Opinion
3:21-cr-00076-HZ 3:21- cv-00108-HZ
05-22-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. LYLE JUSTIN SCHIRM, Defendant.
Natalie K. Wight Cassady A. Adams United States Attorney's Attorneys for Plaintiff Lyle Justin Schirm 39346-509 FCI Sheridan Defendant, Pro Se
Natalie K. Wight
Cassady A. Adams
United States Attorney's
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Lyle Justin Schirm 39346-509
FCI Sheridan
Defendant, Pro Se
OPINION & ORDER
MARCO A. HERNANDEZ, United States District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motions to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)(Compassionate Release), ECF 49, 56. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendant's Motions.
BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2022, Defendant pled guilty to one count of smuggling goods from the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) in Case no. 3:21-cr-00076-HZ and one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii) in Case no. 21-cr-00108-HZ. On February 28, 2023 the Court sentenced Defendant to 30-month terms of imprisonment on each count to run concurrently.
Defendant's projected release date is March 3, 2025.
On March 26, 2024 Defendant filed pro se Motions for sentence Reduction Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in both cases. The Court took Defendant's Motions under advisement on May 10, 2024.
STANDARDS
A federal district court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824-25 (2010). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), Congress provided an exception, commonly known as compassionate release, to reduce a defendant's sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Under the original statute, only the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) could file a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for a sentence reduction on a defendant's behalf. United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021). The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5191 (2018), however, amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow a defendant, after first requesting that the BOP move for a reduction on his or her behalf, to directly move the district court for a sentence reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that-
(i) Extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; [. . . ]
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
The United States Sentencing Commission's policy statement identifies categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons. Before November 1, 2023, the Sentencing Commission's policy statement applied only to § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by the BOP Director on behalf of a defendant. Aruda, 993 F.3d at 801. The Ninth Circuit concluded that on a defendant's direct motion for compassionate release, the policy factors “may inform a district court's discretion . . ., but they are not binding.” Id. at 802 (citation omitted). On November 1, 2023, however, the Sentencing Commission amended the sentencing guidelines and explained that the amendment “extends the applicability of the policy statement to defendant-filed motions.” U.S. Sentencing Commission, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Effective Nov. 1, 2023) at 7, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/official-text-amendments/202305Amendments.pdf. Accordingly, a defendant must show extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce the sentence consistent with the policy statement.
The policy statement identifies categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons to be considered individually and in the aggregate: the defendant's medical conditions, age, family circumstances, and status as a victim of abuse. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4). The policy statement also contains a catchall provision for other circumstances that, alone or when combined with circumstances from the specified categories, are “similar in gravity.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5).
The defendant seeking a reduction of his sentence bears the burden to establish that the defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies and that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to warrant a reduction of his or her sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Greenhut, 2:18-CR-00048-CAS-1, 2020 WL 509385, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020) (holding that a defendant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to sentencing reduction and citing United States v. Sprague, 135 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1998)).
DISCUSSION
I. Exhaustion
Defendant requested compassionate release from the warden of FCI Sheridan on July 20, 2023, and his request was denied. Def.'s Mot., ECF 49, 56, at 3. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is ripe for review.
II. Merits
In both of his Motions Defendant checked “yes” in response to the section stating, “do you believe there are other extraordinary and compelling reasons for your release” and selected from the available options the box for “there are other extraordinary and compelling reasons for my release.” Def. Mots. at 4. Defendant, however, did not enter any information in the section that directs the movant to “explain . . . the basis for your request.” Id. at 5. In the Proposed Release Plan that Defendant filed in both cases, however, Defendant includes his administrative request for compassionate release in which he states, “I was sentenced in February of [2023]. My child was born in December of [2022]. My fiance is haveing [ sic ] a difficult time with the bills and the ability to get to work with a newborn. I respectfully request compassionate release for this reason.” Def. Proposed Release Plan, ECF 50, 57 at 6. In his Replies Defendant states he has four children living with his significant other and three of the four are Defendant's children from a previous relationship. His three older children are ages 15, 16, and 17. Def. Reply, ECF 52, 60, at 1. Defendant notes the mother of his older three children “lost her rights because of neglect and abuse....These disadvantages are grave for my [three older] children as there [sic] only custodial parent is not in the picture.” Id. Defendant explains that he signed “power of attorney to my [significant other] thinking that would be enough to take care of” his older kids, but she has not been able “to get food stamps [for them because] . . . she is not there [sic] biological parent.” Id. In addition, enrolling the older children in school is going to be “tricky as there must be one of their parents to sign them up for school last year.” Id. The Government asserts Defendant fails to establish family circumstances that satisfy the extraordinary and compelling standard and, therefore, his Motions should be denied.
Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13(b)(3) sets out the following family circumstances of a defendant that constitute an extraordinary or compelling reason to reduce a sentence:
(A) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or the defendant's child who is 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability or a medical condition.
(B) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.
(C) The incapacitation of the defendant's parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the parent.
(D) The defendant establishes that circumstances similar to those listed in paragraphs (3)(A) through (3)(C) exist involving any other immediate family member or an individual whose relationship with the defendant is similar in kind to that of an immediate family member, when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for such family member or individual.
In his Proposed Release Plan Defendant submitted letters from his significant other, a student attendance coach at the high school attended by Defendant's three older children, and the director of A Way Out. Defendant's significant other states her monthly income ranges from $1,500 to $1,800 per month and although “rental assistance programs have helped with housing costs,” state “assistance is only available for her and [her son because she] lack[s] legal rights to the three teens.” Prop Rel. Plan, ECF 52, 57 at 10. As a result, Defendant's significant other states she cannot “access TANIF or other forms of state aid” or enroll the older children in school. Id. She states her family support is “limited to [her] 88-year-old grandfather” and Defendant's family is “unavailable.” Id. None of the letters, however, indicate there has been “[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children” or “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner” or parent and that Defendant “would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner” or parent.
Although Defendant's family circumstances are unfortunate, they do not meet the criteria set out in § 1B1.13(1)(C). See, e.g., United States v. Kniss, No. 3:18- CR-00142-MO, 2020 WL 6200183, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 21, 2020)(noting it is “difficult for a family when one parent goes to prison,” but declining to find it qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling circumstance when the defendant merely wants to provide financial support); United States v. Adesanya, No. 3:21-CR-0321-B, 2024 WL 251925, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2024)(denying motion for compassionate release when the defendant asserted “his wife's immigration status means she cannot work or register their kids for school,” he “was the primary financial provider for [their] family” and his family “is under a continuous threat of eviction” because “many, if not most, families face financial difficulties when their family members, especially their primary financial provider, is incarcerated. Something that affects so many inmates and their families generally cannot be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying early release.”). The Court, therefore, concludes Defendant has not established an extraordinary or compelling reason for compassionate release exists in this case. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's Motions for Sentence Reduction.
CONCLUSION
The Court DENIES Defendant's Motions for Sentence Reduction Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), ECF 49, 56.
IT IS SO ORDERED.