Opinion
CRIMINAL 18-253
06-26-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. MANUEL D. REYNOSO, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BERYL A. HOWELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending before the Court is defendant Manuel D. Reynoso's pro se motion seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Def.'s Mot. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 95. Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition as a person previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count One), and of possessing a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana and n-ethylpentylonea (methamphetamines), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Counts Two and Three), and sentenced, on June 21, 2019, to an aggregate term of 87 months' imprisonment. See Judgment at 1-3, ECF No. 66; Indictment at 1-2, ECF No. 1. Defendant's convictions on all three counts were affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Reynoso, 38 F.4th 1083, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2022). As to Count One, the only conviction collaterally challenged now, the D.C. Circuit rejected defendant's argument, seemingly revived at least in part here, that “his gun-possession conviction should be reversed under Rehaif because the district court failed to instruct the jury that knowledge of felon status is an element of the crime.” Id. at 1088 (citing Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019)).
In what can be gleaned from the thirteen handwritten lines of defendant's form pro se motion, defendant contends: (1) that his property was taken in violation of Due Process and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is construed as a revival of his suppression motion; (2) that his firearm was “used to convict [him] without determining if [he] [is] such a Dangerous person who can't possess said firearm,” an apparent challenge under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022); and (3) that his “Indictment did not comply with” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), which requires “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged,” FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1), and that he “was not put on notice as to all elements of the offense” for violating the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), apparently raising, again, his challenge to his conviction under Rehaif, 588 U.S. 225. For the reasons below, defendant's motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case has been described in detail in this Court's pretrial order denying defendant's motion to suppress, United States v. Reynoso, No. 18-cr-253, 2018 WL 6067430 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2018), and in the D.C. Circuit's opinion affirming defendant's convictions on direct appeal, see Reynoso, 38 F.4th 1083. The facts and procedural history pertinent for consideration of the instant motion are briefly summarized below.
A. Factual Background
Defendant was arrested following a lawful traffic stop, during which he “admitted that he possessed marijuana” and “fled from law enforcement officers[.]” Reynoso, 2018 WL 6067430, at *4 (denying motion to suppress physical evidence seized from defendant's person and vehicle driven by defendant). In the early hours of May 16, 2018, at roughly 1:00 a.m., a Secret Service officer pulled defendant over for driving with his headlights off. Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1087. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer “smelled marijuana” and asked defendant, who was driving “with one passenger in the front and one in the back[,] . . . about the smell.” Id. at 1087-88. Defendant “denied that anyone in the car had been smoking but immediately showed the officer a rolled dollar bill containing a marijuana bud” and “indicated that was the only marijuana in the car.” Id. at 1088. Shortly thereafter, defendant “fled, sprinting toward the National Mall.” Id. During an inspection of the vehicle, an officer saw in plain view “a firearm magazine . . . in the front passenger door.” Reynoso, 2018 WL 6067430, at *2 (citations omitted); see also Trial Tr. at 67:3-13, 110:8-22 (Feb. 12, 2019), ECF No. 83. Defendant was eventually apprehended “near the Tidal Basin . . . carrying $2,890 in cash, two cellphones, a set of keys, and a small amount of methamphetamine.” Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1088. A search of the vehicle by a Secret Service crime scene officer “reveal[ed] a black Glock semi-automatic pistol” concealed underneath the driver's seat floor mat of the vehicle defendant was driving, which gun had attached “an extended magazine containing twenty rounds of .40-caliber ammunition.” Id. (citing Trial Tr. at 210:5-6 (Feb. 12, 2019)).
At the time defendant committed the offense, he had two prior convictions: (1) in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, in 2011, for “distribution or possession with intent to distribute ecstasy . . . and marijuana,” Trial Tr. at 146:10-16 (Feb. 13, 2019), ECF No. 52 (defendant acknowledging prior conviction), for which defendant “was sentenced to two five-year terms, to run consecutively, but with all but ten months suspended,” Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1088; and (2) in the Prince George's County Circuit Court in Maryland, in 2018, for “possession with intent to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm ‘with a conviction of an enumerated or a disqualifying crime,'” id. (citation omitted); see also Trial Tr. at 173:17-20 (Feb. 13, 2019) (Court instructing jury of the same pursuant to parties' stipulation). After denial of defendant's suppression motion, Reynoso, 2018 WL 6067430, at *4, and at the five-day jury trial, defendant acknowledged, by stipulation, that “he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of incarceration,” Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1088, which stipulation this Court instructed the jury was to be considered “for the purpose of proving an element of the charge . . . of being unlawfully in possession of a firearm and ammunition as a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” Trial Tr. at 42:1-5, 174:2125 (Feb. 13, 2019); see also Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1088.
On February 15, 2019, at the close of trial, a jury found defendant guilty on all three counts. Id.; see also Verdict Form, ECF No. 49.
B. Procedural Background
On June 21, 2019, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 87 months' imprisonment, made up of concurrent terms of 87 months' imprisonment on Count One and 12 months' imprisonment on each of Counts Two and Three, to be followed by concurrent terms of supervised release of 36 months on Count One and 12 months on each of Counts Two and Three. See Judgment at 3-4; Min. Entry (June 21, 2019). As part of the sentence, a forfeiture order was entered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d), declaring forfeited to the United States defendant's interest in “a Glock 27, .40 caliber, semi-automatic pistol and .40 caliber ammunition,” which were seized at the time of his arrest and thereby “involved in or used in the knowing commission of the offense.” Order of Forfeiture at 1-2, ECF No. 66-1.
The same day defendant was sentenced, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, establishing that 28 U.S.C. § 922(g)-the felon-in-possession statute underlying defendant's conviction on Count One-requires the government to “prove that a defendant knew both that he engaged in the relevant conduct (that he possessed a firearm) and also that he fell within the relevant status”-here, that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year of imprisonment, id. at 227.
Defendant timely appealed, challenging his convictions on several grounds, including that Count One, charging violation of § 922(g), “should be reversed under Rehaif because the district court failed to instruct the jury that knowledge of felon status is an element of the crime,” and “that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him on the omitted knowledge-of-status element.” Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1088, 1090.
On direct appeal, defendant additionally argued (1) “the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's conclusion that he possessed the gun found under the floor mat of the BMW,” Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1089, and (2) that “the government exercised an unlawful, race-based peremptory strike to remove a Black juror from the jury pool,” id. at 1096 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)), and (3) “several claims relating to his Sixth Amendment right to call Valle Rodriguez as a witness at trial,” id. at 1094, each of which arguments the Circuit rejected, see id. at 1087, 1098.
On July 1, 2022, after holding the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021), see Per Curiam Order, United States v. Reynoso, No. 19-3045 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 1, 2021), the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment, see Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1098, and on August 24, 2022, the mandate issued, see Mandate, United States v. Reynoso, No. 19-3045 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2022). On October 26, 2023, defendant's pending pro se § 2255 motion seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence was docketed, see Def.'s Mot. On November 24, 2023, defendant was released from his term of imprisonment and began a 36-month period of supervised release, set to expire November 23, 2026. See Prob. Mem. at 1, ECF No. 98. With the filing of the government's opposition brief on February 29, 2024, with no reply from defendant within the time provided, see Scheduling Order (Dec. 7, 2023) (directing “defendant to submit any reply by March 6, 2024”), or otherwise, the issue is now ripe for resolution.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A person in federal custody may petition the court to “vacate, set aside, or correct” a sentence “upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A court shall correct a sentence if “the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or . . . there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack[.]” Id. § 2255(b).
“[T]he ‘in custody' language has not required that a prisoner be physically confined in order to challenge his sentence on habeas corpus,” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989), and “[a] prisoner on supervised release is considered to be ‘in custody' for purposes of a § 2255 motion,” United States v. Sutherland, 103 F.4th 200, 205 n.1 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); see also Hanson v. United States, No. 23-5166, 2023 WL 5569546, at *2 (6th Cir. July 13, 2023) (same), cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 1118 (2024); Scanio v. United States, 37 F.3d 858, 860 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).
A judgment challenged on collateral attack carries with it a “presumption of regularity,” even “when the question is waiver of constitutional rights.” Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001) (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992)). The burden of proof rests on the petitioner to establish a denial of constitutional rights by a preponderance of evidence. See United States v. Simpson, 475 F.2d 934, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); see also United States v. West, 68 F.4th 1335, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“The more likely than not standard is the usual standard applied in § 2255 cases[.]” (citations omitted)).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant's form pro se motion, raising several purported Due Process grounds for why his sentence should be set aside under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, boils down to three challenges. First, that defendant's “firearm was taken in violation of the Takings Clause” and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-an apparent challenge to the lawfulness of the search from which officers recovered the firearm and ammunition underlying defendant's § 922(g)(1) conviction, and which search this Court had previously determined to be lawful. Def.'s Mot. at 5; see Reynoso, 2018 WL 6067430, at *4. Second, that defendant's firearm was “used to convict [him] without determining if [he] [is] such a Dangerous person who can't possess said firearm,” an apparent challenge under Bruen, 597 U.S. 1. Def.'s Mot. at 5. Finally, under Rehaif, that defendant's “Indictment did not comply” with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), and defendant “was not put on notice as to all elements of the offense” of possessing a firearm as a person previously convicted of a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)-relitigating in part an argument the D.C. Circuit had conclusively rejected on direct appeal. Def.'s Mot. at 5; see Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1098. As explained below, although defendant's motion is timely, defendant has either procedurally defaulted on these claims or otherwise failed to demonstrate any basis for relief on the merits. His motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under § 2255 is accordingly denied.
A. Timeliness of Defendant's Pending Motion
Section 2255 “impose[s] a one-year ‘period of limitation' on all motions made under § 2255.” United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)). The government raises no timeliness objection, see generally Gov't's Opp'n Def.'s Mot. (“Gov't's Opp'n”), ECF No. 101, and defendant contends only that the “one year limitations period” does not apply, Def.'s Mot. at 4-5 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, and Rehaif, 588 U.S. 225). Given that the “[f]ailure to meet that statutory deadline would close the courthouse doors to the Section 2255 motion, absent exceptional circumstances,” whether defendant's motion complies with the statute's one-year limitation period is a threshold determination. United States v. Rice, 727 Fed.Appx. 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. McDade, 699 F.3d 499, 503-04 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (recognizing the Supreme Court's holding in Holland v. Florida “that the limitations period in § 2244(d)”-the “nearly identical provision” to § 2255(f) applicable to State court judgments-“was not jurisdictional,” and that “in view of Holland, [] equitable tolling applies to motions filed pursuant to § 2255” (citing Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010))). The Court finds that defendant's motion satisfies the time requirements of Section 2255(f).
The one-year limitation period in Section 2255(f) “‘run[s] from the latest of' several events, including, as relevant here, ‘the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final[.]'” United States v. Arrington, 4 F.4th 162, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)). “For someone who, like [defendant], does not petition . . . for certiorari, a judgment becomes final when the time to seek certiorari expires-ordinarily, 90 days after judgment.” Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 531 (2022) (citing Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003), and Sup. Ct. R. 13.1); see also Hicks, 283 F.3d at 387; Sup. Ct. R. 13.3 (“The time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment . . . not from the issuance date of the mandate[.]”). Under the “mailbox rule,” a “prisoner files a document at the time he ‘deliver[s] it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Blount v. United States, 860 F.3d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (alterations in original) (quoting Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988)); see also Rule 3(d), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings (2019) (“A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely if deposited in the institution's internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing.”); Charles Alan Wright et al., 3 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 632 (5th ed.) (“A § 2255 motion is deemed ‘filed' on the day the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities to be mailed.”).
Under this precedent, defendant's motion is timely. The D.C. Circuit issued the decision affirming defendant's convictions on July 1, 2022, and the 90-day period for seeking certiorari was extended, on defendant's motion, to November 28, 2022, which is the start date of the one- year clock, as defendant did not file a petition. See Ltr., United States v. Reynoso, No. 19-3045 (Sept. 26, 2022) (letter from Supreme Court Clerk of Court advising that defendant's “application for an extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari . . . has been presented to The Chief Justice, who . . . extended the time to and including November 28, 2022”). With defendant's pro se motion dated August 24, 2023, and received by this Courthouse on September 29, 2023, see Def.'s Mot., defendant's motion was “filed” within this one-year period ending on November 28, 2023, and thus, is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
B. Defendant's Claims That Property Was Taken in Violation of Due Process and the Takings Clause Are Without Merit.
In four handwritten lines, defendant asserts that his “property was taken in violation of Due Process” and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Def.'s Mot. at 5. This argument is raised for the first time on collateral review. In this circumstance, his claims are “deemed to be procedurally defaulted and may be raised in habeas only if [he] establishes either (i) ‘cause' for the default and ‘actual prejudice' resulting from the alleged violation, or (ii) his ‘actual innocence.'” United States v. Hicks, 911 F.3d 623, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998)). Defendant's pro se motion fails to address the procedural bar to considering the merits of his claims, and thus provides no basis for excusing the procedural default or establishing either “actual prejudice” or “actual innocence.” Id. “[P]rocedural default is generally a preliminary issue to be addressed before a federal court's consideration of the merits of a claim[.]” United States v. Johnson, No. 98-cr-71 (BAH), 2023 WL 4234651, at *10 (D.D.C. June 28, 2023) (citation omitted). Yet, because the “prejudice analysis essentially requires a merits analysis,” when, as here, “relief is due to be denied even if claims are not procedurally barred, a federal court can skip over the procedural bar issues to . . . address the merits of a defendant's claims.” Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). In this case, where defendant's motion fails “even if [his] claims are not procedurally barred,” Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted), “skip[ping] over the procedural bar issues” is appropriate, id.; see also Reynoso v. Lumpkin, 854 Fed.Appx. 605, 605 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[I]nstead of deciding if [petitioner] can overcome his procedural default . . . we will cut straight to the merits to deny his claim.” (alterations in original; citation omitted)).
On the merits, defendant offers neither legal argument nor factual detail to supplement the skeletal four lines of his Due Process and Takings Clause challenges, leaving little substantive basis for this Court to address such a fragment of an argument. Insofar as defendant challenges the lawfulness of the Fourth Amendment search from which officers recovered the firearm and ammunition underlying defendant's conviction on Count One, that argument fails for the same reasons articulated in the denial of defendant's pretrial motion to suppress, following thorough consideration of the memoranda of law submitted by defendant and the government, and testimony presented at a suppression hearing on defendant's motion. Reynoso, 2018 WL 6067430, at *4; see also Suppression Hr'g Tr. Part II at 33:14-18 (Nov. 16, 2018), ECF No. 41 (orally denying defendant's motion).
As this Court determined, there was “objectively reasonable probable cause for the initial stop” of the vehicle driven by defendant, given the officer's testimony that he “stopped the defendant for driving at night without any headlights, a violation of” D.C. Municipal Regulations. Reynoso, 2018 WL 6067430, at *3 (citations omitted); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” (citations omitted)). With defendant's vehicle lawfully detained for a traffic violation, and after the officer smelled marijuana and “defendant conceded that there was at least a small amount of marijuana in the car,” Reynoso, 2018 WL 6067430, at *3 (citation omitted), the officer had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained drug contraband and thus to conduct a search pursuant to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, see United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing the automobile exception, “officers generally may search a car if it ‘is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband'” (quoting United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012))). “Before [the officer] had the opportunity to search the car, however, the defendant took flight and a different officer discovered . . . a magazine . . . in plain view in the vehicle, providing further probable cause for a warrantless search” of the vehicle from which officers recovered the Glock semi-automatic pistol with a high-capacity magazine containing 20 rounds of ammunition, the basis for defendant's conviction on Count One. Reynoso, 2018 WL 6067430, at *3. In short, defendant's conclusory argument offers no basis to depart from the prior holding that the vehicle search, from which officers recovered the semi-automatic pistol underlying defendant's conviction on Count One, was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at *4.
Second, to the extent defendant contends that his “property was taken” in violation of his Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment, Def.'s Mot. at 5, he “never explain[s] what additional process was due, as is required to bring a procedural due process claim . . . nor what fundamental right [he] [was] deprived of, as is required for a substantive due process claim,” and the record affords no basis for concluding that defendant was denied such due process, Abuzeid v. Mayorkas, 62 F.4th 578, 582 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (citing Barkley v. U.S. Marshals Serv. Ex rel. Hylton, 766 F.3d 25, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and Abigail All. For Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). The search of the vehicle and seizure of the firearm were lawful under the Fourth Amendment, see supra, and thus no violation of defendant's Due Process rights occurred in the forfeiture of that property upon defendant's conviction on Count One. Defendant was put on notice, through the Indictment's forfeiture allegations, that the property seized from him would be forfeited upon his conviction of the § 922(g) violation, see Indictment at 2-3 (alleging that “[u]pon conviction . . . the defendant shall forfeit to the United States . . . any firearms and ammunition involved in or used in the knowing commission of this offense”); he consented to forfeiture rather than seek the jury's determination of forfeiture under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(5), see Order of Forfeiture at 1; and he did not raise the issue of forfeiture on appeal; see generally Reynoso, 38 F.4th 1083. Simply put, there was no violation of defendant's Due Process rights in the search, seizure, or forfeiture of defendant's property.
Finally, defendant's two-line argument that his property was taken in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is likewise without any merit. See Def.'s Mot. at 5; U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting the government from taking “private property . . . for public use, without just compensation”); Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147 (2021). Where, as here, the government “lawfully acquired” defendant's firearm “under the exercise of governmental authority”-i.e., the lawful search of the vehicle driven by defendant and pursuant to the Court's Forfeiture Order-the “government may not be required to compensate an owner for [such] property.” Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452-53 (1996) (citation omitted) (holding forfeiture of wife's interest in car used in connection with violation of state indecency law was not “a taking of private property for public use”); see also McCutchen v. United States, 145 Fed.Cl. 42, 51 (2019) (recognizing “there are certain exercises of the police power that have repeatedly been treated as legitimate even in the absence of compensation to the owners,” including “government actions taken to enforce prohibitions on the use or possession of dangerous contraband, or to require the forfeiture of property used in connection with criminal activity” (brackets and quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases)), aff'd on other grounds, 14 F.4th 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021). With the government having “seized [defendant's] property” pursuant to a lawful search of the vehicle, and obtained a Forfeiture Order upon defendant's conviction, the “[p]roperty seized and retained pursuant to the police power [was] not taken for a ‘public use' in the context of the Takings Clause.” Nicholas v. U.S. Secret Serv., No. 18-cv-606 (EGS), 2020 WL 2571520, at *1 (D.D.C. May 21, 2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
Further weakening defendant's Due Process and Takings Clause arguments is defendant's assertion at trial that he did not own the forfeited firearm, see Trial Tr. at 38:25-39:2 (Feb. 12, 2019); Trial Tr. at 180:15-23, 188:11-20 (Feb. 13, 2019), when such ownership is a predicate for his constitutional claims, see Scahill v. District of Columbia, 909 F.3d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (providing that to succeed on a procedural due process claim, plaintiff must “identify a cognizable liberty or property interest”).
C. Defendant's Bruen Challenge Fails.
Defendant next argues that his property was “used to convict [him] without determining if [he] [is] such a Dangerous person who can't possess said firearm.” Def.'s Mot. at 5 (capitalization omitted). Again, defendant offers neither legal argument nor factual support for this challenge, but appears to assert his entitlement to possess the firearm due to Bruen's holding that “the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual's right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 10; Def.'s Mot. at 4-5 (citing Bruen in statute-of-limitations section of form motion). This argument is meritless. Bruen did not “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons[.]” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), and citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010)); see also United States v. Rahimi, No. 22-915, 602 U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___ 2024 WL 3074728, at *5, *11 (June 21, 2024) (holding “[a]n individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment” and recognizing “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626)). Indeed, “[a]s seven other judges in this district have concluded, the D.C. Circuit has decided that felons are not entitled to the protections of the Second Amendment,” United States v. Richardson, No. 23-cr-200 (JDB), 2024 WL 402948, at *3 & n.2 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2024) (collecting cases) (citing Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[A] felony conviction removes one from the scope of the Second Amendment[.]”)). Given defendant's prior felony convictions, see Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1088, the Second Amendment simply did not cover his possession of a firearm and ammunition as a person previously convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
D. Defendant's Rehaif Challenge Fails.
Defendant's remaining argument rests on the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif, decided the day of defendant's sentencing in this case. Again, in five short lines, defendant contends that the “Indictment did not comply” with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) and that he “was not put on notice as to all elements of [the] offense as required in Rehaif.” Def.'s Mot. at 5. This argument fails on multiple grounds.
First, insofar as defendant attempts to relitigate the argument thoroughly considered and rejected by the D.C. Circuit-that his felon-in-possession conviction must be reversed because the jury instructions omitted “an element of the crime,” i.e., that defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm-that argument falls flat. Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1088, 1091 (citing Rehaif, 588 U.S. 225). The D.C. Circuit, reviewing defendant's Rehaif jury instructions challenge for plain error, affirmed defendant's conviction on Count One, finding no plain error in the jury not being instructed that “it needed to find Reynoso knew he had been convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year in prison,” id. at 1090, and that the Supreme Court's decision in Greer “foreclose[d]” defendant's challenge, id. at 1093 (citing Greer, 593 U.S. 503); see Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134-35 (2018) (providing that for relief on plain error grounds, “there must be an error that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned,” “the error must be plain-that is to say, clear or obvious,” “the error must have affected the defendant's substantial rights,” and “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 194 (2016))). In Greer, the Supreme Court held that “Rehaif errors in felon-inpossession cases ordinarily will not justify plain-error relief because proof that the defendant was a felon will usually also suffice to show that he knew he was a felon.” Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1092 (citing Greer, 593 U.S. at 508-09); see Greer, 593 U.S. at 509-10, 515 (finding no plain error where, “[b]efore their respective felon-in-possession offenses, both [defendants] had been convicted of multiple felonies”; “[n]either defendant has ever disputed the fact of their prior convictions”; defendants either “stipulated to the fact that he was a felon” or “admitted that he was a felon when he pled guilty”; and “on appeal, neither . . . argued or made a representation that they would have presented evidence at trial that they did not in fact know they were felons when they possessed firearms”).
As in Greer, the Circuit found the “record plainly indicate[d] that Reynoso knew he was a felon at the time he was found with a gun” where, “[a]t trial, Reynoso stipulated that he had previously been convicted of offenses punishable by more than one year in prison,” which “felon status [was] itself probative of knowledge of felon status,” id. at 1093-94 (citing Greer, 593 U.S. at 509), and documents submitted by defendant relating to his prior Virginia and Maryland convictions “demonstrate that he must have known he had been convicted of offenses punishable by more than a year of imprisonment,” id. at 1093. Accordingly, the jury instructions used at defendant's trial, while excluding the knowledge-of-status element under Rehaif, “did not affect Reynoso's substantial rights,” nor had defendant “show[n] that the proceedings were fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 1093-94. “Rather, the overwhelming probability is that [defendant's] trial would have come out the same way had the jury instructions included the knowledge-of-status element.” Id. at 1093. The Circuit concluded that the jury instructions did not “undermine the ‘fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,'” id. at 109394 (quoting Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 194)-the plain-error test's fourth prong-since defendant “stipulated to his felon status at trial” and offered “no reason to think that his case is an exception” to the general rule that “felon status is itself probative of knowledge of felon status,” but “[o]n the contrary, his own evidence suggest[ed] he knew he was a felon,” id. at 1094 (citing Greer, 593 U.S. at 509).
Defendant's threadbare motion offers no grounds to depart from the Circuit's sound reasoning, consistent with Greer, that no plain error was present in the pre-Rehaif jury instructions. See Greer, 593 U.S. at 509-10. Here, as in Greer, defendant “had been convicted of multiple felonies,” which “prior convictions are substantial evidence that [he] knew” he was a felon; defendant never “disputed the fact of [his] prior convictions”; and he “stipulated to the fact that he was a felon.” Greer, 593 U.S. at 509; see Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1088, 1094 (noting “Reynoso stipulated to his felon status at trial,” and had pleaded guilty to two prior convictions). Accordingly, defendant has not come close to “carr[ying] the burden of showing that the Rehaif error[] . . . affected [his] substantial rights.” Greer, 593 U.S. at 509-10 (“In sum . . . demonstrating prejudice under Rehaif will be difficult for most convicted felons for one simple reason: Convicted felons typically know they're convicted felons. So it is here.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Next, defendant argues that the “Indictment did not comply with” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c), Def.'s Mot. at 5, which in pertinent part requires the Indictment to “be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged[.]” FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). Defendant failed to raise this objection to the Indictment's omission of the knowledge-of-status element on direct appeal, see generally Reynoso, 38 F.4th 1083, but even “skip[ping] over the procedural bar issues,” defendant's claims fail on the merits, Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d at 1215 (citations omitted)). The Indictment's omission of the knowledge-of-status element “did not affect [defendant's] substantial rights or the fairness of the proceeding” as to justify plain-error relief. United States v. Todd, 851 Fed.Appx. 596, 597-98 (6th Cir. 2021) (concluding that “[a]lthough neither the indictment nor the jury instructions included the required knowledge-of-status element, the error was harmless and did not affect [defendant's] substantial rights or the fairness of the proceedings”).
“[I]ndictments must contain sufficient detail for defendants ‘to understand the charges, to prepare a defense, and . . . to be protected against retrial on the same charges.” United States v. Lorenzana-Cordon, 949 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). As the government argues, “[o]ther than the new requirements” under Rehaif, “the Indictment satisfied” Rule 7(c)'s requirements-“it was plain, concise, and defined in a written statement signed by an attorney the essential facts behind each count charged.” Gov't's Opp'n at 9 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c), and Indictment at 1-3). Defendant does not allege that, had he known of the knowledge-of-status element under Rehaif, he would have mounted a defense to that element. See Reynoso, 38 F.4th at 1093 (“[U]nder Greer, ‘a Rehaif error is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon.'” (quoting Greer, 593 U.S. at 514)). In any event, such defense would not have prevailed, given evidence in the “record indicat[ing] [defendant] must have known his prior convictions were punishable by more than one year in prison,” id. at 1090, with the result that “[n]o reasonable juror could have believed that he did not know of his status,” United States v. Lee, 834 Fed.Appx. 160, 166 (6th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (finding no plain error in “pre-Rehaif indictment”). Whether on procedural default or on plain error review, defendant's Rehaif challenge to his Indictment falls short.
Defendant does not request a hearing on his § 2255 motion, see generally Def.'s Mot., and none is warranted. A hearing on a § 2255 motion is not required when “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see United States v. Safarini, No. 21-3077, 2023 WL 2905007, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2023) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court's denial of request for evidentiary hearing under § 2255, and recognizing “[a] district judge's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying a § 2255 motion is generally respected as a sound exercise of discretion when the judge denying the § 2255 motion also presided over the trial in which the petitioner claims to have been prejudiced” (quoting United States v. Baxter, 761 F.3d 17, 24 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2014))). “Only where the Section 2255 motion raises detailed and specific factual allegations whose resolution requires information outside of the record or the judge's personal knowledge or recollection must a hearing be held.” United States v. Pyles, 860 Fed.Appx. 178, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Here, defendant has not come close to “identifying] any detailed and specific factual allegations whose resolution requires information outside of the record or [this Court's] personal knowledge or recollection.” Id. at 187 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pollard, 959 F.2d at 1030-31, and citing United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Rather, defendant's motion, the government's opposition, the D.C. Circuit's decision affirming the judgment, and the transcripts of the proceedings held before this Court conclusively show that defendant is not entitled to relief, rendering an evidentiary hearing on defendant's § 2255 motion unwarranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, defendant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ECF No. 95, is denied. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.