Summary
In United States v. Hodgins, 485 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1973), the statements of the applicant in support of exemption were much more complete and clearly disclosed both the religious and moral foundation of his beliefs.
Summary of this case from United States v. FullerOpinion
No. 72-2844.
August 2, 1973. Rehearing Denied November 2, 1973.
Michel F. Willey (argued), San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Joseph E. Reeves, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), James L. Browning, Jr., U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
Appellant has taken this appeal from conviction of refusal to submit to induction into the armed forces. At issue is the validity of his classification as I-A in light of his application for conscientious objector status. His motion for acquittal was denied by the District Court upon two grounds: that he had failed to state a prima facie claim for a I-O classification; that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Appellant contends that in both respects the court was in error.
When appellant registered for the draft he applied for a I-O status and completed and filed his SSS form 150 with the local board. The local board rejected a I-O classification without stating reasons, and he was classified I-A. He was granted a personal appearance before the local board. It adhered to its classification. On appeal, the appeal board retained him in I-A without giving reasons. After physical and psychiatric examination he was then reclassified I-Y. Some months later he was re-examined and determined to be fit and was then reclassified I-A. No appeal was taken from this last reclassification. On being ordered to report for induction, he appeared but refused induction.
In support of the District Court's judgment the Government contends that appellant failed to state a prima facie claim for conscientious objector status in that insufficient information was presented as to the religious nature of his beliefs, how they came to be acquired or the depth to which they were held. We cannot agree.
The "three basic tests" for conscientious objector status as specified in United States v. McKinley, 447 F.2d 962, 963 (9th Cir. 1971) are: (1) that the registrant is opposed to war in any form, rather than selectively to some wars; (2) that his opposition is founded upon religious training and belief (as this language was construed in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970)); (3) that his beliefs are sincerely held. (Appellee's reliance on the result in that case is, however, misplaced. It is clearly distinguishable on the facts. There, no form 150 was filed. The registrant relied solely upon an answer he supplied to a question in a current information questionnaire which made no effort to show religious foundations for belief: "I am physically and mentally incapable of killing another human being.")
The answers given by appellant in his form 150 are set forth in the margin. In three short sentences he sufficiently described his concept of God and why it was that the nature of his belief in God precluded his taking human life. "I believe that God is love and the ability to love. I believe in God. Therefore, I cannot take another human life or assist in that taking, but can only love him." Nowhere does it appear that his objection to war was selective. Absence from his statement of self-serving protestations of sincerity or depth of feeling does not, in our view, defeat a prima facie claim since these matters more appropriately and effectively are subject to exploration in interview.
"Series I.
B I am, by reason of my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form and I am further conscientiously opposed to participation in non-combatant training and service in the Armed Forces. I, therefore, claim exemption from both combatant and noncombatant training and service in the Armed Forces."
killing
"Conscientious objectors (do not sign this series unless you claim exemption as a conscientious objector.)
"By reason of religious training and belief I am conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form and hereby request that the Local Board furnish me the Special Form for Conscientious Objector (SS Form No. 150.)
Michael Francis Hodgins"
"The Local Board reviewed and did not reopen registrant's file. Registrant was to remain in classification 1-A. File to be forwarded to Appeal Board for a final determination.
"The Local Board did not feel there was sufficient reason to be granted a 1-O classification."
447 F.2d 962
"Defendant's Form 150, his responses at his personal appearance, and all of the other documents submitted to his Local Board prior to his denial of his 1-O classification on May 9, 1967, do not meet the requirements for the presentation of a prima facie case of conscientious objection enunciated in McKinley, supra.
"Defendant's failure to present facts sufficient to constitute a prima facie entitlement to a 1-O classification is dispositive of the case."
403 U.S. 698
"In order to qualify for classification as a conscientious objector, a registrant must satisfy three basic tests. He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 [91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168]. He must show that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, as the term has been construed in our decisions. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 [85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733]; Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 [90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308]. And he must show that his objection is sincere. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 [75 S.Ct. 392, 99 L.Ed. 428]. In applying these tests, the Selective Service System must be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious sect, if any, to which he may belong. United States v. Seeger, supra; Gillette v. United States, supra; Williams v. United States, 216 F.2d 350, 352," 403 U.S. at 700. (Emphasis supplied.)
"In three short sentences he sufficiently described his concept of God and why it was that the nature of his belief in God precluded his taking human life. `I believe that God is love and the ability to love. I believe in God. Therefore, I cannot take another human life or assist in that taking, but can only love Him.' Nowhere does it appear that his objection to war was selective. Absence from his statement of self-serving protestations of sincerity or depth of feeling does not, in our view, defeat a prima facie claim since these matters more appropriately and effectively are subject to exploration in interview.
"Assuming that appellant's beliefs were sincerely and deeply held * * * this statement was sufficient to provide a prima facie claim. In denying him a conscientious objector status it was then incumbent upon the local board or the appeal board to specify the basis for denial — whether it was founded on a view that the statement was legally insufficient or upon a finding of lack of sincerity or necessary depth of belief. United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1969) * * *.
"We conclude that appellant was improperly classified 1-A."
i.e., Haughton, supra.
Haughton Haughton
"The local board, however, must state the reasons for its denial of a requested classification when a registrant has `met the statutory criteria' * * * for that classification or, in the language of Dickinson, Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed. 132, has placed himself `prima facie within that statutory exemption' * * *." 413 F.2d at 739.
463 F.2d 1219 423 F.2d 1126
show satisfy
426 F.2d 544
313 F.2d 773
supra.
327 U.S. 114
476 F.2d 254 Nelson. Nelson Hodgins
Assuming that appellant's beliefs were sincerely and deeply held (and we find nothing in the record inconsistent with sincerity or depth of feeling), this statement was sufficient to provide a prima facie claim. In denying him a conscientious objector status it was then incumbent upon the local board or the appeal board to specify the basis for denial — whether it was founded on a view that the statement was legally insufficient or upon a finding of lack of sincerity or necessary depth of belief. United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 1969). Here the records of the local board show only "the local board did not feel there was sufficient reason to be granted a I-O classification."
We conclude that appellant was improperly classified I-A.
The Government further contends that by failing to appeal his reclassification from I-Y to I-A, appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and is thus precluded from judicial review. We cannot agree.
In McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969), the Court discussed at length the reason for the exhaustion rule. It is designed to avoid premature interruption of the administrative process and allow the agency a measure of autonomy subject to review for abuse. 395 U.S. at 193-194, 89 S.Ct. 1657. It serves to allow the agency to develop the factual background for the case and exercise its administrative expertise. 395 U.S. at 194, 89 S.Ct. 1657. It serves to avoid judicial intervention, at a point when the administrative process may yet resolve the dispute favorably to the complainant. 395 U.S. at 195, 89 S.Ct. 1657.
The Court noted, however, that these administrative law principles may have to be softened somewhat in the Selective Service context where the registrant is denied any judicial review of his induction order, save in criminal proceedings had against him. "Such a result should not be tolerated unless the interests underlying the exhaustion rule clearly outweigh the severe burden imposed upon the registrant if he is denied judicial review." 395 U.S. at 197, 89 S.Ct. at 1664.
In the case before us all purposes of the exhaustion rule had been met when the appeal from the original I-A classification was taken. No new circumstances appear to have arisen that would suggest that the question on appeal from reclassification would in any respect be different. The reclassification to I-A was from I-Y, and the issues upon appeal would rationally seem to relate to the propriety of terminating the I-Y classification. If properly terminated, the justification for the I-A classification had already been determined. Insistence on a second appeal, under these circumstances, would simply subject the appeal board to a rehearing upon the same facts, a result that would seem to add unnecessarily to its burdens. To require the registrant to seek rehearing on all occasions when the opportunity fortuitously presents itself, in our view places an undue burden on him without any compensating administrative advantages.
United States v. Nelson, 476 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. April 12, 1973), is distinguishable. While it holds that a claim of lack of basis in fact was barred by failure of the registrant to take a second administrative appeal following reopening and reclassification by his local board, an entirely new issue was presented by the local board action, one that had not been presented on the first appeal.
We conclude that the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies did not require the taking of appeal from the order reclassifying appellant I-A from his I-Y classification.
Judgment reversed.