schiano Law Office, Rochester, NY, for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is a motion filed by defendant Allan Watson (hereinafter "Defendant") for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. 38). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is denied.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 30, 2017, Defendant appeared before the undersigned, waived indictment, and pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(C)(i). (Dkt. 26; Dkt. 27; Dkt. 28; Dkt. 36). On October 30, 2017, the undersigned sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum term of incarceration as required by statute—25 years in prison. (Dkt. 35; Dkt. 37). Defendant is currently housed at Federal Correctional Institution Ray Brook ("FCI Ray Brook") in the Adirondacks, and his projected release date is April 2, 2038. See Find an Inmate , Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). According to a Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") website, FCI Ray Brook has one inmate who is currently testing positive for COVID-19, 15 inmates who have recovered, no staff currently testing positive, and 10 staff who have recovered. See COVID-19: Coronavirus , Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2020). That same website notes that no inmates or staff members have died from COVID-19. Id. In addition, 217 tests have been administered to inmates at the facility, with no pending tests and 17 positive tests. Id.
It is not clear how there could be 17 positive tests, with one inmate who is currently testing positive and 15 inmates who have tested positive and recovered. There seems to be one inmate who is not accounted for with these numbers.
Defendant now seeks to be released because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant cites to rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated, the difficulties faced by his fiancée and mother of two of his children, and the First Step Act's amendment which changed the penalties a defendant faces when stacking § 924(c) convictions. (Dkt. 38). The government opposes Defendant's motion, arguing that Defendant has neither established extraordinary and compelling circumstances justifying the requested relief or that a reduction in his sentence would comport with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). (Dkt. 40). Defendant filed a reply in further support of his motion, arguing that the BOP is not equipped to handle the COVID-19 pandemic regardless of whether Defendant suffers from pre-existing medical conditions, and relying extensively on a decision from another judge in this district where a defendant who was sentenced to 40 years in prison in or around 2006, had his sentence essentially cut in half pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (See Dkt. 41 (quoting United States v. Marks , 455 F. Supp. 3d 17 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) )).
Although the statutory provision in effect at the time of Defendant's plea and sentence was ultimately amended by § 403(a) of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), the amendment did not impact the mandatory minimum applicable to Defendant. In other words, the First Step Act limited the 25-year mandatory minimum consecutive prison term to a sentence imposed after "a prior conviction under this subsection has become final...." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). Such a 25-year sentence may no longer be stacked and imposed contemporaneously while also imposing a sentence for other § 924(c) convictions.
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The United States Probation Office ("USPO") has submitted a memorandum to the Court dated September 8, 2020, noting that Defendant is a "Care Level 1 inmate with no medical restrictions," and he has two disciplinary infractions while incarcerated. (Dkt. 42 at 1). The USPO states that Defendant has served just over 34 months of his sentence, and it sets forth its position that a sentence reduction is not appropriate. (Id. at 1-2).
III. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
"A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except pursuant to statute." United States v. Gotti , 433 F. Supp. 3d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The compassionate release statute, as amended by the First Step Act, is such a statutory exception, and provides as follows:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that ... the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that ... extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Relief is appropriate pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) when the following conditions are met: (1) the exhaustion requirement of the statute is satisfied; (2) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction of the prison sentence; (3) the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support modification of the prison term; and (4) the reduction in the prison sentence is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statements. The government does not oppose Defendant's application on exhaustion grounds, as he has filed a request with the Warden at FCI Ray Brook for release and more than 30 days have elapsed since the Warden's receipt of that request, which was denied. (Dkt. 40 at 2); see also United States v. Wen , 454 F. Supp. 3d 187, 192–94 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (as a claim-processing rule, § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional and thus subject to the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel). Thus, the exhaustion requirements of the statute do not operate to bar the Court's consideration of the motion.
However, the Court agrees with the government that Defendant has failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying a sentence reduction. While the Court does not doubt that Defendant's incarceration is difficult for his family, and likely even more difficult during this pandemic, the situation described by Defendant and his fiancée does not rise to the level of "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances so as to justify a sentence reduction. Instead, the circumstances described are comparable to those unfortunately experienced by many families of individuals incarcerated within the BOP.
In addition, the Court disagrees that the COVID-19 pandemic justifies Defendant's release. FCI Ray Brook appears to be adequately handling the COVID-19 pandemic, and while the Court does not doubt that it is more difficult to stop the spread of the virus within prison walls, Defendant is 39 years old (Dkt. 30 at 2) and he does not identify any pre-existing medical condition that would place him at increased risk of serious illness if he becomes ill with the virus. In fact, the Presentence Investigation Report noted that Defendant reported he was in "good physical health with no history of significant illness or injury." (Id. at ¶ 83).
With respect to Defendant's reports of his rehabilitation, the Court is not sure how Defendant's self-reports in that regard square with the USPO's reports of disciplinary infractions while incarcerated—but in any event, even if Defendant is on the path toward a change in his prior behavior, which the Court hopes is the case, that does not justify reducing his sentence, and the Marks decision does not persuade the Court otherwise.
Finally, the Court also agrees with the government that the § 3553(a) factors counsel against granting Defendant's requested relief. Defendant's criminal history is significant, and in 2001, he was sentenced by a judge in this district to 108 months in prison after being convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. (Id. at ¶ 46). Defendant had repeated issues of non-compliance while on supervised release for those crimes, and his supervised release was revoked in December 2007 (resulting in a 366 day prison sentence), October 2010 (resulting in a 15-month prison sentence), and October 2012 (resulting in a 366 day prison sentence). Defendant's current offense of conviction reflects that he continued with his drug trafficking and possession of firearms in furtherance of that drug trafficking (see id. at ¶¶ 16-32 (describing two separate incidents—in July 2016 and November 2016—involving Defendant's possession of narcotics packaged for distribution and firearms)), notwithstanding the prior punishments imposed.
In sum, the Court appreciates that Defendant is concerned about the pandemic and being housed in a correctional facility. Moreover, the Court recognizes that prison settings can present challenges in thwarting the spread of this virus. However, on the record before the Court, a reduction of Defendant's prison sentence is not warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Dkt. 38) is denied.
SO ORDERED.