Opinion
No. 73-3034.
July 19, 1976. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied October 27, 1976.
James Holmes Haddock, Carl F. Andre, A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. of Miss., Jackson, Miss., for defendants-appellants.
S. Bobo Dean, Washington, D.C., for Miccosukee tribe of Indians of Florida.
Robert E. Hauberg, U.S. Atty., James B. Tucker, Asst. U.S. Atty., Jackson, Miss., Wallace H. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Larry G. Gutterridge, Jacques B. Gelin, Lands Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Before COLEMAN, CLARK and RONNEY, Circuit Judges.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING [2] (Opinion Dec. 13, 1974, 5 Cir. 1974, 505 F.2d 633)
Our original opinion in this case is reported, 505 F.2d 633 (5 Cir. 1974).
Since the rendition of that opinion, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the context of a criminal case, has had occasion to pass on the issue of whether the State has been deprived of jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by Indians on the Choctaw Indian Reservation. In an exhaustive, scholarly opinion, it was held that Mississippi retains such jurisdiction, Tubby v. State, 327 So.2d 272 (Miss., 1976).
There are two decisive factors in this case.
I [6] The Chata Development Company
In the prior opinion we held that Chata, a Mississippi corporation, chartered in compliance with Mississippi law, is an entity separate and apart from the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians; that in this suit the United States is attempting to lend its name to a suit on behalf of a private corporation and thus was not a real party in interest.
We adhere to that view.
Chata was a building contractor, no more and no less. It had a contract to build houses for the Choctaw Housing Authority. Unless the Authority was contracting with itself, which would have been a barefaced subterfuge, then Chata's separate identity, capacity, and existence cannot be doubted, as a matter of either law or fact.
II [10] The Status of the Mississippi Choctaw Indians
After the ratification of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek the Choctaw Indians who chose to remain in Mississippi were no longer an Indian Tribe, they were citizens of Mississippi, and they most assuredly were not wards of the United States. The only way they could reassume Choctaw tribal citizenship was to move to the Indian Territory.
As cited in the original opinion, a thorough discussion of this situation was authored by Mr. Justice Pitney in Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 41 S.Ct. 342, 344, 65 L.Ed. 684 (1921). That opinion of the Supreme Court sets forth in interesting detail the many unsuccessful efforts of the Mississippi Choctaws to reassume Choctaw citizenship without moving to the Indian Territory. See, also, Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 75, 30 L.Ed. 306 (1886).
The opinion in Amos was grounded on Article XIV of the Dancing Rabbit Treaty:
"Each Choctaw head of a family desirous to remain and become a citizen of the States, shall be permitted to do so, by signifying his intention to the Agent within six months from the ratification of this Treaty, (etc)."
This was an important concession. Unlike the later mistreatment of the Cherokees, no Choctaw had to remove himself to the Indian Territory unless he wished to do so. It was not a surprising arrangement, because the Choctaws had always lived in harmony with the white man. Their proud boast was that, unlike the nearby Chickasaws and Creeks, they had never raised their hands in war against the white man. Great chiefs, like Pushmataha, had rejected the blandishments of Tecumseh in the War of 1812 and had sent him out of the Nation into the hands of the more hospitable Creeks, the result of which, at the hands of Andrew Jackson, is well known. Moreover, the Choctaws were not nomadic. They lived in fixed habitations, cultivating corn and other crops. Thus they were identified as one of the five civilized tribes.
In any event, this Treaty was made by and between the Tribe and the United States and both were bound by its terms. By remaining and accepting (or claiming later, as some did) the lands allotted to those who wished to stay, the individual Indian likewise bound himself to the provisions of the Treaty.
The Treaty of Dancing Rabbit is a part of the Supreme Law, United States Constitution, Article 6, Clause 2, and it cannot be altered by an Act of Congress; Congress cannot obliterate the jurisdiction of Mississippi over its citizens.
This case simply does not fit into the extensive jurisprudential grooves developed with reference to Indian wards or those Indian Reservations which were established either by Treaty or created by Congress for those who never converted their Indian status to that of state citizenship.
The Leech Lake Reservation, the subject of the Supreme Court opinion in Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 was established by a Treaty, and Bryan was a duly enrolled member of the Chippewa tribe.
The Choctaw Indians of Mississippi do not live in Indian country. Except for that land patented to individual Indians under the terms of the Treaty (and not in trust) the Tribe sold all of its land to the United States in 1830. By 1850 virtually every acre of it had been patented to private purchasers by virtue of sales at the Land Offices in Columbus and Paulding. See, DeCoteau v. District County Court for Tenth Judicial District, 1975, 420 U.S. 425, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 43 L.Ed.2d 300. See also, Dillon v. Antler Land Company of Wyola, 9 Cir., 1974, 507 F.2d 940, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1998, 44 L.Ed.2d 482.
In its original brief the Department of Justice asserted:
"The Mississippi Band's reservation, held in trust for the Indians by the United States, is not under the jurisdiction of the State of Mississippi and is not subject to state tax."
We considered this to be so palpably erroneous that we proceeded in our original opinion to demonstrate our disagreement.
We must confess some bafflement with the wiggling positions taken by the government at various periods of this appeal.
In its original brief the government asserted, as above quoted, that the Mississippi Band's reservation "is not under the jurisdiction of the State of Mississippi".
In a motion to amend the opinion, filed January 28, 1975, the government argued, although it had raised the point in the first place, that it was not necessary to a decision of the case.
In the petition for rehearing, now under consideration, the government argues:
"Before leaving McGowan [ United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 58 S.Ct. 286, 82 L.Ed. 410] we want to clear up a misconception which, we believe, was created by our pleadings and brief. An Indian reservation is never an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction either in a practical sense or under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution. Compare the opinion of the Court, 505 F.2d 633 at 641 note 2 and 643. Within an Indian reservation tribal jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction largely pre-empt state jurisdiction as to matters affecting the Tribe and its members, but state jurisdiction controls matters exclusively concerning non-Indians. For instance, a crime committed by a non-Indian against another non-Indian in Indian country is tried in state court and under state law. As a corollary state law enforcement officers have free access within Indian reservations. This is not so as to areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, [ 66 S.Ct. 307, 90 L.Ed. 261] (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 [ 17 S.Ct. 107, 41 L.Ed. 419] (1896). See also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission [ 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129]. Consequently the provisions of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution and the holding in Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 [ 83 S.Ct. 426, 9 L.Ed.2d 292] (1963), requiring formal state consent to establishing an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction, are inapplicable to the establishment of an Indian reservation. See United States v. McGowan, supra, 302 U.S. at 539 [ 58 S.Ct. 286]."
The government argues that by reason of certain Congressional enactments beginning with May 25, 1918, eighty eight years after the Treaty, the State has lost its jurisdiction over its Choctaw Indian citizens.
An examination of the various Congressional enactments since 1918 has been a matter of considerable interest. A brief synopsis of the Legislative history of these Acts will be set forth in the Appendix to this opinion.
We take first the Act of May 25, 1918, 40 Stat. 561. This was an appropriation bill. It referred to the "full-blood Choctaw Indians of Mississippi" and to "the relief of [their] distress". The entire statute [40 Stat. at 573] reads as follows:
MISSISSIPPI
Sec. 9. For the relief of distress among the full-blood Choctaw Indians of Mississippi, including the pay of one special agent, who shall be a physician, one farmer, and one field matron, $5,000; for their education by establishing and maintaining day schools including the purchase of land and the construction of necessary buildings, $20,000; for the purchase of lands, including improvements thereon, not exceeding eighty acres for any one family, for the use and occupancy of said Indians, to be expended under conditions to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior for its repayment to the United States, under such rules and regulations as he may direct, $25,000; for the purpose of encouraging industry and self-support among said Indians and to aid them in building homes, in the culture of fruits, grains, cotton, and other crops, $25,000, which sum may be used for the purchase of seed, animals, machinery, tools, implements, and other equipment necessary, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, to enable said Indians to become self-supporting, to be expended under conditions to be prescribed by the said Secretary for its repayment to the United States on or before June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty-five; in all, $75,000, to be immediately available.
The Act does not refer to the Indians as a tribe, it does not mention an Indian Reservation, and it offered no help to those of less than the full blood. It was what it declared itself to be, a relief act, limited to individual Choctaws of the full blood. It required that one-third of the appropriation be repaid as directed by the Secretary of the Interior and that another one-third should be repaid by June 30, 1925. Obviously, Congress did not consider the Mississippi Choctaws as wards of the government.
It is hardly a matter of surprise, burdened like their white brethren with a hazardous one crop (cotton) economy and discriminatory freight rates which stifled industrial development, that the Indians did not pay for the lands which had been sold them out of the $25,000 appropriated for that purpose. Congress found it advisable to legislate again. It passed the Act of June 21, 1939 [ 53 Stat. 851]:
AN ACT
To define the status of certain lands purchased for the Choctaw Indians, Mississippi.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That title to all lands purchased by the United States for the benefit of the Choctaw Indians of Mississippi, under authority contained in the Act of May 25, 1918 (40 Stat.L., 573), and similar subsequent Acts, not under contract for resale to Choctaw Indians, or on which existing contracts of resale may hereafter be canceled, is hereby declared to be in the United States in trust for such Choctaw Indians of one half or more Indian blood, resident in Mississippi, as shall be designated by the Secretary of the Interior.
Approved, June 21, 1939.
Title to the lands was "declared to be in the United States in trust for such Choctaw Indians of one-half or more Indian blood, resident in Mississippi, as shall be designated by the Secretary of the Interior". Only those individuals designated by the Secretary of the Interior were to have the benefit of this Act. Neither a tribe nor a reservation is mentioned.
This brings us to a consideration of the Act of June 18, 1934 [ 48 Stat. 984], upon which the government so strongly relies for the proposition that the State of Mississippi has been ousted of jurisdiction over its Indian citizens, the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek to the contrary notwithstanding.
Shorn of extraneous provisions, this Act reads as follows:
That hereafter no land of any Indian reservation, created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress, Executive order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian.
Sec. 2. The existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands and any restriction on alienation thereof are hereby extended and continued until otherwise directed by Congress.
* * * * * *
Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to acquire through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing land for Indians.
* * * * * *
Sec. 7. The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to proclaim new Indian reservations on lands acquired pursuant to any authority conferred by this Act, or to add such lands to existing reservations: Provided, That lands added to existing reservations shall be designated for the exclusive use of Indians entitled by enrollment or by tribal membership to residence at such reservations.
* * * * * *
Sec. 16. Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have the right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult Indians residing on such reservation, as the case may be, at a special election authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe. Such constitution and bylaws when ratified as aforesaid and approved by the Secretary of the Interior shall be revocable by an election open to the same voters and conducted in the same manner as hereinabove provided. Amendments to the constitution and bylaws may be ratified and approved by the Secretary in the same manner as the original constitution and bylaws.
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the following rights and powers: To employ legal counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the Federal, State, and local Governments. The Secretary of the Interior shall advise such tribe or its tribal council of all appropriation estimates or Federal projects for the benefit of the tribe prior to the submission of such estimates to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress.
Sec. 17. The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by at least one-third of the adult Indians, issue a charter of incorporation to such tribe: Provided, That such charter shall not become operative until ratified at a special election by a majority vote of the adult Indians living on the reservation. Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and personal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands and to issue in exchange therefor interests in corporate property, and such further powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent with law, but no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period exceeding ten years any of the land included in the limits of the reservation. Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act of Congress.
Sec. 18. This Act shall not apply to any reservation wherein a majority of the adult Indians, voting at a special election duly called by the Secretary of the Interior, shall vote against its application. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior, within one year after the passage and approval of this Act, to call such an election, which election shall be held by secret ballot upon thirty days' notice.
Sec. 19. The term "Indian" as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. For the purposes of this Act, Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall be considered Indians. The term "tribe" wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reservation. The words "adult Indians" wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to Indians who have attained the age of twenty-one years.
Approved, June 18, 1934.
Importantly enough, Congress expressly directed that Sections 16, 17, and 18 should not apply to the Choctaw Indian Tribe located in Oklahoma.
We again point to the specific language of Section 16: "Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have the right to organize * * *".
We adhere to the view originally entertained that the definition of the term "Indian" appearing in Section 19 in no way altered or amended the description of those entitled to organize under the terms of Section 16.
We also adhere to the opinion that:
(1) The Choctaw Indians residing in Mississippi in 1934 were not members of an Indian tribe. The tribe was in Oklahoma. The tribal status of the Mississippi Choctaws had been permanently extinguished by the 1830 Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek;
(2) Granting that Section 7 of the 1934 Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to set up new Indian reservations, we think that the clear intent of Congress was to legislate for Indian tribes, not for individual Indians;
(3) We see nothing in the Acts of Congress conferring authority upon the Secretary of the Interior to create Indian tribes where none had theretofore existed. Under Section 16 only a tribe could organize for self-government, etc. Additionally, we think the purpose was to give the tribes some independence from the Bureau of Indian Affairs;
(4) Nothing in the various Congressional enactments indicates a desire or purpose to abrogate the Dancing Rabbit Treaty;
(5) Nothing in the various Congressional enactments indicates a desire or purpose to oust Mississippi of its jurisdiction over those who had been its citizens, so declared by Treaty, for over a hundred years.
Consequently, we are of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the State of Mississippi over its citizens of Choctaw Indian blood stands unimpaired.
As to the dealings between the Secretary of the Interior and the United States government, on the one hand, and the Mississippi Choctaws, on the other, we do not purport to pass on their validity vis a vis the participants.
The Petition for Rehearing is
DENIED.