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finding that the defendant had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances when his diabetes and hypertension were controlled, monitored, and managed by the BOP
Summary of this case from United States v. FormanOpinion
No. CR13-3033-LTS
2020-06-11
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Bruce Kenton JEFFERS, Defendant.
Jamie D. Bowers, US Attorney's Office, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.
Jamie D. Bowers, US Attorney's Office, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.
ORDER
Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before me on defendant Bruce Jeffers' motion (Doc. No. 129) for compassionate release, along with his supporting brief (Doc. No. 130). The Government has filed a response (Doc. No. 133) and Jeffers has filed a reply (Doc. No. 140). Oral argument is not necessary. See Local Rule 7(c).
II. BACKGROUND
On September 19, 2013, Jeffers was indicted on two counts – possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) and 924(e)(1). Jeffers pleaded guilty to both counts and on October 1, 2015, he was sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment on both counts, to run concurrently, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. See Doc. No. 104. Jeffers is scheduled to be released on July 13, 2021, but is currently being considered by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for a 151-to-180-day home confinement placement. Doc. No. 133-1 at 3.
Jeffers reports that on April 2, 2020, he submitted an administrative request for compassionate release to the warden at FCI Forrest City Low, where Jeffers is incarcerated. See Doc. No. 130-1. Jeffers cited his status in the "chronic care" clinic in support of his request. See Doc. No. 140 at 1. On April 10, 2020, Jeffers filed a pro se motion (Doc. No. 119) to reduce his sentence under the CARES Act, which I interpreted as a motion for home confinement. I denied the motion on April 21, 2020. See Doc. No. 121. I found that the CARES Act does not allow courts to release inmates from prison and place them on home confinement and that the most I could do was make a recommendation to the BOP. Id. I also found that such a recommendation was not warranted based on the COVID-19 cases at the Forrest City Low FCI at the time or Jeffers' health condition, which he had failed to explain. Id. at 3.
The Government disputes this and argues that Jeffers did not submit his request until April 20, 2020. See Doc. No. 133-2.
Jeffers' motion also mentioned compassionate release. I found that he failed to allege that 30 days had passed since he submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden at his facility or that he fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal the failure of the BOP to bring a motion on his behalf. Id. at 4. I declined to excuse his failure to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies based on the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. I noted I would consider a compassionate release request once he exhausted his administrative remedies as outlined in § 3582(c)(1)(A) and refiled his motion, noting, however, that his current motion did not come close to demonstrating extraordinary and compelling reasons to justify his early release. Id. at 5.
On April 20, 2020, the day before I filed my order, Jeffers submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden at Forrest City Low FCI citing extraordinary and compelling circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Doc. No. 133-2. Jeffers states this was his second compassionate release request. See Doc. Nos. 140 at 3, 140-1. In his request, Jeffers stated he has multiple risk factors and is at high risk if he contracts COVID-19. He noted he was 59 years old and is listed as "chronic care" because he suffers from high blood pressure and anxiety. Doc. No. 133-2 at 2-3.
While the request is dated April 20, 2020, Jeffers states he submitted it on April 22, 2020. Doc. No. 140-1.
On May 6, 2020, the Federal Defender's Office filed a motion (Doc. No. 124) to be appointed as counsel for Jeffers, which I granted. See Doc. No. 124. On May 18, 2020, the warden at Forrest City Low FCI denied Jeffers' April 20, 2020, request. See Doc. No. 135-1. On May 20, 2020, Jeffers filed his current motion for compassionate release. See Doc. No. 129. He relies primarily on his diabetes and hypertension diagnoses to argue there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Doc. No. 130 at 7. He also presents the opinion of Dr. Mehul Tejani, who reviewed Jeffers' BOP records. Dr. Tejani noted Jeffers was seen for medical care in the BOP for Type 2 diabetes mellitus, essential hypertension, mild Fuch's dystrophy of the cornea of his eye, mild to moderate hearing loss, low back pain and a laceration to the forehead, sustained while using a jig saw on prison grounds. Id. at 7 (citing Doc. No. 130-2). Dr. Tejani noted Jeffers did not require any medications to control his diabetes during the timeframe examined and that his lab reports indicated Jeffers has adequately controlled diabetes. Id. at 8.
With regard to hypertension, Dr. Tejani noted that a large majority of the records showed Jeffers' blood pressure was under control, but that when it was elevated, medical staff responded by adding the appropriate medication. He was most recently on three medications. Id. Dr. Tejani concluded:
With regards to the current COVID-19 pandemic, which has disproportionately affected correctional facilities, he is of course at higher risk of being exposed to the virus. His risk factors for suffering poor outcomes if he were infected rest largely on his age of 59, and while diabetes and high blood pressure are also predictors of mortality, his are well controlled. Furthermore, he does not seem to be debilitated from his conditions as evidenced by clearance for work in food service without restrictions.
In conclusion, while Mr. Jeffers has several chronic conditions, his health issues are currently being appropriately and well managed by the CCC. I do not think he would necessarily receive better care outside of the correctional facility.
Doc. No. 130-3. Despite this opinion, Jeffers argues health conditions (particularly his Type 2 diabetes ) present extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. He notes the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) has acknowledged that Type 2 diabetes is a disease that increases one's risk of suffering severe complications from COVID-19. Id. at 9. He argues that when combined with his hypertension, age and other health conditions, he faces a greater risk of complications related to exposure to COVID-19. Id. Jeffers states that as of the date of his motion, Forrest City FCI had 253 infected inmates and one infected staff. Id. at 10.
III. COMPASSIONATE RELEASE STANDARDS
A court's ability to modify a sentence after it has been imposed is extremely limited. One way a court may modify a sentence is through "compassionate release" as outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which was recently modified by the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603. In the past, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) permitted a court to reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment only upon the motion of the BOP. The FSA modified § 3582(c)(1)(A) such that a defendant may now directly petition the court "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." See Mohrbacher v. Ponce , No. CV18-00513, 2019 WL 161727, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2019) (discussing modifications made to § 3582(c)(1)(A) by the FSA); see also United States v. Perez-Asencio , No. CR18-3611, 2019 WL 626175, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019).
If a defendant fully exhausts administrative remedies, the court may, upon motion of the defendant, reduce the defendant's sentence, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if the court finds that:
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ...
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Jeffers does not meet the requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). He is under 70 years of age. See Doc. No. 130 at 2. Accordingly, Jeffers' only possible avenue for relief is § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
The starting point in determining what constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons" under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is the Sentencing Guideline discussing compassionate release issued by the United States Sentencing Commission. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2018); see also United States v. Hall , No. CR98-7, 2019 WL 6829951, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 13, 2019) ; United States v. Rivernider , No. CR10-222, 2019 WL 3816671, at *2 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2019). The Guideline provides that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist in the following circumstances:
(A) Medical Condition of the Defendant.—
(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.
(ii) The defendant is—
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process,
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.
(B) Age of the Defendant.—The defendant (i) is at least 65 years old; (ii) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.
(C) Family Circumstances.—
(i) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children.
(ii) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.
(D) Other Reasons.—As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1.
This Guideline predates the FSA and has "not been amended to reflect that, under the FSA, a defendant may now move for compassionate release after exhausting administrative remedies." Rivernider , 2019 WL 3816671, at *2. Courts are split on whether the policy statement is binding because it predates the FSA's changes to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A number of district courts have concluded that Guideline § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 does not restrain a court's assessment of whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to release a defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez , 424 F.Supp.3d 674, 681-82 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ; United States v. Urkevich , No. CR03-37, 2019 WL 6037391, at *3 (D. Neb. Nov. 14, 2019) ; United States v. Brown , 411 F.Supp.3d 446, 451-52 (S.D. Iowa 2019) ; United States v. Fox , CR14-03, 2019 WL 3046086, at *3 (D. Me. July 11, 2019) ; United States v. Beck , CR13-186-6, 425 F.Supp.3d 573, 579-80 (M.D.N.C. 2019) ; United States v. Cantu , 423 F.Supp.3d 345, 350-52 (S.D. Tex. 2019). Other courts have concluded that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist only if they are included in the Guideline. See, e.g., United States v. Lynn , No. CR89-0072, 2019 WL 3805349, at *4 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2019).
As I have previously stated, I agree with those courts that have found that the Guideline provides helpful guidance on what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons, but is not conclusive given the recent statutory changes. See United States v. Schmitt , No. CR12-4076-LTS, 2020 WL 96904, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 8, 2020) ; see also Rodriguez , 424 F.Supp.3d at 681-82 (Congress knew that the BOP rarely granted compassionate release requests prior to the FSA, and the purpose of the FSA is to increase the number of compassionate release requests granted by allowing defendants to file motions in district courts directly even after the BOP denies their request); Brown , 411 F.Supp.3d at 450-51 (same).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Government argues Jeffers failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on two grounds. First, it argues that Jeffers submitted his request for release on April 20, 2020, not April 2. Second, it argues that Jeffers did not raise the issue of his diabetes as a reason for release in his request.
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) unambiguously instructs that a defendant can only bring a motion for compassionate release in federal court "after [he] has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on [his] behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." I agree with the majority of courts to weigh in on this issue that the statutory text of § 3582(c)(1)(A) makes it clear that a court cannot entertain a compassionate release motion unless a defendant has exhausted administrative remedies—even in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., United States v. Raia , 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. Apr. 2, 2020) ; United States v. James , 15-cr-255 (SRN), 2020 WL 1922568, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2020) ; United States v. Jenkins , No. 4:15-CR-3079, 2020 WL 1872568, at *1 (D. Neb. Apr. 14, 2020) ; United States v. Boyles , No. 18-20092-JAR, 2020 WL 1819887, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2020) ; United States v. Aguila , No. 2:16-cr-00046-TLN, 2020 WL 1812159, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Apr. 9, 2020) ; United States v. Epstein , No. 14-287 (FLW), 2020 WL 1808616, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2020) ; United States v. Alam , No. 15-20351, 453 F.Supp.3d 1041, 1043-44 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2020) ; United States v. Holden , No. 3:13-cr-00444-BR, 452 F.Supp.3d 964, 973-74 (D. Or. Apr. 6, 2020) ; United States v. Woodson , No. 18-cr-845 (PKC), 452 F.Supp.3d 31, 33-34 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020) ; United States v. Weiland , No. 18 Cr. 273 (LGS), 2020 WL 1674137, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020) ; United States v. Johnson , No. RDB-14-0441, 451 F.Supp.3d 436, 444-43 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2020) ; United States v. Carver , No. 4:19-cr-06044-SMJ, 451 F.Supp.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (E.D. Wash. Apr., 1, 2020) ; United States v. Zywotko , No. 2-19-cr-113-FtM-60NPM, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1492900, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2020). Most courts that hold otherwise waive the exhaustion requirement based on Second Circuit precedent. See United States v. Colvin , No. 3:19-cr-179 (JBA), 451 F.Supp.3d 237, 239-40 (D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2020) ; United States v. Zukerman , No. 16 Cr. 194 451 F.Supp.3d 329, 331-32 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2020) ; Poulios v. United States , No. 2:09-cr-109, 2020 WL 1922775, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 21, 2020).
Jeffers filed his current motion for compassionate release on May 20, 2020. Doc. No. 129. He argues that he submitted his initial compassionate release request to the warden on April 2, 2020, and re-submitted it on April 22, 2020. The Government states the BOP's only record of a compassionate release request is dated April 20, 2020 (see Doc. No. 133-2), and concedes exactly 30 days passed from the date Jeffers submitted that request to the date he filed this motion. I have no reason to doubt Jeffers' representation that he made a request on April 2, 2020, or the Government's understanding that he made a request on April 20, 2020. Under either scenario, Jeffers satisfied the 30-day requirement on the date he filed his current motion. Thus, I consider the § 3582(c)(1)(A) requirement to be satisfied.
Jeffers has submitted documentation of an informal resolution attempt stating he "re-applied for compass[s]ionate release on the 22nd of April" because his first request was never answered. See Doc. No. 140-1.
The Government's second argument is that Jeffers failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not citing Type 2 diabetes in his request to the warden while citing it as a primary health concern in his motion. Doc. No. 133 at 7. An issue-exhaustion requirement has been considered by other district courts in the context of whether a defendant must specifically mention the COVID-19 pandemic in his or her BOP administrative request for compassionate release based on medical issues. Courts finding that COVID-19 must be raised in an administrative request reason that the BOP should be given an opportunity to address COVID-19's impact on the defendant. See United States v. Valenta , No. 15-161, 2020 WL 1689786, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2020) ; States v. Jenkins , No. 4:15-CR-3079, 2020 WL 1872568, at *1 (D. Neb. Apr. 14, 2020) ; United States v. Mogavero , No. 2:15-cr-00074-JAD-NJK, 2020 WL 1853754, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2020). Courts that do not require a defendant to raise the COVID-19 pandemic in his or her administrative request explain that such motions are based on health conditions raised in the administrative request, and the COVID-19 pandemic "merely accentuates h[er] meritorious claims for release." Miller v. United States , No. 16-20222-1, 453 F.Supp.3d 1062, 1065 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2020) ; United States v. Coker , No. 3:14-CR-085, 2020 WL 1877800, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 15, 2020). Another district court within the Eighth Circuit has found that "issue exhaustion is inappropriate because § 3582 contains no such requirement and BOP compassionate release requests are not adversarial proceedings." United States v. Brown , 457 F.Supp.3d 691, 697, No. 4:05-CR-00227-1, 2020 WL 2091802, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 9, 2020) (citing Sims v. Apfel , 530 U.S. 103, 109, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000) ("The desirability of a court imposed a requirement of issue exhaustion depends on the degree to which the analogy to normal adversarial litigation applies in a particular administrative proceeding.")).
The Government argues that one of the purposes for requiring prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies is to give the BOP an opportunity to address the issue. See Doc. No. 133 at 5 (citing United States v. Valenta , Criminal No. 15-161, 2020 WL 1689786, at *1 (W.D. Penn. Apr. 7, 2020) ). It cites 28 C.F.R. § 571.61, which outlines the process for submitting a § 3582(c)(1)(A) request to the warden and requires the request to contain "at a minimum ... [t]he extraordinary or compelling circumstances that the inmate believes warrant consideration." The warden responded to Jeffers' request on May 18, 2020. See Doc. No. 135-1. The warden concluded Jeffers' circumstances did not meet the criteria for consideration for a reduction in sentence and that COVID-19 did not currently warrant an early release. Id.
I find that Jeffers' administrative request dated April 20, 2020, satisfies section 3582(c)(1)(A), despite not mentioning Type 2 diabetes. No issue exhaustion exists in the text of § 3582(c)(1)(A). Jeffers' requests and motion for compassionate release are based on the increased risk of complications he may face if exposed to COVID-19 based on his current health conditions. In other words, the focus of Jeffers' motion is the threat of exposure to COVID-19 in light of his underlying health conditions, not the underlying conditions themselves – which are adequately controlled. Jeffers cited his concerns over COVID-19 in both his administrative request and motion. While he did not explicitly cite Type 2 diabetes in his administrative request, he did note his "chronic care" status, his age, high blood pressure, anxiety and the medications he takes. Notably, Jeffers' diabetes is adequately controlled without medication. See Doc. No. 130-3 at 1.
I will not require Jeffers to submit another administrative request, a process that will be meaningless since the BOP has already addressed COVID-19 in light of other underlying health conditions, such as high blood pressure, that are also associated with an increased risk of complications if exposed to COVID-19. Jeffers has exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) because he filed his motion for compassionate release more than 30 days after he submitted his first administrative request to his warden requesting compassionate release due to COVID-19 and his underlying health conditions.
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Jeffers argues that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist here because his diabetes and hypertension, when combined with his age and other health conditions, greatly increase the complications he could suffer if exposed to COVID-19. Doc. No. 130 at 9. He also contends that he is also at a high risk of contracting COVID-19 because, despite precautions, the virus has spread quickly and extensively throughout BOP facilities. Id. at 9-11.
The Government concedes that if a defendant has a chronic medical condition that has been identified as increasing the defendant's risk of serious illness from COVID-19, then that condition may be extraordinary and compelling. Doc. No. 133 at 12. The Government acknowledges that Type 2 diabetes and hypertension are listed by the CDC as factors which could place individuals at a higher risk of severe outcomes from COVID-19. Id. at 12-13. However, the Government contends that both of Jeffers' conditions are well-controlled under BOP care and that Jeffers' own expert did not conclude that he would necessarily receive better care outside the correctional facility. Id. at 13. The Government argues that a generalized concern about contracting COVID-19 should not be recognized as an extraordinary and compelling reason on its own.
There appears to be no dispute that Jeffers' Type 2 diabetes and hypertension increase his risk of serious illness if he were infected with COVID-19. However, I find that his health conditions are not sufficiently severe to establish a compelling basis for his release. The CDC lists categories of people who might be at higher risk from severe illness from COVID-19. Notably, it states that people with certain underlying medical conditions are at risk, "particularly if not well controlled." People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html (last visited June 8, 2020). Two of those categories relevant here are (1) people who have serious heart conditions and (2) people with diabetes. However, both of Jeffers' conditions (hypertension and Type 2 diabetes ) are well-controlled.
People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html (last visited June 9, 2020)
The CDC does not list people with hypertension as those who might be at a higher risk from serious illness from COVID-19. The CDC explains that those with pulmonary hypertension may be at a higher risk, but the medical records do not demonstrate that Jeffers suffers from pulmonary hypertension. See Doc. No. 130-2. The CDC further explains:
Groups at Higher Risk for Severe Illness , CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/groups-at-higher-risk.html (last visited June 9, 2020).
Although many patients with severe illness from COVID-19 have underlying hypertension, it is unclear at this time if hypertension is an independent risk factor for severe illness from COVID-19. Hypertension is common in the United States. Hypertension is more frequent with advancing age and among men, non-Hispanic blacks, and people with other underlying medical conditions such as obesity, diabetes, and serious heart disease. At this time, people whose only underlying medical condition is hypertension are not considered to be at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19.
Clinical Questions about COVID-19: Questions and Answers , CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/faq.html#Patients-with-Hypertension (last visited June 9, 2020).
While Jeffers also suffers from diabetes, the CDC explains that people with diabetes might be at higher risk because "[p]eople with diabetes whose blood sugar levels are often higher than their target are more likely to have diabetes-related health problems" and that "[t]hose health problems can make it harder to overcome COVID-19." Groups at Higher Risk for Severe Illness , CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/groups-at-higher-risk.html (last visited June 9, 2020). Jeffers' diabetes is well-controlled without medication. See Doc. No. 130-3 (explaining that a diagnosis is made when someone reaches a hemoglobin A1c level of 6.5%, that the goal for someone on treatment is generally considered to be 7% and that Jeffers' lab values have ranged from 5.9% to 6.6% with his most recent level measuring at 5.9%).
The CDC recommends that those with diabetes and hypertension continue to take medication as usual and, for diabetics, test blood sugar and track results. Jeffers' blood pressure is well-controlled with medication and his diabetes is adequately controlled without medication. Both of these conditions are monitored and managed through his regular visits to the chronic care clinic. Id. While Jeffers' concerns about exposure to COVID-19 are understandable, I find he has not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances based on his medical conditions. See United States v. Gray , 14 CR 810-10(CM), 2020 WL 3050730, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2020) (concluding COVID-19 did not present extraordinary and compelling circumstances in light of 53-year-old defendant's medical conditions of hypertension (controlled with medication) and diabetes ).
C. Section 3553 Factors
Even if Jeffers' circumstances could be considered extraordinary and compelling, I would have to review the § 3553 factors to determine whether his release would be appropriate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Under those factors, I conclude it would not. United States District Judge Mark W. Bennett wrote as follows in his order regarding Jeffers' sentencing:
Jeffers illegally and stealthily entered his ex-girlfriend's residence, under cover of darkness, in the wee hours of an August morning, found his ex-girlfriend on the living room couch asleep with their five-year-old daughter, stuck a loaded firearm in his ex-girlfriend's face, while holding her down with the other arm, threatened to kill her, and warned her not to call the police.
Doc. No. 103 at 2. Jeffers had previously served five different prison terms for crimes (including violent crimes), had been sent to jail nine different times for other crimes, had his parole revoked twice and his probation once and each time had been sent back to prison. Id. at 3. Acknowledging that "[a]n upward variance may be based on ‘the need to protect the public’ and ‘criminal history not accounted for in [a defendant's] criminal history category,’ " United States v. Archambault , 777 F.3d 982, 983 (8th Cir. 2015), as well as the extent and likely duration of emotional or psychological injuries to victims, see United States v. Roberts , 747 F.3d 990, 991 (8th Cir. 2014), among other factors, Judge Bennett imposed a substantial upward variance (108 months) to the advisory guidelines range (18 to 24 months). See Doc. No. 103 at 19-25. He emphasized Jeffers' extensive criminal history, his recidivism, the nature of Jeffers' convictions and the need to protect the public, the post-traumatic stress suffered by the victims and the need to serve the sentencing objectives of punishment and deterrence. Id. at 19-23.
While there are some mitigating factors, including Jeffers' behavior within the BOP and a support system in place upon release, see Doc. Nos. 130 at 12-13, 130-5, 130-6, the balance of the § 3553 factors weigh strongly in favor of Jeffers serving his full prison sentence. This provides an alternative basis for denying his motion.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Jeffers' motion (Doc. No. 129) for compassionate release is denied. The Clerk's office shall provide a copy of this order to the institution where Jeffers is incarcerated.