Opinion
Crim. No. 1:16-cr-321
07-20-2017
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JEROME KING
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is Defendant Jerome King's motion for reconsideration (Doc. 81) of this court's denial of his amended motion to suppress evidence (Doc. 39). After careful consideration, the court will deny Defendant's motion for reconsideration. I. Background
The facts of this case, as the court found them, are set forth in this court's June 9, 2017 memorandum. (See Doc. 75 at 3-9). Familiarity with these facts is presumed for purposes of this memorandum.
On January 13, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to suppress physical evidence and statements (Doc. 24), and later amended that motion to add an additional basis for suppression, (see Doc. 39). In his amended motion to suppress, Defendant raised four arguments for suppression, including that the police had no reasonable suspicion to detain him, lacked a legal basis to enter his apartment and seize the shotgun, and lacked probable cause to arrest him without a warrant. (Doc. 39 at 2). He further contended that any statements he made while in custody at the hospital were in violation of Miranda, and any other contraband seized from the apartment after the comprehensive police search must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree due to the prior unlawful police conduct. (Id.)
The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion on April 11, 2017. Following the hearing, the parties filed supplemental briefing on their respective positions. (See Docs. 61, 63, 73, 74). The court subsequently denied Defendant's amended motion to suppress in its entirety. (Docs. 75, 76).
On June 23, 2017, Defendant filed a pro se motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 81). His motion focuses on one particular ground for suppression: the warrantless entry into his apartment and the associated warrantless seizure of the shotgun. (Id. at 2-4).
Although the court received Defendant's motion for reconsideration on June 28, 2017, it is certified as being placed into the prison mail system on June 23, 2017. Therefore, under the prisoner mailbox rule, the motion is deemed filed on June 23, 2017. See Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 391 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011). The court also notes that the instant motion contains a letter in which Defendant alleges that he was told by his attorney that it was too late to file a motion for reconsideration, and therefore he requests that the court consider his purportedly late pro se motion timely. (Doc. 81 at 6). However, because Defendant's motion was filed within fourteen days of the court's June 9, 2017 denial of his suppression motion, the motion for reconsideration is timely under the applicable local rules of court, see M.D. Pa. Local Rule 7.10.
Defendant argues that the court made a clear error of fact regarding where Corporal Henry was located when he first saw the shotgun. The thrust of his argument is that Corporal Henry was standing inside the doorway of Defendant's apartment unit, and not inside the doorway to the common area of the second floor of the apartment building. (Id. at 3-4). Defendant asserts that Corporal Henry's cross-examination testimony and other parts of the record conclusively demonstrate that Corporal Henry was unlawfully inside the apartment unit when he first saw the shotgun, making the warrantless seizure of the shotgun a Fourth Amendment violation and thus requiring suppression. (Id.)
The Government filed a one-page response to Defendant's motion. (Doc. 82). It asserts that Defendant did not make the requisite showing of "newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in the law, or a legitimate need to correct a manifest injustice" to permit reconsideration of the denial of the suppression motion. (Id. (citing Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (setting forth standard for motion for reconsideration—under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)—of final judgment of dismissal of complaint)). Defendant's motion for reconsideration is now ripe for disposition.
II. Discussion
Defendant asks the court to reconsider the denial of a motion to suppress, which is an interlocutory order. See United States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131 (1962)). The standard of review for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is different than the standard of review for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
A motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order, which courts generally interpret as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or for relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b), requires the showing of "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court [issued the underlying order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice." United States ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 848-49 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Max's Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)).
See Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2013) (listing cases). --------
Reconsideration of an interlocutory order, on the other hand, is more properly considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and is appropriate whenever justice so requires. See State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. County of Camden, 824 F.3d 399, 406 & n.14 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Cir. 1973) ("[S]o long as the district court has jurisdiction over the case, it possesses inherent power over interlocutory orders, and can reconsider them when it is consonant with justice to do so.")); United States v. Rojas, No. 1:15-CR-00169, 2017 WL 105932, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2017) (Rambo, J.) (quoting Qazizadeh v. Pinnacle Health Sys., 214 F. Supp. 3d 292, 295-96 (M.D. Pa. 2016)) (applying "when consonant with justice to do so" standard to motion for reconsideration of interlocutory order involving motion in limine in a criminal case).
In this case, Defendant has provided no reason for the court to believe that justice requires reconsideration of the interlocutory denial of his suppression motion. Defendant's argument, although somewhat difficult to understand, appears to attempt to point to inconsistencies in the testimony of Corporal Henry and Officer Roadcap that he believes conclusively show that Corporal Henry was standing in the apartment unit when he first perceived the shotgun. For the following reasons, the court does not agree.
Defendant maintains that when Corporal Henry was cross-examined at the suppression hearing, he testified that Officer Roadcap had followed him up the fire escape and was standing behind him either in the "threshold of the fire escape doorway" to the apartment building, or "just behind" him in the common area. (Doc. 81 at 3 (quoting Doc. 67, Tr. of Hr'g on Mot. to Suppress [hereinafter "Doc. 67"], at 26-27)). According to Defendant, this testimony is inconsistent with Officer Roadcap's testimony that when he followed Corporal Henry up the fire escape, he observed Corporal Henry standing in or inside the apartment building doorway while he waited outside the building on the fire-escape landing. (Id. at 4; see also Doc. 67 at 37). As Defendant argues, "[i]t is clearly impossible for [O]fficer Roadcap to have observed Corporal Henry in the 'apartment building doorway' when according to Corporal Henry['s] testimony, [O]fficer Roadcap himself was in the 'apartment building doorway.'" (Doc. 81 at 4). Thus, according to Defendant, Officer Roadcap's report from the day of the incident should be believed, which intimates—with some ambiguity—that Corporal Henry was inside the apartment unit when he first observed the shotgun. (See Doc. 67 at 37; Doc. 73-1).
The problem with Defendant's argument is that this court has already largely addressed this issue. In a footnote in the June 9, 2017 opinion, the court identified the potential inconsistency between Officer Roadcap's report and his testimony at the suppression hearing, and thoroughly explained the factual resolution the court had reached. (Doc. 75 at 6 n.2).
As Defendant observes, Corporal Henry's cross-examination testimony does indicate some uncertainty regarding where Officer Roadcap was standing at the time Corporal Henry first saw the shotgun. Corporal Henry's imprecise recollection of where Officer Roadcap was standing, however, does not undermine this court's factual finding concerning where Corporal Henry was standing when he first observed the shotgun, which is the critical question.
Defendant makes much of the fact that Corporal Henry's cross-examination testimony places Officer Roadcap in the common area or in the threshold of the apartment building doorway. But Corporal Henry's equivocal testimony about where another officer was standing is by no means conclusive evidence of that fact. To the contrary, Officer Roadcap's testimony and written report both unequivocally indicate that he remained outside the doorway; the ambiguity regarding which doorway he remained outside of, and through which Corporal Henry had passed, was clarified at the suppression hearing. Both Corporal Henry and Officer Roadcap testified that Corporal Henry was inside the apartment building doorway, not the apartment unit doorway. Most importantly, as this court previously noted, "upon direct questioning regarding the potential ambiguity in the report where it states that Corporal Henry was standing 'inside the doorway,' Officer Roadcap clarified that Corporal Henry was standing inside '[t]he apartment building doorway,' not the apartment unit doorway." (Doc. 75 at 6 n.2 (quoting Doc. 67 at 37)).
Consequently, this court did not err in its factual findings. Despite the fact that Corporal Henry's testimony regarding Officer Roadcap's location does not perfectly align with Officer Roadcap's version of the events, the record overwhelmingly supports the finding that Corporal Henry was standing outside Defendant's apartment unit in the common area when he first observed the shotgun. Moreover, it is Corporal Henry's location, not Officer Roadcap's, that is crucial to the determination of the lawfulness of the search and seizure in question. Consequently, Defendant's motion for reconsideration will be denied.
III. Conclusion
After careful consideration of Defendant's arguments and the record in this case, the court finds no error in its previous factual findings. Accordingly, the court will deny Defendant's motion for reconsideration of this court's denial of his amended motion to suppress evidence. An appropriate order will issue.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge Dated: July 20, 2017