Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, NIRAV K. DESAI, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
MICHAEL PETRIK, JR., Counsel for Defendant MARCO ANTONIO LARA-GOMEZ.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 22, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 13, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between September 22, 2015, and October 13, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes 583 pages of documents and photographs, as well as physical items. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. Specifically, pages 0001 through 0278 was produced to the defendant's attorney. On September 15, 2015, the government made pages 0279 through 0583, consisting of bank records, available to the defendant's attorney for his review. The government has also provided the defendant with a proposed plea agreement.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the discovery in this matter with his client, consult with his client regarding that discovery and the proposed plea agreement, and otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 22, 2015 to October 13, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.