Opinion
CAUSE NO. 3:21cr47 DRL
2023-01-27
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Johnny HELTON, Defendant.
Joel R. Gabrielse, Frank E. Schaffer, Government Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, South Bend, IN, for Plaintiff.
Joel R. Gabrielse, Frank E. Schaffer, Government Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, South Bend, IN, for Plaintiff.
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM
Damon R. Leichty, Judge
In April 2021, law enforcement conducted two controlled buys of methamphetamine from Johnny Helton. He pleaded guilty to one count of a two-count indictment as to him—distributing 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). The court deferred acceptance of his guilty plea until sentencing.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The court must first calculate the guideline range correctly, then decide what sentence is reasonable for this defendant. Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. 62, 67, 137 S.Ct. 1170, 197 L.Ed.2d 490 (2017); United States v. Swank, 37 F.4th 1331, 1334 (7th Cir. 2022). The 2021 guidelines apply. See Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 531, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013).
Mr. Helton objects to a missing two-level reduction under the guideline-version of the statutory safety valve (¶¶ 22, 38, 98). U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(18), 5C1.2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The court must calculate the guideline range correctly, as the guidelines are plainly written. See United States v. Severson, 569 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 2009). Mr. Helton falls short of § 5C1.2's conditions, so the court overrules the objection and defers this discussion to 18 U.S.C. § 3553 where the court can and will account for the differential between the guideline and statute.
That said, the court adopts as its findings ¶¶ 1-120 of the revised presentence report. Mr. Helton starts at offense level 32 (192.9 grams total weight and 189.88 grams of actual methamphetamine). U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(4); see also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) n.(B) (defining actual). His clear and timely acceptance of responsibility and other argument take him to offense level 27. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
The sentencing guidelines assess four criminal history points against Mr. Helton, placing him in criminal history category III. U.S.S.G. chap. 5A. There the guidelines recommend a sentencing range of 87-108 months. U.S.S.G. chap. 5A. The safety valve permits a sentence below the otherwise applicable 60-month (5-year) minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
DISCUSSION
The court decides this sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Turning to the statutory factors, the court must choose a reasonable sentence: one sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy federal sentencing goals. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Consistent with the "uniform and constant" federal judicial tradition, the court considers "every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue." Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 487, 131 S.Ct. 1229, 179 L.Ed.2d 196 (2011) (citation omitted). A sentence must "fit the offender and not merely the crime," id. at 487-88, 131 S.Ct. 1229, and the court sentences a defendant as he stands at the time of sentencing, not merely based on a snapshot of his life at the time of his offense.
At the time of this offense, and a serious one at that, Mr. Helton sold almost 193 grams of nearly pure methamphetamine over two occasions. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). He was a smaller fish in a much bigger pond, but he was drowning in a dangerous drug—personally for sure, and now graduating from mere possession to dealing. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C); Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Methamphetamine Research Report 2 (2019) (calling methamphetamine one of the most commonly abused drugs and one that most contributes to violent crime).
Law enforcement targeted the predominate supplier of methamphetamine from South Bend to Warsaw and learned that this man supplied Mr. Helton, located in Mentone. In coordinating one controlled buy with this supplier, the supplier informed the confidential source that he was out of drugs and referred him to Mr. Helton. Mr. Helton did the deal in a retail parking lot in Warsaw. He offered the confidential informant an extra ounce, but the confidential informant lacked the money, so Mr. Helton used a scale to weigh the right amount to sell. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A).
Mr. Helton told the informant he would like to do more business in the future. The second time, just two weeks later, Mr. Helton met the confidential informant in a hotel parking lot in Warsaw and sold more. But to get this new amount to sell, Mr. Helton had to obtain the methamphetamine from two other suppliers or dealers—not the main one who brought law enforcement to monitor Mr. Helton, but two others—so he had multiple sources. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A).
Nevertheless, after both deals, Mr. Helton met with the main Warsaw supplier in the same parking lots where the deals occurred as law enforcement watched. They clearly had a close association—Mr. Helton even drove this supplier to South Bend to acquire and transport drugs at times because the supplier lacked his own vehicle. His addiction and lack of better judgment got him entangled in this operation far deeper than he may have realized. Ultimately, he was arrested when law enforcement raided the home of a woman who also helped this supplier sell large quantities of methamphetamine. No good can be assumed from Mr. Helton's presence at this home. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
For someone with two prior convictions for methamphetamine possession, who has now moved to dealing this drug, no one can doubt its stronghold on Mr. Helton's life, the seriousness of this offense, or the staunch need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C). Addiction is a powerful force. The gravity of just some of its unfortunate effects is on display today. Unusual among defendants, and aside from marijuana, his opiate and daily methamphetamine use began late in life, at age 34. He then lost longstanding work as an RV-company's plant manager from the 2008 recession and became disabled in 2014, paving no real road back and inviting a downward spiral. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(6).
Today he stands sober. A terrific accomplishment, he has participated in substance abuse therapy for the last 18 months. He has remained sober for 636 days and passed every drug test for the past 20 months. He has participated in individual and group therapy sessions. He has completed two programs. His sessions decreased to once a month given his progress, but he has pressed on with added treatment. His brain may never physiologically forget its habit, but he has made concerted efforts to create new and stronger habits—far more than most drug offenders. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(6).
Mr. Helton qualifies under the federal safety valve, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); but, without a quorum of the Sentencing Commission, the sentencing guidelines have not caught up to Congress' 2018 expansion of it. Everyone agrees he qualifies. He should not be penalized merely because the dust on U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 has not yet been knocked off. As a policy matter, the court adheres to a modern congressional pronouncement rather than an old guideline. See United States v. Grisanti, 943 F.3d 1044, 1053 (7th Cir. 2019); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). After all, since 2018, the safety valve was intended to benefit low-point, non-violent drug offenders who weren't leaders or organizers of criminal activity and who made a good faith effort to cooperate truthfully. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); United States v. Syms, 846 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 2017). By definition, this is Mr. Helton.
The Sentencing Commission, newly with a quorum last year, has since proposed an amendment to the safety valve's cousin in the sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, to conform to the state of federal law. It will likely become effective November 2023.
His record isn't predesigned toward greater criminality. Other than a mere finable offense at age 20, and private marijuana use, he largely lived a law-abiding life until age 34. His drug use, lost career, and eve of disability aided his first drug conviction, albeit even then not until age 40. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court rarely sees drug offenders who have such a comparatively clean track record—bookended both before and now after a serious federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(6).
Also, though it proves difficult to say that CHC III substantially overrepresents the seriousness of his history, today it so overstates the likelihood he will reoffend. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(5); U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.3(b)(1), (b)(3), (c)(2). At most, he strikes as a CHC II offender. He barely falls within CHC III. Only one of two possession convictions gets him there, aside from an eleven-year-old offense. His history materially involves only non-violent, possession charges; and he has made great strides to shake the driving force to them. At least on his record, it seems an odd exercise of discretion to put aside points through Congress' wisdom under the First Step Act but grimly cling to them in weighing his criminal history category. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1).
More to that point, unlike most any other federal offender, in the past Mr. Helton has complied with every supervisory condition that any court has asked him to meet. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(6). He has thrived with structure. Indeed, to the count of 50 months, he has proven that he can live a law-abiding life—even beset by drug addiction—while under supervision. Of course, this likewise means he needed supervision of this duration; but the point is that he is not just amenable, he responds. Only outside supervision has he returned to drugs.
If, on this record, this is the first time he has completed measurable drug therapy, greater hope is that it will stick and that the need for deterrence and public protection is less. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). Indeed, such a record advocates markedly toward the prospect of alternatives to just incarceration. Given his record under supervision, and the added tools of drug treatment, the individual today who will likely abide the court's careful restrictions and abide the law without such a stranglehold of addiction isn't the same person as the offender who twenty months ago fell prey again to it.
Never before has Mr. Helton been convicted of dealing. It was always personal use. And, unlike many dealers, he did so just to get drugs for a steeped addiction—and one that no longer domineers his life as much, thereby lessening the recidivism risk. He made no money—quite telling that he accepted mere drugs and resisted the lure of a quick buck, given his family's financial circumstances. He worked for drugs. Moreso, the immediate post-sale meetings with the supplier, as well as the supplier's call out of his primary suppliers—but not Mr. Helton—tend to show he was used, likely as a shield, which tends to recast his culpability. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(6). He wasn't an organizer, but a tool.
At age 51—in his entire lifetime—Mr. Helton has served only six months in jail, and then only once. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Given all circumstances, this is one of those unique cases in which the certainty of a sentence will likely prove more effectual than its length. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B). His recidivism risk and the corresponding need for deterrence are less urgent based on his history and true characteristics, see United States Sent. Comm'n (USSC), Recidivism Among Federal Drug Trafficking Offenders 90 (2017) (18.3 percent rearrest rate for methamphetamine traffickers released at ages 51-60); USSC, Recidivism of Federal Drug Trafficking Offenders Released in 2010 110 (2022) (25.6 percent rearrest rate for methamphetamine traffickers released at ages 50-59), though his recidivism risk undoubtedly remains tied to his ability to avoid drug use indefinitely, focus on his family, elude negative peer influences, and execute on a concerted plan, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B).
As confirmed by probation and the parties, Mr. Helton was sentenced on May 3, 2012 to one year for methamphetamine possession and was released on October 31, 2012.
Nearly a lifetime resident of Indiana, Mr. Helton has been in a relationship for 31 years. His spouse doesn't use drugs. She works nights for a medical device company. She currently is enrolled in college to further her career. They have lived in Mentone for twelve years in a stable home now for two children, both with special needs. Mr. Helton—not a spring chicken but instead with notable health issues—is nonetheless the primary caretaker of both boys: one his own and another admirably in his temporary guardianship because the child's father has been incarcerated. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
Each day, Mr. Helton takes the boys to and from school. He cooks. He attends every parent-teacher conference, every class function, every doctor appointment, every counseling session; and he occasionally retrieves his son early or aids him when the special needs at school demand. His son's condition favors routine. He also provides daily care for his elderly mother across the street. Sentences interfere with family relationships and obligations all the time, and some for good reason, but these "effects are consequences of the parent's crime, not the sentence imposed." United States v. Graham, 915 F.3d 456, 459-60 (7th Cir. 2019). Still, more than the usual is at stake from a heavy-handed sentence today. Answers might be found to a spouse's job, her education, even the care of an elderly mother, but these together with the welfare of two kids with special needs present a more unusual case, given the family's financial means. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); cf. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 app. n.1(B).
His disability income pays for the mortgage and car, and the family will lose that during his incarceration. See United States Social Sec. Admin. (SSA), What Prisoners Need to Know 2-3 (2021). Mr. Helton also would need to reapply for disability benefits if incarcerated beyond a year. See id. That said, his spouse makes a decent living.
It isn't lost on the court that his choices got him here. It also isn't lost on the court that his use of methamphetamine three or four times daily means that, as much as he would like to say "he never brought the drug home," that in effect he did. Even giving him the benefit of use during the day while the kids were at school, it is difficult to imagine that he was not at times high during pick up or during other interactions. Notably, and relieving some concern, his two drug deals occurred only during the day when the kids were gone and then only in another town. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A).
Added to this picture is Mr. Helton's significant health issues. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(5), (a)(6); see also U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. His medication list resembles a small pharmacy, and his wellbeing requires regular attention. His health required three hospitalizations in 2022 alone. He also has mental health challenges that today receive appropriate treatment from therapy and medication while supervised. The Bureau of Prisons can address his needs. With his age and health issues, the cost differential between incarceration and other confinement is nonetheless worthy of account—not just in understanding society's cost-benefit and this defendant's care, but to employ the rule of parsimony. See Graham, 915 F.3d at 460; United States v. DuPriest, 794 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2015).
The expected governmental cost to house a defendant with the Bureau of Prisons is $3,688.00 per month versus $371.00 per month on supervision.
A lengthy prison sentence would prove overkill for someone who suffers from significant drug addiction, who wrestles with mental (and physical) health issues, who has this defendant's history, who earnestly has completed treatment, who has remained sober for 636 days, and who has spent modest time in the past experiencing the loss of liberty. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Dyer, 216 F.3d 568, 570-71 (7th Cir. 2000). Today's sentence achieves adequate deterrence and protects the public. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C).
The hope of rehabilitation begins with accepting responsibility. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 47, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002). Mr. Helton has done that more than many. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(6), (f); see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 app. n.1(G). Today, his frame of mind affords optimism for rehabilitative success over a shorter period of time than this offense might otherwise demand. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). This road sometimes proves harder for some than others, but this offense seems to have been a wake-up call. His sister quotes Anne Frank: "What is done cannot be undone, but at least one can keep it from happening again." His sobriety, treatment, and compliance while on release suggest he could continue to combat his addiction and live a law-abiding life, if given appropriate structure. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C).
A guideline sentence often poses the best hope nationally for avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among similar defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The court has weighed this factor carefully with considerate reference to information from the Sentencing Commission. See, e.g., USSC, Recidivism of Federal Drug Trafficking Offenders Released in 2010 107 (2022) (average imprisonment length for methamphetamine trafficking offenders is 78 months). Mr. Helton isn't the average offender. Aside from the court's § 3553(a)(6) remarks already, the total amount of drugs here was greater than necessary to meet the statutory charge (and original minimum), which too contextualizes this crime's seriousness, though at the lower end his starting level 32. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). That said, the congregation of compelling mitigating factors persuades the court that today's sentence, as structured, creates no disparity in truth, and even so certainly not one unwarranted. The guidelines aren't always on the mark, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007), and the law requires the court to promote federal sentencing goals with a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), always mindful of individualizing the sentence, see Pepper, 562 U.S. at 487, 131 S.Ct. 1229; Booker, 543 U.S. at 264-65, 125 S.Ct. 738.
Given all § 3553(a) factors, a 60-month sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy federal sentencing goals, with this sentence to be served in the following manner: 9 months of imprisonment; and 15 months on home incarceration and then 36 months on home detention during a 5-year term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1) (court must impose a term of supervised release of not more than 5 years); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a) (recommending 2-5 years); cf. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1. This leaves 9 months of supervised release without home incarceration or detention. His incarcerative and supervisory release will be governed by additional conditions.
Mr. Helton cannot pay the fines recommended by the guidelines even if afforded the most generous of installment payment schedules, so the court imposes no fine. A special assessment of $100.00 is mandatory. 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A).
SENTENCE
Accordingly, the court accepts the guilty plea and sentences the defendant, Johnny Helton, to a term of 60 months to be served in the following manner: 9 months of imprisonment with the Bureau of Prisons; and 15 months on home incarceration to be followed by 36 months on home detention, both during a 5-year term of supervised release.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, the court leaves it to the Bureau of Prisons to determine the appropriate amount of time served to be credited toward the defendant's sentence. The court grants the defendant the privilege to self-report and orders the defendant to report to the facility designated by the United States Marshal Service on March 13, 2023 at 9:00 a.m. If no facility has been designated by that date, the defendant must report to the United States Marshal Service in the Robert A. Grant Federal Building, 204 South Main Street, South Bend, Indiana 46601 at that date and time.
While on supervised release, he must comply with the terms of supervision set forth in ¶¶ 121-131 of the revised presentence report, as amended here, which paragraphs the court incorporates as part of this sentence having made an independent judgment that they should be imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). After notice and an opportunity to consult and object, the court amends these conditions as follows:
The court corrects the scrivener error of ¶ 134 as stated on the record.
132. You must serve a 15-month term of home incarceration to begin within 10 days of placement on supervision, with electronic monitoring at your own expense through participation in a co-payment program administered by the probation office. You are restricted to your residence at all times except for medical appointments or necessities, substance abuse treatment or programming, caretaking and education of the children (including under your guardianship) and your mother, church services, court hearings, and at times specifically authorized in advance by the court alone. Failure to pay these fees will not be grounds for imprisonment unless the failure is willful. This condition is imposed as a substitute for imprisonment. It also reduces the risk of recidivism and provides public protection and defendant rehabilitation
133. Upon immediate completion of your term of home incarceration, you must serve a 36-month term of home detention with electronic monitoring at your own expense through participation in a co-payment program administered by the probation office. During this time, you must remain at your place of residence except for medical appointments or necessities, substance abuse treatment or programming, caretaking and education of the children (including under your guardianship) and your mother, church services, court hearings, and at times specifically authorized in advance by the probation officer. Failure to pay these fees will not be grounds for imprisonment unless the failure is willful. This condition is imposed as a substitute for imprisonment. It also reduces the risk of recidivism and provides public protection and defendant rehabilitation.The defendant expressly waived reading of the other supervisory conditions.
134. You will be monitored by GPS location monitoring technology for the period of 15 months while on home incarceration and to continue during your first 24 months of home detention, and you must follow the rules and regulations of the location monitoring program. You must pay the costs of the program. Failure to pay these fees will not be grounds for imprisonment unless the failure is willful. This condition protects the public and promotes rehabilitation while enabling the probation officer to satisfy the statutory requirements to keep informed of the conduct and condition of the defendant and aid the defendant and bring about improvements in his conduct and condition.
135. During your period of home incarceration, and unless excused in advance by a written court order, you must appear in the Robert L. Miller, Jr. Courtroom on the third floor of the Robert A. Grant Federal Building, 204 South Main Street, South Bend, Indiana 46601, the first Friday of each month at 9:30 a.m. to report to the court your progress with treatment, compliance with supervisory conditions, successes, and challenges. Your probation officer will also attend. The court may impose additional sanctions for noncompliance with your conditions or nonappearance at these hearings or refer this matter for revocation of your release. This condition protects the public and promotes rehabilitation while enabling the court to keep informed of the conduct and condition of the defendant and aid the defendant and bring about improvements in his conduct and condition. It also reduces the risk of recidivism and provides public protection and defendant rehabilitation.
The court imposes no fine. The defendant must pay to the United States a special assessment of $100.00, which is due immediately.
The court grants the government's motion to dismiss count 3 of the indictment.
SO ORDERED.