Opinion
24-1605
09-13-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY J. NORTON, Defendant-Appellant.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
Submitted September 11, 2024 [*]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division. No. 1:15-CR-2-HAB Holly A. Brady, Chief Judge.
Before DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
ORDER
Law enforcement officials seized large quantities of cash from Larry Norton's truck after stopping the vehicle in Indiana, and from the house where he was arrested in Texas. A federal prosecution for drug trafficking ensued. In the meantime, the Federal Bureau of Investigation notified Norton that it would seek administrative forfeiture of the seized cash. Norton did not respond, and after the deadline for filing claims expired, the FBI declared the cash administratively forfeited. Norton later filed a multitude of motions seeking return of the cash. The district judge denied them as untimely, among other reasons. We affirm.
Norton was stopped for speeding in Fort Wayne, Indiana, in November 2014. During the stop, the state trooper noticed unusual wiring near the gas pedal, and a K-9 unit alerted the officer to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. The officer did not arrest Norton, but he impounded the truck.
In January 2015, Norton and four codefendants were federally indicted in the Northern District of Indiana on one count of conspiracy to distribute 1 kilogram or more of heroin and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, and arrest warrants were issued. Weeks later, law enforcement officers arrested Norton inside a codefendant's home in Mission, Texas. They found $179,600 in cash in the house. Then, after obtaining a warrant, federal agents took possession of Norton's truck from the authorities in Indiana. They discovered $405,220 in cash in hidden compartments.
In March 2015, shortly after Norton's arrest, the FBI notified Norton that it was initiating administrative forfeiture of the seized cash under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), 18 U.S.C. § 983. To effect notice, the FBI sent certified letters to Norton at the jail where he was detained, to three residences connected to Norton, and to his then-attorney's place of business. The letters instructed Norton that he could contest the forfeiture by filing a claim before April 24, 2015, and also warned Norton that failure to file a claim by the deadline would result in waiving his "right to contest the forfeiture of the [cash] in this proceeding and any judicial proceeding-either civil or criminal." The FBI did not receive any claims contesting the forfeiture, so in June 2015 it declared the cash administratively forfeited to the United States.
A jury found Norton guilty in May 2017, and the district judge sentenced him to life imprisonment. Norton appealed, and we affirmed his conviction and sentence. United States v. Norton, 893 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2018).
In late 2021, Norton began seeking the return of the forfeited cash by filing a series of motions, variously labeled, in district courts in the Southern District of Texas (where the $179,600 was seized) and the Northern District of Indiana (where the $405,220 was seized and he was prosecuted). The district judge in Texas construed the motions as requests under 18 U.S.C. § 983(e) to set aside the administrative forfeiture. The judge denied Norton's motions as untimely and further observed that his arguments were outside the scope of § 983(e).
In the case now before us, the district judge first concluded that she could not address the motions concerning the cash seized in Texas because another court had already ruled on those motions. The judge then determined that any claim that Norton had to the cash seized in Indiana was untimely and that his constitutional arguments were frivolous in § 983(e) proceedings.
On appeal, Norton first argues that the district judge should have granted his motions because his constitutional rights were violated when his property was seized and he was prosecuted. He contends that the stop of his truck violated the Fourth Amendment and that the government violated his right to due process by knowingly presenting false witness testimony at his criminal trial.
Norton's arguments go to the validity of his conviction; they are not grounds for relief from an administrative forfeiture. See Martov v. United States, 926 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2019) (observing that arguments that could have been raised on direct appeal "are outside the scope of our review" of administrative forfeiture proceedings). Under CAFRA, once an administrative forfeiture is complete, "the scope of judicial review is extremely limited." Troconis-Escovar v. United States, 59 F.4th 273, 276 (7th Cir. 2023). Indeed, a claimant can challenge only the sufficiency of the government's notice of its intent to declare property forfeited. Id. at 276-77 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)). But in his motions, Norton did not challenge the adequacy of notice, and so he offered no valid basis for relief. See Martov, 926 F.3d at 908 And even if Norton had raised appropriate grounds for vacating the forfeiture, the district judge correctly concluded that he filed his motions well outside the five-year window that § 983(e) provides.
Norton previously moved for the return of $9,300 that he suggests was seized from his person when he was arrested, contending that he had no knowledge of any forfeiture proceedings regarding that property. The district judge denied his motion, and we dismissed Norton's appeal as untimely. Norton v. United States, No. 23-1248, 2023 WL 5092778, at *1 (7th Cir. June 26, 2023). He is precluded from relitigating the issue now, though he tries.
Norton next invokes Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and argues that the district judge should have held a hearing to determine whether there was a nexus between the seized cash and the drug conspiracy. But Rule 41(g) "is not the proper way to challenge an administrative forfeiture in federal district court." Wilson v. United States, 75 F.4th 775, 777 (7th Cir. 2023). Instead, Rule 41(g) allows for the return of property obtained in a search and seizure "before forfeiture proceedings have been initiated." Troconis-Escovar, 59 F.4th at 276. Norton made no attempt to get the cash back before the forfeiture proceedings commenced; it is long past time to invoke Rule 41(g).
AFFIRMED
[*] We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. p. 34(a)(2)(C).