Opinion
Case No. 4:19-cr-1
05-23-2019
UNITED STATES of America v. Juan MENDOZA-BALLEZA
Jay Woods, U.S. Department of Justice (Chattanooga USAO) Office of U.S. Attorney, Chattanooga, TN, for United States of America.
Jay Woods, U.S. Department of Justice (Chattanooga USAO) Office of U.S. Attorney, Chattanooga, TN, for United States of America.
ORDER
TRAVIS R. McDONOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Juan Mendoza-Balleza's motion seeking district court review of Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee's order of detention. (Doc. 30.)
The Court is authorized to conduct a detention hearing (i.e. , to consider whether to detain Defendant) only if the Government first establishes that one of the circumstances listed in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(f) exists. See United States v. Byrd , 969 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1992) ("In other words, § 3142(f) does not authorize a detention hearing whenever the government thinks detention would be desirable, but rather limits such hearings to the [six circumstances listed in (f)(1)(A), (f)(1)(B), (f)(1)(C), (f)(1)(D), (f)(2)(A) and (f)(2)(b) ]."); United States v. Friedman , 837 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1988) ("After a motion for detention has been filed, the district court must undertake a two-step inquiry.... It must first determine by a preponderance of the evidence ... that the defendant has either been charged with one of the crimes enumerated in Section 3142(f)(1) or that the defendant presents a risk of flight or obstruction of justice."); United States v. Ploof , 851 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[T]he structure of the statute and its legislative history make it clear that Congress did not intend to authorize preventive detention unless the judicial officer first finds that one of the § 3142(f) conditions for holding a detention hearing exists."). In this case, the parties agree that the only basis for a detention hearing is the Government's assertion that there is a serious risk Defendant will flee. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A) ; (Doc. 25, at 5; May 21, 2019 Hrg. Tr. at 13–16).
Defendant has been in either state or federal custody since December 27, 2018, when the Coffee County Sheriff arrested him for driving on a revoked or suspended license. (See Pretrial Servs. Report, at 6.) On January 8, 2019, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Defendant with illegally reentering the United States in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1326. (Doc. 1.) At his initial arraignment, Defendant waived his right to a detention hearing "with the understanding that a hearing will be granted at a later date on motion of defendant." (Doc. 6.)
On April 2, 2019, Defendant moved the Court to release him pending trial. (Doc. 17.) Magistrate Judge Lee conducted a hearing on Defendant's motion for bond on April 10, 2019. (Doc. 25.) At that time, the Government urged the Court to conduct a detention hearing and to determine under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(e)(1) that no conditions of release would reasonably assure Defendant's appearance and the safety of the community. (Id. at 5.) The Government took the position that Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(f)(2)(A) authorized such a detention hearing because it had presented evidence to meet its threshold burden to show Defendant posed a "serious risk of flight." (Id. at 5–6, 71–72.) Magistrate Judge Lee agreed and proceeded to consider whether any condition or set of conditions of release would reasonably assure Defendant's appearance and the safety of the community. (See id. at 70–84.) During the hearing, Magistrate Judge Lee and the parties noted that Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") had filed a detainer on Defendant. (Id. at 78–82.) The Government did not, however, take the position that Defendant was sure to be detained and deported by ICE in the event Magistrate Judge Lee ordered Defendant released pending trial. (Id. ) Magistrate Judge Lee ultimately ruled that the Government satisfied its burden to show that there was no condition or set of conditions of release that would reasonably assure Defendant's appearance as required under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(e)(1). (Id. at 82–84; Doc. 23.) In making this determination, Magistrate Judge Lee found that the ICE detainer on Defendant was a "factor" she could consider but that it was not determinative with regard to whether detention pending trial was appropriate. (Doc. 25, at 78–82.)
On May 2, 2019, Defendant moved for the undersigned to review Magistrate Judge Lee's detention order pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3145(b). (Doc. 30.) On May 21, 2019, the Court held a hearing on Defendant's motion. Neither Defendant nor the Government introduced new evidence. Instead, both parties relied on the record established at the April 10, 2019 hearing. The Court did, however, hear additional argument from the parties regarding whether the Government satisfied its burden to show that: (1) it is entitled to a detention hearing under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(f)(2) based on its assertion that there is a "serious risk [Defendant] will flee"; and (2) no condition or set of conditions of release will reasonably assure Defendant's appearance and safety of others as required under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(e)(1).
During the hearing, the Government acknowledged for the first time that the serious risk of flight on which Magistrate Judge Lee relied does not exist. If the Court does not detain Defendant, ICE will immediately detain him and deport him within ninety days. (May 21, 2019 Hrg. Tr. at 12–16.)
THE COURT: But you're telling me today it's factually impossible for him to flee.
MR. WOODS: Well, I'm not going to say anything is impossible.
THE COURT: I mean, barring him breaking out of custody, you're saying if I don't detain him that – I mean, the question on the – the serious risk question, the threshold question, is, is there – with that – in the absence of detention, is there a serious risk of flight.
MR. WOODS: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: But there is no risk of flight.
MR. WOODS: Your Honor, that is correct. If I were – if everything were to proceed as I believe Congress directs it to proceed, because there's already a final order in place, the defendant will not go through immigration court....
(Id. ) Given these undisputed facts, the Government cannot satisfy its threshold burden under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(f)(2)(A) to show that there is a serious risk Defendant will flee. Therefore, the Court is not authorized to conduct a detention hearing. See Byrd , 969 F.2d at 109. As long as Defendant remains in the custody of the executive branch, albeit with ICE instead of the Attorney General, the risk of his flight is admittedly nonexistent. Cf. United States v. Veloz-Alonso , 910 F.3d 266, 268–69 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting issues that arise when the executive branch attempts to pursue prosecution and removal or deportation simultaneously). Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Lee's detention order is hereby VACATED. Defendant is hereby ORDERED to be RELEASED from custody of the Attorney General or the Attorney General's representative pending trial. Defendant is ORDERED to appear before Magistrate Judge Lee on May 24, 2019 , at 2:00 p.m. to effectuate this order.
Because the Court finds the Government has not satisfied its burden to show it is entitled to a detention hearing, the Court makes no finding as to whether there is any condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably assure the appearance of a person as required and the safety of the community under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(g).