Opinion
2:18-cr-00036-TLN
02-29-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. STEFANIE LAVAN
ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Stefanie Lavan's (“Defendant”) Motion for Compassionate Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (ECF No. 82.) The Government filed an opposition. (ECF No. 85.) Defendant did not file a reply. Also before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Concurrent Sentencing. (ECF No. 81.) The Government did not file an opposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motions.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On November 14, 2019, Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). (ECF Nos. 40, 43.) On April 7, 2022, the Court sentenced Defendant to a 24-month term of imprisonment followed by a 48-month term of supervised release. (ECF No. 78.)
While on pretrial release pending sentencing in the instant case, Defendant was arrested in the District of Nevada for attempting to deliver 21 pounds of methamphetamine, 10,000 suspected fentanyl pills, 15 grams of psychedelic mushrooms, and 19 grams of heroin. (ECF No. 79 at 9.) On August 30, 2022, in the District of Nevada, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). (D. Nev. Case No. 3:21-cr-00041-RCJ-CLB (hereinafter “No. 3:21-cr-00041”), ECF Nos. 28, 30.) On February 6, 2023, the District of Nevada court sentenced Defendant to a 36-month term of imprisonment followed by a 36-month term of supervised release. (No. 3:21-cr-00041, ECF Nos. 39, 41.) The court indicated Defendant's sentence was to run consecutive to the sentence imposed in the instant case. (No. 3:21-cr-00041, ECF No. 41.)
Defendant has served approximately 28 months of her aggregate 60-month sentence at FCI-Tallahassee and is projected to be released on January 16, 2026. (ECF No. 85-1 at 5.) On October 17, 2023, Defendant, proceeding pro se, filed the instant motion for compassionate release (ECF No. 82) and motion for concurrent sentencing (ECF No. 81). The Court will address Defendant's motions in turn.
II. Analysis
A. Motion for Compassionate Release
i. Exhaustion
Generally, a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824-25 (2010). The compassionate release provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) sets forth a rare exception to the general rule. However, relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is only available
upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons [“BOP”] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier.18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
In the instant case, Defendant submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden on June 17, 2023. (ECF No. 82 at 15.) Because more than thirty days have elapsed since that request, Defendant has met the threshold exhaustion requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
ii. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Despite having met the exhaustion requirement, Defendant is eligible for compassionate release only if she can demonstrate there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction and such reduction is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit has held “the current version of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable policy statement[ ]' for 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant.” United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (2021). The Ninth Circuit explained “[t]he Sentencing Commission's statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform a district court's discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant, but they are not binding.” Id. Therefore, the Court views § 1B1.13 as persuasive authority.
Defendant argues the following constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for her release: (1) her medical conditions; (2) inadequate medical care; and (3) the reduction of her status points due to the Sentencing Guideline amendments. (ECF No. 82 at 3-5.) In opposition, the Government argues none of these circumstances justify Defendant's release. (ECF No. 85 at 3-5.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with the Government.
First, Defendant fails to persuade the Court that her medical conditions warrant a sentence reduction. Defendant asserts her age (71-years-old), incontinence, possible multiple sclerosis (“MS”), severe dizzy spells, double vision, memory lapses, arthritis, and mental health issues are extraordinary and compelling reasons for her release. (ECF No. 82 at 5.) However, for a medical condition to qualify as “extraordinary and compelling, the ailment must substantially diminish the defendant's ability to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and be a condition from which the defendant [is] not expected to recover.” United States v. Barajas-Guerrero, No. 1:17-cr-00148-JLT-SKO, 2023 WL 5002933, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2023). Defendant's medical records indicate she is currently being treated for toenail fungus, stimulant related disorders, unspecified depressive disorder, eye problems, essential (primary) hypertension, poly osteoarthritis, and urinary incontinence. (ECF No. 88-1 at 53.) Defendant's medical records also reveal she is being treated and medicated for such conditions. (Id. at 8-9.) Moreover, there is no evidence that Defendant has been diagnosed with MS. (Id. at 9.) Therefore, based on the record currently before the Court, it appears none of Defendant's health conditions substantially diminish her ability to provide self-care and the BOP is capable of adequately treating Defendant's conditions. (Id. at 8-9.)
Second, Defendant's claim that she is receiving inadequate medical care at FCI-Tallahassee is not a proper ground for compassionate release. (ECF No. 82 at 5.) “[T]o challenge the conditions of . . . confinement, that claim may be properly brought in a habeas petition or a direct civil claim, not via compassionate release.” United States v. Shults, No. 1:17-cr-00136-JLT, 2022 WL 2990716, at *5 n.4 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2022). Venue is not proper in the Eastern District of California to consider a habeas petition from Defendant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, venue lies with the district court that has personal jurisdiction over the petitioner's custodian. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). Because FCI-Tallahassee is in Tallahassee, Florida, the proper venue for Defendant to challenge the conditions of her confinement is the Northern District of Florida.
Third, the Court finds Defendant's argument that she is eligible for retroactive application of Amendment 821 of the Sentencing Guidelines is unavailing. (ECF No. 82 at 4.) Amendment 821 made several changes to the way status points are calculated under the federal sentencing guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. Amendment 821 does not apply here since Defendant did not receive any adjustment for status points in the instant case. (ECF No. 79 at 8.)
For these reasons, the Court concludes Defendant has not shown extraordinary and compelling reasons for her release.
iii. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors
In addition, the Court finds a sentence reduction is not warranted under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“§ 3553(a)”) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (mandating consideration of the § 3553(a) factors before granting compassionate release). Defendant raises several arguments that may be construed as arguments under § 3553(a). Specifically, Defendant asserts that if she was released, she would pose no public safety risk, her medical conditions would no longer be agitated due to the prison's metal bed, and she would be willing to live at a sober facility. (ECF No. 82 at 4-5, 15.) In opposition, the Government emphasizes Defendant's 24-month sentence properly reflects the § 3553(a) factors. (ECF No. 85 at 4.)
The Court agrees with the Government. Defendant's well-supported, 24-month term of imprisonment fell considerably below the guideline range of 57 to 71 months. Defendant has not shown the § 3553(a) factors support a further reduction. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion for compassionate release.
Neither party addresses the effect of Defendant having served over 24 months in prison, which fully satisfies her term of imprisonment for the instant offense. It is unclear to the Court whether it has jurisdiction to reduce Defendant's remaining term of imprisonment, which was imposed as a consecutive term by the District of Nevada. However, because the Court ultimately declines to reduce Defendant's sentence for the reasons stated herein, the Court need not and does not address this issue further.
B. Motion for Concurrent Sentencing
Defendant also filed a separate motion for concurrent sentencing. (ECF No. 81.) The District of Nevada court imposed a 36-month term of imprisonment for the offense Defendant committed while on pretrial supervision and indicated the sentence was to run consecutive to the 24-month term of imprisonment Defendant received for the instant offense. (No. 3:21-cr-00041, ECF No. 41); see 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.”). Defendant fails to cite any authority that would allow this Court to modify the sentence imposed by the District of Nevada. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion for concurrent sentencing.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF No. 81) and DENIES Defendant's Motion for Concurrent Sentencing (ECF No. 82).
IT IS SO ORDERED.