Opinion
1:15-CR-00142 EAW
2021-01-07
UNITED STATES of America, v. Glenn STACHARCZYK, Defendant.
Brendan T. Cullinane, Joseph M. Tripi, Richard D. Kaufman, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, Marianne Shelvey, U.S. Department of Justice/Organized Crime Section, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
Brendan T. Cullinane, Joseph M. Tripi, Richard D. Kaufman, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, Marianne Shelvey, U.S. Department of Justice/Organized Crime Section, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is the motion filed by defendant Glenn Stacharczyk ("Defendant") for reconsideration of this Court's Decision and Order denying his motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. 1931). Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically recognize motions for reconsideration, such motions "have traditionally been allowed within the Second Circuit." United States v. Yannotti , 457 F. Supp. 2d 385, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). District courts "have applied the applicable civil standard to such motions in criminal cases." United States v. Larson , No. 07-CR-304S, 2013 WL 6196292, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2013).
"The standard for granting ... a motion [for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Common grounds for reconsideration include "an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd. , 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). "These criteria are strictly construed against the moving party so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the court." Boyde v. Osborne , No. 10-CV-6651, 2013 WL 6662862, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2013) (quoting Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Petrojam, Ltd. , 72 F. Supp. 2d 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ). The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is within "the sound discretion of the district court...." Aczel v. Labonia , 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Defendant bases his motion on three arguments: (1) this Court appointed the Federal Public Defender's ("FPD") office to represent him in connection with his request for compassionate release, and the issuance of its Decision and Order on December 17, 2020 (Dkt. 1928) denied him the opportunity to have the FPD's office file papers on his behalf; (2) the Court misapprehended what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons; and (3) the Court did not understand the remedy sought by Defendant. (Dkt. 1931).
With respect to the FPD's office, the undersigned never appointed that office to represent Defendant. Rather, consistent with the Standing Order entered April 7, 2020, by the Chief Judge, the FPD's office has been appointed to represent any defendant who previously qualified for assigned counsel, to make a determination as to whether to file a compassionate release decision on the defendant's behalf. As a matter of course, that office reviews compassionate release motions filed by pro se defendants in this District, and when it deems it appropriate, it appears on behalf of the defendant and files a motion. However, in this case, the FPD's office elected not to appear on Defendant's behalf. After receiving Defendant's motion, the undersigned's staff confirmed with AFPD Slawinski, who is referenced in Defendant's motion, that he communicated to both Defendant and his family that he would not be filing a motion on his behalf. Accordingly, the issue of counsel provides no basis for reconsideration.
Defendant's argument about extraordinary and compelling reasons amounts to nothing more than Defendant quarreling with the Court's conclusion on this issue, which is not a basis for reconsideration. "The determination as to what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a reduction is committed to the sound discretion of the district court." United States v. Roney , 833 Fed. Appx. 850, No. 20-1834 (2d Cir. Nov. 2, 2020) (citing United States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2020) ). Regardless of what other district courts have concluded, this Court has previously expressed its view that it agrees "with those courts that have taken the position that a number of factors must be considered when a defendant argues that medical vulnerability to COVID-19 constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying compassionate release, because the inquiry is fact-intensive and must consider, among other factors, the defendant's age, the severity and documented history of the defendant's health conditions, defendant's history of managing those conditions in prison, the proliferation and status of infection at defendant's facilities, and the proportion of the term of incarceration that has been served." United States v. MacCallum , No. 1:15-CR-00204 EAW, 511 F.Supp.3d 419, 426 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2021) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Gibson , 117-CR-0657, 2020 WL 7343802, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2020) ). Here, Defendant did not meet his burden to meet this standard.
Finally, the Court did not misunderstand the remedy sought by Defendant. Rather, it fully understood the relief sought by Defendant—but disagreed that he met his burden to establish that he was entitled to that relief.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for reconsideration of his request for compassionate release (Dkt. 1931) is denied.
SO ORDERED.