Summary
denying request for appointment of counsel for compassionate release motion, where defendant's "chances of success on his proposed motion . . . are extremely slim"
Summary of this case from United States v. LewisOpinion
01 CR 619(VM)
02-03-2021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. LEONARDO PIÑA, Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER VICTOR MARRERO, U.S.D.J. :
By letter dated September 3, 2020, defendant Leonardo Piña ("Piña") requested that the Court assign him an attorney to pursue a motion for compassionate release because, among other things, the mother of his daughter had recently died from COVID-19. (See Dkt. No. 390.) The Court construed the letter as a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and denied the motion without prejudice because Piña had not demonstrated compliance with Section 3582's exhaustion requirements, nor had he sufficiently established extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting relief. (See Dkt. No. 393.)
Now before the Court is Piña's renewed request for an attorney to assist him in filing a compassionate release motion. (See attached letter.) For the reasons stated herein the request is DENIED.
In criminal matters, the right to appointed counsel "extends to the first appeal of right, and no further." Starkes v. United States, No. 20 Civ. 0265, 2020 WL 230944, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2020) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987)). For a compassionate release motion such as the one Piña contemplates, it is within the district court's discretion whether to appoint counsel. See United States v. Hilliard, No. 17 CR 35, 2021 WL 242538, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2021).
The Court finds that appointment of counsel is unwarranted here because Piña's chances of success on his proposed motion for compassionate release are "extremely slim." Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Myers, 524 F. App'x 758, 759 (2d Cir. 2013) ("In this case, where it was readily ascertainable from the record that Appellant was ineligible for a reduction in sentence, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for appointment of counsel." (quoting United States v. Cirineo, 372 F. App'x 178, 179-80 (2d Cir. 2010))).
As a threshold matter, Piña has now satisfied the exhaustion requirements of Section 3582(c)(1). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (noting that the court may entertain a defendant's compassionate release motion after the defendant "has fully exhausted all administrative rights"). Nonetheless, Piña has failed to establish that the circumstances of his case entitle him to the relief he seeks.
To grant a sentence reduction under Section 3582(c)(1), the Court must find that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." Under Section 3582(c)(1), courts are authorized "to consider the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons that an imprisoned person might bring before [the court] in motions for compassionate release." United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020).
Here, Piña argues that he is entitled to compassionate release for three primary reasons: (1) the increased risk of exposure to COVID-19 faced by incarcerated individuals; (2) Piña's medical condition; and (3) the death of his daughter's mother. Having considered the records Piña submitted along with his letter, the Court is unpersuaded that these reasons constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances in his case.
First, the Court is mindful of the fact that incarcerated individuals face heightened risk of COVID-19 infection. However, "the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release." United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Peralta, No. 19 CR 135, 2020 WL 6683095, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2020) (same). Without demonstrating any individualized risk to himself, Piña fails to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for release on this basis.
Second, Piña's medical conditions likewise fail to satisfy the extraordinary and compelling standard. To be sure, obesity and diabetes are among the underlying conditions that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has identified as creating an increased risk of serious illness from COVID-19. Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): People With Certain Medical Conditions, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (last updated Feb. 1, 2021). But the other conditions Piña lists -- including, for example, high cholesterol, back pain, prostatitis, and depression -- are not identified as risk-increasing underlying conditions. See id. Furthermore, Piña's obesity and diabetes are not enough to support his motion because the medical records he provides are from September 2019 (see attached letter at 18) and do not indicate the current status of these illnesses, nor, more importantly, do they suggest that the treatment he has received from the Bureau of Prisons has failed to manage them. See, e.g., United States v. Mood, No. 19 CR 113, 2020 WL 3256333, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2020) (denying release to 53-year-old with diabetes, hypertension, and obesity where "[t]here is no question that [the defendant] has health issues, but his condition is stable and has been effectively managed by routine monitoring and medication"). Furthermore, at fifty-one years old, Piña is not in the "greatest risk" age group category. Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Older Adults, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/older-adults.html (last updated Dec. 13, 2020). Piña's present medical condition does not, therefore, constitute an extraordinary and compelling basis to grant compassionate release.
Moreover, while the Court is mindful of the strain and hardship the pandemic has placed on many families, concern for one's family does not typically warrant relief. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 09 CR 0272, 2020 WL 3791976, at *2 (D. Md. July 7, 2020) (finding that a defendant who cited concern for himself and his family in light of COVID-19 had not shown "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances). Although Piña initially suggested that compassionate release was warranted because his daughter's mother had passed away, his renewed submission indicates that his daughter is twenty-one years old. (See attached letter at 2.) The letter also suggests that his daughter lives in the United States, whereas Piña will be deported to the Dominican Republic upon his release from custody. The Court is sensitive to the difficulties Piña's family has no doubt experienced following the death of a relative. However, because Piña has not established both that his daughter is incapable of caring for herself and that Piña is the only available caretaker for her, the death of his daughter's mother does not warrant compassionate release. See, e.g., United States v. Francisco-Ovalle, No. 18 CR 526, 2021 WL 123366, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2021) (denying release because although the defendant desired to care for his mother and sister, he did "not allege that he is their only potential caretaker").
Lastly, even if Piña had satisfied the extraordinary and compelling standard, compassionate release is not supported by the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (stating that if the court finds extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting relief, it shall consider "the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable"). On September 21, 2018, Piña was sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment upon pleading guilty to one count of assault in aid of racketeering. (Dkt. No. 376.) At his plea hearing, Piña stated that he was a member of a group involved in drug-related crimes and that, in order to maintain his position in that group, he shot someone. (Plea Tr., Dkt. No. 354, at 30:25-32:8.) Moreover, as of the date of this Order, Piña has not yet served half of the sentence imposed. (See attached letter at 40.) The Court therefore finds that release would not adequately "reflect the seriousness of the offense," or "afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion of defendant Leonardo Piña ("Piña") for appointment of counsel to assist in the submission of a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order to Leonardo Piña, Register Number 21070-479, Moshannon Valley Correctional Institution, 555 Geo Drive, Philipsburg, PA 16866, and note service on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
3 February 2021
/s/_________
Victor Marrero
U.S.D.J.
Image materials not available for display.