Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, JARED C. DOLAN, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
GEORGE MGDESYAN, Counsel for Defendant KYN K. NAOPE.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 4, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until November 13, 2015, and to exclude time between September 4, 2015, and November 13, 2015, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, business records, and search warrant evidence and related documents in electronic form which, if printed, would comprise multiple boxes of material. The government is in the process of producing this evidence directly to counsel. Additional evidence will made available for inspection and copying, such as the physical evidence seized during the execution of search warrants.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and consult with his client regarding the allegations in the indictment and any possible defenses.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 4, 2015 to November 13, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.