Opinion
3:11-cr-00025
2022-02-01
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Christopher M. ROBERTSON, Defendant.
Andrea Leigh Glasgow, United States Attorney's Office, Davenport, IA, for Plaintiff.
Andrea Leigh Glasgow, United States Attorney's Office, Davenport, IA, for Plaintiff.
ORDER GRANTING COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
ROBERT W. PRATT, Judge
Before the Court is Defendant Christopher Robertson's Pro Se Motion for Compassionate Release, filed on July 26, 2021. ECF No. 135. Counsel for Defendant filed an appearance and a supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Compassionate Release in September 2021. ECF Nos. 136, 137. The Government filed a Response in Opposition. ECF No. 139. Defendant replied to the Government's Response, ECF No. 140, and filed additional briefing with the Court in October 2021, ECF No. 141. The matter is fully submitted.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was raised by a single mother in a lower-class neighborhood in Iowa. ECF No. 74 ¶¶ 54, 57. Defendant started using illegal drugs in his teens. Id. ¶¶ 65, 66. He dropped out of high school after completing the ninth grade in order to work full time. Id. ¶ 71. When his dad died of heart disease, Defendant struggled with the loss of his father and relied on the close relationships he had with his mother and siblings. Id. ¶¶ 54, 56, 57. Defendant, however, started to increase his drug use into young adulthood, staying "awake on methamphetamine" for periods as long as a week at a time. Id. ¶ 65. Defendant struggled with addiction to the point where he was selling drugs to pay off drug debts. Id. ¶ 18. Defendant was in his late-twenties by the time he was arrested for the federal offense in this case. See id. at 4.
Defendant was arrested in February 2011 after a search warrant was executed by law enforcement officers at his residence following an intercepted controlled delivery of marijuana and methamphetamine. Id. ¶¶ 10, 14. Between 2010 and 2011, Defendant had conspired with his Codefendant to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(D), and 846. ECF No. 92. Defendant also possessed firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Id. After Defendant was indicted, the Government filed a notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851 enhancing Defendant's drug-offense penalty based on a prior felony drug offense. ECF No. 24; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), 851. The prior felony used to enhance Defendant's sentence was a 2003 Iowa conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. ECF No. 24 ¶ 1. The § 851 recidivist enhancement increased Defendant's mandatory minimum term from five years to ten years in prison under § 841(b)(1)(B). Defendant eventually accepted a plea deal and pleaded guilty to two counts of a four-count Indictment: Conspiracy to Manufacture and Distribute Drugs (Count One) under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(D), and 846, and Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking (Count Four) under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). ECF Nos. 46, 47, 53. Defendant also stipulated to the § 851 enhancement and waived a hearing on the § 851 notice. ECF No. 47 ¶ 8. In 2012, this Court sentenced Defendant to 180 months’ imprisonment, including 120 months on Count One to be followed by sixty consecutive months on Count Four, and eight years of supervised release. ECF No. 92.
Defendant is currently in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) at FMC Rochester. Find an Inmate , Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/mobile/find_inmate (last visited Jan. 25, 2022). He is thirty-eight years old. Id. He has been incarcerated for over a decade of his life and is projected to be released from prison on March 18, 2024. ECF No. 135 at 24. Since beginning his term of incarceration, Defendant has successfully completed numerous prison programs, including drug-abuse education and vocational training. Id. at 16–21. In addition, Defendant has maintained contact with an outside employer, who as of June 2021, promises Defendant full-time employment with a decent starting wage upon Defendant's release. Id. at 22.
In June 2021, Defendant requested compassionate release from the Warden at FMC Rochester under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). ECF No. 135 at 15; ECF No. 137 at 4. Defendant argued for compassionate release on four grounds: (1) the length of his enhanced sentence created a sentencing disparity following reforms under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018); (2) he feared contracting the virus that causes COVID-19; (3) he presented significant post-sentencing rehabilitation; and (4) as a non-violent offender under a minimum-security classification, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of his early release. ECF No. 135 at 12-14. The Warden denied Defendant's request. ECF No. 137-1 at 1.
Defendant then filed a Motion with this Court seeking relief on the same grounds. ECF No. 135. The Government has opposed Defendant's Motion. ECF No. 139. The Government argues that Defendant's Motion should be denied because: (1) Defendant is vaccinated against the virus that causes COVID-19; (2) he does not have any health concerns to qualify for compassionate release; (3) there are no extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release; and (4) his recent disciplinary infractions "cast doubt on the defendant's claimed rehabilitation." Id. at 1, 14 (stating Defendant possessed a "hazardous tool" in 2020 and a cell phone on two separate occasions in 2018 and 2019). The Government appears to concede that Defendant faces a sentencing disparity.
II. ANALYSIS
The First Step Act amended various provisions of the U.S. Code to promote rehabilitation of prisoners and unwind decades of mass incarceration. Cong. Research Serv., R45558, The First Step Act of 2018: An Overview 1 (2019). Congress designed § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow federal prisoners to move for compassionate release directly with U.S. district courts—instead of solely relying on the BOP's determination—to maximize the use and transparency of the statute. See First Step Act, § 603(b). In addition to increasing access to compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the First Step Act restricted which prior convictions could serve as predicate offenses for harsh sentencing enhancements under §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and 851. Logically, these congressional reforms under the First Step Act can and should be considered in tandem when deciding compassionate release motions, especially given that these reforms fall under the same umbrella of combating mass incarceration in our country. In deciding whether a defendant should be granted compassionate release, this Court considers three things: (1) exhaustion of administrative remedies with the BOP under § 3582(c)(1)(A) ; (2) whether a defendant has "extraordinary and compelling" justifications for early release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) plus any relevant policy statements from the U.S. Sentencing Commission; and (3) whether the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of release. See, e.g., United States v. Santamaria , 516 F. Supp. 3d 832, 835 (S.D. Iowa 2021).
A. Exhaustion
First, § 3582(c)(1)(A) includes a gatekeeping provision that provides two routes for a defendant to bring a compassionate-release motion to the Court. A defendant may file a motion after fully exhausting administrative remedy procedures with the BOP. Id. Alternatively, a defendant may file a motion after "the lapse of [thirty] days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." Id.
Here, Defendant's Motion is ripe for review because the Warden denied his June 2021 request. Therefore, for purposes of this Motion, Defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies with the BOP and the Court can proceed on the merits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Second, the Court must determine whether Defendant presents "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) or any relevant policy statement by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. The Sentencing Commission provides several factors to consider in Application Note 1 of § 1B1.13 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. This includes the defendant's medical condition, age, family circumstances, and any "other reasons" considered extraordinary and compelling in the discretion of the BOP Director. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 1B1.13 app. n. 1(A)–(D) (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2021). Following the First Step Act, federal district courts assume the same discretion as the BOP Director when considering any other extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. See, e.g., United States v. Cantu , 423 F. Supp. 3d 345, 352 (S.D. Tex. 2019). The factors in the Policy Statement and its commentary at § 1B1.13 are relevant, but not binding on district courts, in deciding whether "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a reduction in sentence. See United States v. Marcussen , 15 F.4th 855, 859 (8th Cir. 2021) ("[The Policy Statement] has not been revised since the First Step Act authorized inmates to seek reductions directly.... [T]he First Step Act in 2018 did not change the discretion afforded the district court."). The only limit Congress has provided is that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (emphasis added).
Many courts—including this one—conclude that disparities created by sentencing law reforms are "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 Application Note 1(D). United States v. Jones , No. 4:06-cr-00278, 2021 WL 1156631, at *5 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 25, 2021) ; United States v. Brown , 457 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (S.D. Iowa 2020), appeal dismissed following government request , No. 20-2053 (8th Cir. June 16, 2020) (holding changes to mandatory minimum sentence calculations for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) constitute one of several extraordinary and compelling reasons); e.g., United States v. McPherson , 454 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1053 (W.D. Wash. 2020) ("It is extraordinary that a civilized society can allow this to happen to someone who, by all accounts, has long since learned his lesson."); United States v. Weissinger , 542 F.Supp.3d 882, 887 (E.D. Mo. 2021) (" ‘Extraordinary and compelling reasons’ may include circumstances where, as here, the defendant would receive a significantly lower sentence than the one he is currently serving if sentenced today for the same conduct."); United States v. Chambers , No. 3:12-cr-00071, 2021 WL 4840594, at *3 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2021) (holding that a "longer sentenced imposed compared to the sentence [a defendant] would receive if sentenced today" is an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting compassionate release).
Even before the First Step Act, it was known that § 851 enhancements led to extreme sentencing disparities. See, e.g., United States v. Young , 960 F. Supp. 2d 881, 903 (N.D. Iowa 2013) ("For unknown and unknowable reasons, federal prosecutors have been applying massive numbers of § 851 enhancements in many districts and not in others" creating a sentencing disparity that is "stunningly arbitrary."); U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 253, 255 (2011) (reporting a "lack of uniformity" in the application of § 851 enhancements, with prosecutors in some districts filing § 851 enhancements in over seventy-five percent of eligible cases while prosecutors in other districts filing no § 851 enhancements in any case in which the defendant was eligible); United States v. Kupa , 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("To coerce guilty pleas, and sometimes to coerce cooperation as well, prosecutors routinely threaten ultra-harsh, enhanced mandatory sentences that no one —not even the prosecutors themselves—thinks are appropriate.").
Then, in 2018, Congress recognized the inequities caused by § 851 enhancements by enacting the First Step Act, which reduced and restricted sentencing enhancements based on prior drug felonies. See First Step Act § 401(a). But Congress did not expressly state that its reforms under §§ 841(b)(1) and 851 applied to cases retroactively. Id. § 401(c). This means that compassionate release has become one of the only remedies available for defendants sentenced before the First Step Act to seek justice for disparate sentencing. And in fact, this result aligns with "Congress's purpose in enacting § 3582(c)(1)(A) ... to provide a narrow avenue for relief ‘when there is not a specific statute that already affords relief but "extraordinary and compelling reasons" nevertheless justify a [sentence] reduction.’ " United States v. McGee , 992 F.3d 1035, 1047 (10th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Here, Defendant argues that the disparity created by the sentence he received in 2012 and the sentence he would receive today is an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. Defendant argues that the prior drug felony on his record could not trigger the § 851 enhancement to his § 841(b)(1)(B) violation if he were sentenced today. This is because the First Step Act narrowed the category of prior convictions that justify an § 851 enhancement. The predicate offense today must be a "serious drug felony," instead of merely a "felony drug offense," as was previously defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). See § 841(b)(1)(B) ; First Step Act § 401(a)(1). "Serious drug felonies" do not include (A) convictions for which an offender served twelve months or less in prison, 21 U.S.C. § 802(57) ; (B) convictions for which the offender has been released from prison more than fifteen years prior to the instant offense, id. § 802(57) ; and (C) those offenses punishable by a maximum of less than ten years, as cross-referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2). First Step Act § 401(a)(1).
In Defendant's situation, he did not serve twelve or more months in prison for his 2003 drug felony, Iowa case number FECR063472, and his prior offense was a Class D Felony punishable by a maximum of five years in prison. ECF No. 137 at 3, 7. This means that by the very definition of "serious drug felony," the 2003 state drug offense would not trigger an § 851 enhancement. Because the prior felony would not qualify as a predicate drug offense under modern law, the Government could not have filed an § 851 notice if Defendant were prosecuted today. And if Defendant had not been strapped with an § 851 enhancement, his mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(B) would have been five years instead of ten. Those five years would be combined with another consecutive five-year term for his § 924(c) conviction. Hence, today the Court would likely sentence Defendant to a total of ten years for his offenses and that is less than the length of time he has already served in prison.
The Court is aware of the uncertainty regarding whether the categorical approach applies to recidivist sentencing enhancements under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, Title II, § 101, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. ). See Stewart v. United States , 552 F.Supp.3d 834, 842 (S.D. Iowa 2021). The Supreme Court, however, has "articulated three factors to consider when determining whether a federal recidivism statute is susceptible to overbreadth, subjecting it to a categorical analysis." Id. But the parties do not raise the issue of overbreadth here. Thus, the Court can proceed without conducting a categorical analysis of the state and federal elements of Defendant's prior state drug felony.
What is more, the Government raises no rebuttal to Defendant's sentencing disparity argument. As this Court has previously held, reforms to the type of prior offenses that trigger mandatory terms of imprisonment can be an extraordinary and compelling justification for early release. The criminal legal system would otherwise create "unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." § 3553(a)(6). This Court concludes that non-retroactive changes to the predicate offenses that trigger an § 851 penalty enhancement can constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, in combination with other factors in each individual case. The Court is sensitive to the fact that retroactivity for sentencing calculations generally is the Legislature's province. However, Congress already demonstrated how factors that cannot be an "extraordinary and compelling reason" alone can still be considered with other factors. See § 994(t) ; see also United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 286 (4th Cir. 2020) ("The fact that Congress chose not to make [sections] of the First Step Act categorically retroactive does not mean that courts may not consider that legislative change in conducting their individualized reviews of motions for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)."); McGee , 992 F.3d at 1046–47 ("Nothing in § 401(c) or any other part of the First Step Act indicates that Congress intended to prohibit district courts, on an individualized, case-by-case basis, from granting sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) to some of those defendants."). In conjunction with Defendant's successful post-sentencing rehabilitation and his unique history and characteristics the Court therefore concludes Defendant has established his sentencing disparity is an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Court need not address Defendant's alternative argument under U.S.S.G. Amendment 782 ("Drugs Minus Two Amendment") as it finds the sentencing disparity already exists for the reasons stated above. See ECF No. 137 at 9. Finally, in making its determination, the Court has considered any relevant factors in the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 Policy Statement and its commentary. Marcussen , 15 F.4th at 859.
The Court recognizes the current circuit split over this issue; however, the Eighth Circuit has declined to take a position on whether non-retroactive changes in federal sentencing can serve as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See, e.g., United States v. Davis , 19 F.4th 1083, 1085 n.4 (8th Cir. 2021).
C. § 3553(a) Factors
Third, even if extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for Defendant's release, the Court's decision must comport with any applicable § 3553(a) factors. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress has instructed the Court that a sentence imposed shall be "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to achieve the purpose of sentencing. § 3553(a). Considerations under § 3553(a) include, but are not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the offense, Defendant's history and characteristics, the seriousness of underlying offense, whether the sentence affords adequate deterrence, and protecting the public from the risk of Defendant's further crimes. Id.
The Court is well aware of the seriousness of the underlying offenses in this case. However, Defendant's time served incarcerated satisfies any need for the federal sentence imposed. § 3553(a)(2). Defendant has served 130 months of his prison sentence. If he were sentenced today for the same offenses, he likely would be sentenced to 120 months. This suggests that Defendant has already served a fair sentence and that the goals of incarceration have been achieved. See, e.g., United States v. Ledezma-Rodriguez , 472 F. Supp. 3d 498, 504–05 (S.D. Iowa 2020). The Court thus holds Defendant's sentence is greater than necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offenses, afford adequate deterrence, and serve the purpose of his original sentence. See § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B), (D).
Additionally, the need for the sentence imposed appears weaker given the high risk of contracting COVID-19 at FMC Rochester. FMC Rochester is currently suspending visitation until further notice due to the COVID-19 pandemic and is under the highest level of modified operations in an attempt to control the spread of the virus. See FMC Rochester , Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/rch (last visited Jan. 27, 2022). FMC Rochester reports 335 inmates have tested positive at its facility, with thirty-three inmates and twenty-one staff currently testing positive for the virus. COVID-19 Cases , Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus (last updated Jan. 26, 2022). This is a stark increase from September 2021, when there were "[zero] confirmed active cases" at FMC Rochester. ECF No. 139 at 5. True enough Defendant is vaccinated, but that does not preclude release because the record does not reflect whether he has received a booster dose of the COVID-19 vaccine to further protect against a breakthrough infection. Scientific studies show breakthrough infections are common and that is why booster shots are urged by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 Vaccine Booster Shots , https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/booster-shot.html?s_cid=11706:cdc% 20covid% 20booster% 20shot% 20guidelines:sem.ga:p:RG:GM:gen:PTN:FY22 (last updated Jan. 21, 2022) (recommending adults ages eighteen and older get a booster shot because "[s]tudies show after getting vaccinated against COVID-19, protection against the virus and the ability to prevent infection with variants may decrease over time"). "To be optimally protected, a person needs to get a booster shot when and if eligible." Id. Given Defendant's concerns about contracting the virus that causes COVID-19, the Court holds Defendant has already served a sentence sufficient to reflect the seriousness of the offense, afford adequate deterrence, and provide Defendant with educational and vocational training. See § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B), (D).
But the analysis does not stop there. The Court considers Defendant's history and characteristics. In so doing, the Court assesses Defendant as a whole person. Koon v. U.S. , 518 U.S. 81, 113, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). Starting with his criminal history, Defendant did not have a perfect record leading up to the conviction in this case. See ECF No. 74 ¶¶ 14–52. Looking at the two non-violent offenses for which he received criminal history points under the Sentencing Guidelines, Defendant was convicted of Possession with Intent to Deliver controlled substances in 2003 and Operating Vehicle While Intoxicated in 2008. Id. ¶¶ 43, 44. Defendant also struggled with criminal behavior and addiction as a juvenile. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 40–42, 63, 65–68. Still, the Court recognizes the challenging circumstances surrounding Defendant's youth and finds those circumstances mitigating.
Turning next to Defendant's character and current behavior, his disciplinary record while incarcerated is less than perfect, with three disciplinary violations all within the last few years. See ECF No. 137-2 at 9. But he has made consistent progress over the last decade. Not long after he was sentenced, Defendant earned his high school GED in BOP custody, started taking prison programming courses, and appears to have taken advantage of every opportunity to rehabilitate. See ECF No. 135 at 16; ECF No. 137-2 at 4. He has an impressive vocational training transcript in the construction and building trades. ECF No. 135 at 16–21. These vocational skills will be put into good use in the job Defendant already has lined up upon his release. Id. at 22. While Defendant has struggled with addiction in the past, his "only wish [is] to be released to start a new and better life." Id. at 15. He has completed drug-abuse education to support his readiness for a better life. Id. at 17; ECF No. 137-2 at 3. The Court concludes Defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation is thus mitigating. The Court does not excuse Defendant's criminal history, behavior in manufacturing and distributing controlled substances in violation of federal law, or the dangerous possession of several firearms during the course of his drug offense. The Court is "simply suggesting that [he is a] human being[ ]," with flaws, virtues, and a need for empathy. Richard S. Arnold, Remarks Before the Judicial Conference of the Eighth Circuit: The Art of Judging (Aug. 8, 2002). Defendant's history and characteristics, including his post-sentencing rehabilitation, in conjunction with the Court's analysis of the other § 3553(a) factors, weigh in favor of his release.
Finally, the Court holds that Defendant is not a danger to the public. See § 3553(a)(2)(C) (determining the need for the sentence imposed includes "protect[ing] the public from further crimes of the defendant"). Defendant's criminal behavior occurred during his teens and into his twenties and was largely tangled up with substance abuse. Notably, "parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence." Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). "While age does not excuse behavior, a sentencing court should account for age when inquiring into the conduct of a defendant." United States v. Gall , 374 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 n.2 (S.D. Iowa 2005), rev'd , 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), rev'd , 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Defendant is now almost forty-years old and has hopefully matured out of his youthful behaviors. He is currently classified as a low security risk. ECF No. 137-2 at 15. The Court concludes that Defendant's growth over the past decade mitigates against him posing a danger to the public today. Defendant will also be on supervised release for a period of eight years consistent with the terms of his Amended Judgment. ECF No. 93. Incarceration is not the only "kind[ ] of sentence available," and there are other ways to achieve the same public protection. § 3553(a)(3). Noncustodial sentences like supervised release curtail "prized liberty interests" and "Defendant always faces the harsh consequences that await if he violates the conditions" attached to his release. Gall , 374 F. Supp. 2d at 763, cited with approval in Gall , 552 U.S. at 52 n.7, 128 S.Ct. 586.
The Court therefore holds Defendant not only has extraordinary and compelling reasons for seeking a reduction in sentence but that the § 3553(a) factors strongly weigh in favor of his compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). All of the requirements for compassionate release have therefore been met, and the Court concludes Defendant's early release is justified.
D. Release Plan
The Government does not dispute Defendant's release plan, though it does claim that Defendant's plans have changed from his initial Pro Se Motion. See ECF No. 139 at 1. In Defendant's Pro Se Motion he states that if he is released from prison, he intends to live with an individual in West Branch, Iowa. ECF No. 135 at 8. Then, after obtaining the assistance of counsel, Defendant again proposed to the Court that he be released to live in West Branch, Iowa or, alternatively, with his sister in Oxford, Iowa. ECF No. 135 at 8; ECF No. 137 at 11. Defendant then filed additional briefing with the Court to correct his release plan and make a clear proposal to live with his sister in Oxford upon release. ECF No. 138.
This Court and the U.S. Probation Office (USPO) will work together to ensure Defendant's release plan is workable and ensure his compliance with the conditions of his supervised release as outlined in ECF No. 92. The Court therefore orders Defendant released to reside with his sister, Jesse Hall, at the address identified in his Motion—after inspection and approval by the USPO—or at alternative housing as deemed appropriate by the USPO. Any change in address is subject to USPO approval. Upon release, Defendant shall contact the USPO in the Federal Judicial District where he resides within seventy-two hours. The USPO shall assist Defendant in his efforts to secure employment, and Defendant shall accept and comply with such assistance.
Defendant's prison term is reduced to time served. Defendant's eight-year term of supervised release remains following a ten-day quarantine period with the BOP. Upon commencing supervised release, the Court recommends Defendant reside, participate, and follow the rules of a residential reentry program, as directed by the USPO, for up to 120 days.
Further, this Order is stayed for up to ten days allowing for the Defendant to quarantine while in BOP custody, to allow for the verification of Defendant's residence and release plan, to make appropriate travel arrangements, and to ensure Defendant's safe release. Defendant shall be released as soon as a residence is verified, a release plan is established, appropriate travel arrangements are made, and it is safe for Defendant to travel. There shall be no delay. If more than ten days are needed to make appropriate arrangements and ensure Defendant's safe release, the parties shall immediately notify the Court and show cause why the stay should be extended.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 135) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.