Opinion
CRIMINAL ACTION H-17-418
08-19-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. YOLANDA HAMILTON
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is defendant's counseled motion for a compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Docket Entry No. 339). The Government filed a response in opposition (Docket Entry No. 342). The parties thereafter filed further responses, replies, and supplemental pleadings. (Docket Entries No. 345-350, 353.) Counsel for both parties appeared at a hearing and presented argument on April 29, 2024, at which time the Court took the motion under advisement. Defendant filed a post-hearing supplemental pleading on May 1, 2024. (Docket Entry No. 354.) The Court ordered additional briefing on May 9, 2024, to which the parties responded, filing additional information up through July 19, 2024. (Docket Entries No. 356-359.) The Court has provided the parties ample time and opportunity to file relevant briefing and evidence, and defendant's motion is ripe for disposition.
Having considered the motion, the parties' responses, replies, supplements, additional briefing, the record, argument of counsel, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES the motion for the reasons shown below.
I. BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS
On October 7, 2019, a jury found defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, conspiracy to solicit and receive health care kickbacks, and two counts of false statements relating to healthcare matters. Defendant's sentencing guidelines level was calculated as 41, which resulted in a sentencing guidelines range of 324 to 405 months; the recommended sentence was reduced to the statutory maximum of 300 months. On November 18, 2020, and after considering the relevant sentencing factors and defendant's circumstances, the Court significantly departed downward from the statutory maximum sentence and sentenced defendant to four concurrent sixty-month terms of imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Restitution was ordered in an amount of $9.5 million, payable to Medicare.
The Court granted defendant's subsequent motion to postpone her voluntary surrender to Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) officials pending disposition of her direct appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions on June 15, 2022. U.S. v. Hamilton, 37 F.4th 246 (5th Cir. 2022). Defendant continued to postpone her self-reporting surrender date, until the Court denied further motions to postpone on October 14, 2022, and ordered her to surrender to prison officials. Defendant surrendered to prison officials on October 17, 2022, nearly two years after her sentencing.
Defendant filed the instant motion for a compassionate release through counsel on December 12, 2023. Public online BOP records show that defendant's current anticipated date of release is April 20, 2026. She is currently confined at FMC Carswell in Fort Worth, Texas. At the time she filed her motion, defendant had served slightly over one year of her five-year sentence.
See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited August 18, 2024).
Defendant raises four grounds for a compassionate release in her motion. Three are based on her medical circumstances and one is based on her family circumstances, as follows:
1. elevated health risks due to infectious disease;
2. inadequate long-term and specialized medical care;
3. substantially diminished ability to provide self care; and
4. family circumstances due to her adult daughter's deteriorating medical and psychological issues.
Although defendant's initial motion also referenced her elderly mother and an elderly uncle, defendant's subsequent pleadings focus on the adult daughter's circumstances. Defendant informed the Court on June 14, 2024, that the uncle passed away in early June 2024. (Docket Entry No. 358, p. 2.)
The Government argues that defendant fails to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons, singularly or in combination, that warrant a compassionate release in her case.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) authorizes federal prisoners to request compassionate release from imprisonment based on “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” A prisoner seeking a compassionate release on his own motion must show: (1) exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) extraordinary and compelling reasons that justify the sentence reduction; (3) the reduction is consistent with the United States Sentencing Commission's applicable policy statements; (4) consideration of applicable section 3553(a) sentencing factors weighs in favor of relief; and (5) that he or she is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). See United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13(a); United States v. Jackson, 27 F.4th 1088, 1089 (5th Cir. 2022).
Defendant's exhibits show that her administrative request for a compassionate release based on family circumstances was denied by FMC Carswell Warden Smith on November 22, 2023. (Docket Entry No. 339-3, p. 50.) The Government argues that defendant did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to general conditions at FMC Carswell and COVID-19. Defendant argues that she exhausted all necessary administrative remedies. Because defendant's claims regarding general conditions at FMC Carswell and COVID-19 warrant no relief, the Court has addressed the merits of defendant's claims.
The sentencing guidelines amendments applicable to the pending motion took effect on November 1, 2023. In relevant part, these amendments address compassionate release motions brought by criminal defendants and create a list of extraordinary and compelling circumstances that may justify a sentence reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). Accordingly, after November 1, 2023, district courts may consider the following extraordinary and compelling circumstances in their analysis: (1) medical circumstances of the defendant; (2) age of the defendant; (3) family circumstances of the defendant; (4) whether the defendant, while in custody, was a victim of abuse; (5) other reasons similar in gravity to those previously described; and (6) a change in the law resulting in the defendant receiving an unusually long sentence. Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(6).
The first three of defendant's four grounds for relief in this case focus on circumstances arising from her medical conditions pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1). The medical circumstances of a defendant may constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons under section 1B1.13(b)(1) if the following factors are met:
(b) Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons. - Extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof:
(1) Medical Circumstances of the Defendant. -* * *
(B) The defendant is -
(i) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(ii) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(iii) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.
(C) The defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.
(D) The defendant presents the following circumstances -
(i) the defendant is housed at a correctional facility affected or at imminent risk of being affected by (I) an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease, or (II) an ongoing public health emergency declared by the appropriate federal, state, or local authority;
(ii) due to personal health risk factors and custodial status, the defendant is at increased risk of suffering severe medical complications or death as a result of exposure to the ongoing outbreak of infectious disease or the ongoing public health emergency described in clause (i); and
(iii) such risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner.U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)-(D).
Defendant's fourth ground for relief is based on her family circumstances pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3). The family circumstances of a defendant may constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons under section 1B1.13(b)(3) if the following factors are met:
(3) Family Circumstances of the Defendant. -
(A) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or the defendant's child who is 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability or a medical condition.
(B) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.
(C) The incapacitation of the defendant's parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the parent.
(D) The defendant establishes that circumstances similar to those listed in paragraphs (3)(A) through (3)(C) exist involving any other immediate family member or an individual whose relationship with the defendant is similar in kind to that of an immediate family member, when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for such family member or individual. For purposes of this provision, ‘immediate family member' refers to any of the individuals listed in paragraphs (3)(A) through (3)(C) as well as a grandchild, grandparent, or sibling of the defendant.U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A)-(D).
These amended provisions govern defendant's pending motion for a compassionate release. Relying on these provisions and as augmented by the catch-all provision of section 1B1.13(b)(5), defendant argues that her medical circumstances and/or family circumstances constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for a compassionate release.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Elevated Health Risks
Defendant contends she is entitled to a compassionate release under section 1B.13(b)(1)(D) based on elevated health risks due to infectious disease. To prevail under this provision, defendant must establish that (1) her housing at FMC Carswell is affected or at imminent risk of being affected by an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease; (2) due to her personal health risk factors and custodial status, she is at increased risk of suffering severe medical complications or death as a result of exposure to the ongoing outbreak of infectious disease; and (3) her risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D).
Defendant does not meet her burden of proof under this provision. Defendant sets forth statistics and information as to COVID-19 conditions at FMC Carswell as of January 2022 - well before her incarceration - and as of December 2023 when she filed her motion. (Docket Entry No. 339, p. 16.) A number of her exhibits of reports, media announcements, and articles address conditions at the facility from 2020 through 2023; many of the statistics, reports, and articles were drawn from conditions as they existed generally throughout prison systems during 2020-2022. (Docket Entries No. 339-7; 339-8; 339-9.)
Current COVID-19 statistics for FMC Carswell do not show that the facility is “affected or at imminent risk of being affected by an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease.” As of August 15, 2024, the facility had four open cases of COVID-19 within a total inmate population of 1025. Thus, 0.39% of the FMC Carswell inmate population - or less than one-half of one-percent - is currently infected with COVID-19. This does not indicate that FMC Carswell has an ongoing outbreak of COVID-19 or is at imminent risk of an outbreak. That the facility may have had an outbreak of COVID-19 in the past does not provide grounds at this point for a compassionate release under section 1B1.13(b)(1)(D).
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statisticsinmatecovid19.jsp (last visited August 18, 2024).
Defendant's argument that COVID-19 cases are under reported in prison systems is conclusory and unsupported. Even assuming infections are being under reported, defendant provides no evidence as to the extent, duration, or effect of any current under reporting at FMC Carswell for purposes of meeting her burden of proof under section 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)(i). The sentencing guideline requires that defendant establish that her correctional facility is affected or at imminent risk of being affected by an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease; this, she fails to do. Similarly, her reliance on United States v. Eggleston, 2024 WL 149838 (D. Maryland, Jan. 12, 2024) is misplaced, as the court in that case made no determination that COVID-19 cases were being under reported at FMC Carswell or at any other federal prison facility.
Defendant does not establish that there is an ongoing outbreak or imminent risk of an outbreak of infectious disease (COVID-19) at FMC Carswell, and fails to meet her burden of proof under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D). Nor has she submitted any current information as to an ongoing or imminent risk of an outbreak at FMC Carswell as to any other infectious disease or that an ongoing public health emergency has been declared at the facility by the appropriate federal, state, or local authority. Defendant has been fully immunized against COVID-19 and influenza. (Docket Entry No. 342, Exhibit 1, pp. 85, 116-18; Exhibit 2, pp. 271, 313.) Because defendant has not established applicability of section 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)(i), the Court need not consider whether she meets the requirements of sections 1B1.13(b)(1)(D)(ii) and (iii).
No extraordinary and compelling reasons for a compassionate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D) are shown, and defendant's motion is DENIED as to this claim.
B. Inadequate Long-term and Specialized Medical Care
Defendant next claims she is entitled to a compassionate release due to inadequate long-term and specialized medical care at FMC Carswell.
Under section 1B1.13(b)(1)(C), extraordinary and compelling reasons for a compassionate release exist if:
The defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). Thus, to prevail under this provision, defendant must establish that she is suffering from (1) a medical condition (2) that requires long-term or specialized medical care (3) that is not being provided and (4) without which she is at risk of death or serious deterioration in her health.
In this instance, defendant alleges that she has medical conditions, including herniated discs in her spine and neck, a dental condition requiring intensive endodontic treatment, hypertension, and a respiratory condition, that require long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which she is at risk of death or serious deterioration in her health. Specifically, she complains that she needs gabapentin instead of the ibuprofen and oral steroids she is being given, and that she has received only two epidural steroid injections for pain. Defendant argues that her spinal condition is worsening, particularly after she tripped and fell while walking on her prison facility's campus, and that neurosurgery is necessary. Although defendant states she is being denied physical therapy, her medical records show that she received extensive physical therapy and was eventually discharged after meeting attainable therapeutic goals. (Docket Entry No, 342, Exhibit 2, p. 78.) Defendant complains that she was discharged from physical therapy without full restoration of her physical abilities; however, nothing in the record indicates that additional physical therapy would alleviate the remaining physical limitations associated with her current conditions.
Prior to sentencing defendant, the Court made inquiry into the BOP's ability to address defendant's medical conditions as they existed at that time. The Court was satisfied with the BOP's response that it could monitor and treat defendant's medical conditions. (Docket Entries No. 329, 330.)
The record further shows that defendant underwent an MRI of her right shoulder and right knee in May 2024 as to the injuries she sustained in her trip and fall incident, and was diagnosed with a torn meniscus. Defendant states that FMC Carswell has indicated it will refer her to an orthopedic specialist for consultation in the near future. (Docket Entry No. 358, p. 3.) She has been provided a knee brace and a cane, and is being given prescription doses of ibuprofen.
Defendant acknowledges that she was offered neurosurgery through the BOP and that she declined the procedure over dissatisfaction with the proposed surgeon and his surgical facility. She argues that she should be released from prison so she can undergo surgery with a surgeon at a location of her own choosing. Defendant's argument provides no basis for relief under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C), as she agrees that the surgery she states she needs was made available to her. It is within her right to decline surgery offered by the BOP; however, this does not mean that specialized medical care is not being provided. The sentencing guideline does not require that defendant be provided long-term or specialized medical care of her own choosing. Moreover, to the extent she argues she needs different medications, steroid injections on a set basis, and additional MRIs, her disagreement with the decisions and treatment being provided by her medical care providers does not evince a failure by BOP to provide long-term or specialized medical care. Defendant is a former practicing physician, and it is understandable she would have opinions and preferences as to her own medical treatment. Nevertheless, her personal opinions and preferences do not meet her burden of proof under the relevant guidelines in this instance. Nor does defendant warrant relief by arguing that she could obtain a higher level of medical care that meets with her approval if released from prison; this is not an established metric under section 1B1.13(b)(1)(C).
Moreover, defendant's disagreement with the care and treatment she is receiving for her hypertension and respiratory symptoms does not establish that she is being denied longterm or specialized medical care without which she is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death. Her hypertension is being monitored and she is being provided medications for the condition. Defendant theorizes that spinal pain and on-going stress are significant impediments to keeping her blood pressure under control. (Docket Entry No. 349, Exhibit 2.) However, she declined to continue taking pain medication because it made her dizzy and nauseous.
Although defendant claims that her blood pressure was alarmingly elevated at 156/86 on March 30, 2023 (Docket Entry No. 339-3, p. 4), more recent medical records submitted by defendant reflect blood pressure readings of 132/60 on January 10, 2024 (Docket Entry No. 349, Exhibit YLH 00401), and 124/61 on February 7, 2024 (Docket Entry No. 350, Exhibit YLH 00519).
Defendant's COPD and asthma are being monitored and treated, and she recovered from a bout of pneumonia nine months ago following treatment. She was seen by a pulmonologist in December 2023, who recommended certain medications. Defendant acknowledges she has been given some, but not all, of the pulmonologist's recommended medications. That she has not received all of the medications recommended by the pulmonologist does not establish that her respiratory condition requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which she is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.
Defendant's medical records indicate that her physician's request for nonformulary guaifenesin tablets was disapproved because it was available over the counter. (Docket Entry No. 349, Exhibit YLH 00399.)
Nor does defendant establish entitlement to a compassionate release predicated on her dental issues. Her prison medical records show that she was examined by a dentist eight days after her incarceration, and that her oral hygiene was evaluated as “fair.” She complained of issues with a tooth that had been on-going since 2013, but the examination revealed no swelling or other signs of infection. Id., Exhibit 1, pp. 44, 50, 57, 98. She was placed on the dental “regular care” list and continued to be seen upon request and as needed. Defendant's 2023 prison medical records show numerous sick call visits, but none were for dental issues. Id., Exhibit 2. Defendant complains she has not been able to obtain a certain dental floss brush from prison officials, which she claims is necessary to access the remote areas of her teeth and gums. The record does not establish that her inability to obtain a certain type of dental floss brush through BOP sources constitutes the denial of specialized medical care without which she is at risk of death or serious deterioration in her health.
The Court has carefully reviewed all of the evidence submitted by the parties and finds that defendant has not established that she is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which she is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death. No extraordinary and compelling reasons for a compassionate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C) are shown, and defendant's motion is DENIED as to this claim.
C. Substantially Diminished Ability to Provide Self Care
Defendant next claims that she is entitled to a compassionate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) because she is unable to provide the level of self-care necessary to manage her health conditions. In support, she complains that overcrowding of her room and bathroom, lack of access to adequate medical and hygienic materials, constant exposure to mold, asbestos, and sandblasting, and “even the mattress on which she sleeps” are all exacerbating her conditions. (Docket Entry No. 339, pp. 22-23.) She reiterates these allegations in her corrected reply in further support of her motion. (Docket Entry No. 349, pp. 8-9.)
Section 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) provides for a sentence reduction based on extraordinary and compelling circumstances where the defendant “is suffering from a serious physical or medical condition that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.” That is, defendant must show that she has a serious physical or medical condition that substantially diminishes her ability to provide self-care in prison and that she is not expected to recover from the condition.
Defendant complains in her motion that she is unable to provide the level of self-care necessary to manage her health conditions because of various issues within FMC Carswell. (Docket Entry No. 339, p. 22.) She makes no assertions that she is suffering from a serious physical or medical condition from which she is not expected to recover and that the condition substantially diminishes her ability to provide self-care in prison. Defendant's subsequent pleadings in this proceeding provide no further argument, allegations, or evidence in support of relief under section 1B1.13(b)(1)(B).
The Court has considered all of the arguments and evidence presented by the parties and finds that defendant has not shown that she is suffering from a serious physical or medical condition that substantially diminishes her ability to provide self-care at FMC Carswell and from which she is not expected to recover. No extraordinary and compelling reasons for a compassionate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) are shown, and defendant's motion is DENIED as to this claim.
D. Family Circumstances
In her fourth claim for relief, defendant argues she is entitled to a compassionate release under sections 1B1.13(b)(3)(A) and (D) based on family circumstances regarding her 27-year-old daughter, D.M.
Defendant acknowledges that her family circumstances do not squarely fall within the parameters of 1B1.13(b)(3)(A); she makes no argument that D.M. had a “caregiver” within the meaning of the guideline who is no longer available due to death or incapacitation. To the contrary, she argues that D.M.'s current emotional and/or mental health issues arose and became emergent as a result of defendant's criminal prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment. Thus, defendant asserts under section 1B1.13(b)(3)(D) that circumstances similar to those listed in paragraphs (b)(3)(A) through (b)(3)(C) exist in that her adult daughter is currently incapable of self-care because of a mental disability or condition and defendant is the only available caregiver. The Court agrees that this is an appropriate application of the flexibility the amended section 1B1.13(b)(3)(D) guideline was designed to allow in addressing family circumstances. However, the record before this Court does not evince that defendant has carried her burden of proof under that provision.
First, the evidence submitted by defendant shows that she is not the only available caregiver for D.M. In a letter dated November 1, 2023, as submitted by defendant's counsel to the warden of FMC Carswell, counsel stated on behalf of defendant that
[Defendant] needs to take care of three close family members for whom she has been the primary caregiver. Prior to her incarceration, [defendant] was the primary caregiver for her elderly mother (90) and uncle (93), and her adult daughter (26), all of whom live in her home and depend on her. A close family member has been caring for these individuals while [defendant] has been at Carswell, but this has been a temporary situation, and [defendant's] family needs her. Although [defendant] is “not the only available caregiver” for these three family members, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A)&(C), it is a significant circumstance that should be considered “in determining whether and to what extent a reduction in [her] term of imprisonment is warranted.”
U.S.S.G. § 1.13(d). Prior to her confinement at Carswell, [defendant] served as the only willing and available caregiver. That has changed only temporarily, and only due to her confinement.(Docket Entry No. 339-3, pp. 44-45, emphasis added.) Moreover, in an affidavit provided to the Court dated May 23, 2024, defendant's mother (D.M.'s maternal grandmother) testified that D.M. lives with her and that “I am doing my very best to help [D.M.], but I am 90 years old and can only do so much.” (Docket Entry No. 356, p. 9.) The grandmother makes no argument that she herself is incapacitated, or that she is unable to continue taking care of her granddaughter.
Moreover, defendant's brother J.H., a neurosurgeon, provided an affidavit to the Court dated May 23, 2024, wherein he expressed his concerns for D.M. and stated that, during defendant's imprisonment, “our extended family has provided emotional and financial support” for D.M. (Docket Entry No. 356, p. 6.) Nothing indicates that defendant's brother would be unable to provide caregiving for D.M. if needed. Thus, defendant does not establish that she is the only available caregiver for her adult daughter.
Although D.M.'s father apparently lives and works in Houston, defendant's counsel informed the Court that D.M. did not want counsel to contact her father, and contact was not attempted. (Docket Entry No. 356, p. 4.)
Second, defendant does not establish that D.M. is incapable of providing self-care due to a mental or physical disability or medical condition. Although defendant submits her own affidavits and affidavits of her counsel, J.H., the grandmother, and defendant's friend, S.A., all expressing concerns as to D.M.'s emotional health following defendant's imprisonment, they do not state that D.M. is incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability or medical condition. To the contrary, evidence in the record indicates that D.M. is capable of providing self-care. Although no updated information has been provided for D.M.'s current employment, she successfully obtained and held a part-time job at a McDonald's restaurant commencing August 2021. (Docket Entry No. 356, p. 15.) In an affidavit dated May 23, 2024, defendant's friend, S.A., testified that D.M. was able to work only part-time at McDonald's because of “her emotional condition and inability to focus.” (Docket Entry No. 356, p. 12.) Nevertheless, for unstated reasons, S.A. encouraged D.M. to quit her job at McDonald's in July 2022 and take on new employment as a barista at a Starbuck's on Westheimer in Houston. Id. According to S.A., D.M. “became overwhelmed and had difficulty staying focused” at Starbuck's and left after four months. Id., p. 13. S.A. stated in her affidavit that she met with D.M. on November 14, 2023, and “spent a couple of hours alone with [her] in conversation about her situation and circumstances.” Id. S.A. further stated that D.M. disclosed during that meeting that she had “checked herself into a hospital a few weeks earlier and stayed for several days until her insurance ran out. She also shared with me that her father's insurance no longer covered her health care once she turned 26 in March 2023 and that she was trying to get other coverage.” Id., p. 13. S.A. stated that, “From my interactions with her, I believe [D.M.'s] emotional distress is inordinately precarious” and “has been worsening significantly,” apparently between July 2022 and November 2023. Id. S.A. does not state that D.M. is incapable of providing self-care because of a mental or physical disability or condition.
In his affidavit dated May 23, 2024, defendant's brother, J.H., stated that D.M. “became withdrawn, isolated, and had difficulty concentrating” following defendant's criminal investigation, and “developed physical conditions she had not had before, including eczema and acne.” Id., p. 6. J.H. stated that, during defendant's criminal investigation and two trials, he learned that D.M. had been hospitalized “several times.” In respect for D.M.'s privacy, he declined to provide any details of the nature or timeframe of the hospitalizations. Id. Although his affidavit provides no dates, defendant was found guilty on October 7, 2019, indicating that the hospitalizations referenced by J.H. took place at some point before that and were not recent events. J.H. does not state that D.M. is incapable of providing self-care because of a mental or physical disability or condition.
The grandmother testified in her affidavit dated May 23, 2024, that she and D.M. continue to share a house in Houston, Texas, and D.M. appeared to have gained 75 pounds over the past year, was “not taking care of her personal hygiene,” had stopped socializing with peers and family, and was “picking and scratching” her skin. Id., p. 9. However, the grandmother also stated that D.M. told her she was seeing a therapist and psychiatrist on a regular basis and had been prescribed medication. The grandmother complained that D.M. refused to provide her with names and contact information for the therapists, “despite my requests.” The grandmother stated she did not want to “pry into her [granddaughter's] conversations with her healthcare providers,” but nonetheless wanted to speak with the providers because “I believe I could provide them some insights and information that would be helpful to her treatment.” Id. The grandmother does not state that D.M. is incapable of providing self-care because of a mental or physical disability or condition, and does not state that it is necessary for her to assist D.M. with self-care.
Defendant's counsel met with D.M. on May 16, 2024, to discuss this case and seek her approval to release her medical records for the Court's review. However, D.M. declined to approve the request, and informed counsel that the records “contain very personal and private information that she does not want to share with anyone,” and that “even the prospect of giving anyone access to her records had caused her significant stress and anxiety.” Id., p. 4. Appropriately, counsel did not pursue the matter further, and D.M.'s medical and mental health records are not before the Court. Defendant's counsel has not indicated that D.M. is incapable of providing self-care because of a mental or physical disability or medical condition.
The evidence before the Court clearly suggests that defendant's criminal conviction and imprisonment have emotionally impacted her adult daughter. The Court does not treat lightly the emotional difficulties D.M. has undergone following her mother's imprisonment, and is sympathetic to the challenges she has faced. Nevertheless, defendant has not shown that D.M. is incapable of providing self-care due to a mental or physical disability or medical condition. Significantly, defendant establishes no aspect of self-care that D.M. is incapable of providing for herself that defendant or someone else must be personally present to provide.
The Court contrasts defendant's family circumstances with those shown in United States v. Madison, 2024 WL 3732468 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2024). In Madison, the defendant's mother and stepfather suffered from severe health issues that rendered them incapable of self care. His stepfather was diagnosed with numerous serious health conditions, including bladder cancer, and was unable to obtain transportation to his cancer specialist located three hours away; his mother was diagnosed with glaucoma, osteoporosis, arthritis, high blood pressure, and obesity, was confined to bed, and barely able to walk. His family members needed assistance for activities of daily living that they were unable to provide for themselves. Although the court in Madison assumed arguendo that extraordinary and compelling family circumstances had been shown, it denied the defendant a compassionate release based on his sentencing factors.
It appears to the Court that D.M. is aware of the emotional difficulties she is suffering following her mother's criminal investigation, conviction, and incarceration, and has taken steps to address those difficulties through seeking and obtaining mental health counseling, professional help, and medication as prescribed. She has been able to obtain employment, and is cognizant of the need to obtain medical insurance for herself, having aged-out of her father's insurance coverage. She has maintained contact with family members and other individuals with whom she wishes to maintain contact, and has been protective of her privacy and her desire to avoid public disclosures of her personal health matters. To the extent she has felt the need for hospitalization for any reason, she has sought and obtained such services. She has maintained residency at the family home while attempting to set and enforce boundaries as to her personal privacy.
It is also abundantly clear that D.M. is aware of her mother's pending motion to be released from prison, and that she has declined to become involved in the proceedings or have her medical records disclosed to the Court. The affidavits and pleadings do not state that D.M. has expressed any desire that her mother be released from prison to act as her caregiver, nor has D.M. herself communicated such a desire to the Court through a pleading or affidavit.
The care and concern D.M.'s family has shown for her is exemplary, and the Court has found this to be a difficult case to resolve. Nevertheless, the Court has considered this care and concern in light of the steps being taken by D.M. herself to address her emotional difficulties and the message she has sent through family members and defendant's counsel of her need for privacy. Although D.M.'s decision to not involve herself in her mother's request for a compassionate release has left the Court unable to fully evaluate her current mental and medical condition and capacity for self-care, it respects und upholds D.M.'s right as a legally competent adult to make that decision.
Defendant has not met her burden of proving that D.M. is incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability or medical condition under section 1B1.13(b)(3)(D), and she has not established that circumstances similar to those listed in paragraphs (b)(3)(A) through (b)(3)(C) exist. Defendant's motion for a compassionate release under section 1B1.13(b)(3)(D) is DENIED.
E. Other or Combined Circumstances
In her corrected reply in further support of her motion, defendant argues that she is entitled to a compassionate release under section 1B1.13(b)(5), which states as a basis for a compassionate release the following:
The defendant presents any other circumstance or combination of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the reasons described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs (1) through (4).U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). This “catchall” provision provides that any other circumstance of similar gravity to those outlined elsewhere in section 1B1.13(b), or a combination of such circumstances, may rise to the level of an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a compassionate release.
See, e.g., United States v. LeBaron, 2023 WL 7308116 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2023) (granting compassionate release under section 1B1.13(b)(5), referencing defendant's “psychologically toxic” upbringing in a religious cult isolated from society with little education, with extensive emotional, physical, verbal, and sexual abuse leaving her suffering from Complex PTSD). See also United States v. Laford, 2024 WL 3778890 *3 (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 12, 2024) (“The Commission “rejected a requirement that ‘other reasons' be similar in nature and consequence to the specified reasons. Rather, they need be similar only in gravity[.]” U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 2023: Supplement to Appendix C at 207 (“[T]he Commission continues to believe . . . that judges are in a unique position to determine whether the circumstances warrant a reduction. Guidance beyond that provided in the amended policy statement regarding what circumstances or combination of circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary and compelling to warrant a reduction in sentence is best provided by reviewing courts[.]” Id. (cleaned up).)
As applicable here, defendant argues that the combination of her asserted circumstances constitutes extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting a compassionate release. She further argues that her belief that the BOP was releasing her to home confinement in May 2023, and the ensuing denial of that release, constitutes a singular or combined circumstance similar in gravity to those sets forth in sections 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4). As to this latter circumstance, the Court does not find that it constitutes an extraordinary and compelling ground for compassionate release similar in gravity to those listed in sections 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4). It further finds that the entirety of defendant's circumstances, or any combination thereof, do not warrant a compassionate release under this provision.
The Court has considered defendant's claims, arguments, and supporting evidence and finds that she has not established a basis for granting a compassionate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5).
F. Other Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
The Court has further considered whether defendant has established any other extraordinary and compelling reason for the granting of a compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Having reviewed all of the evidence and arguments presented by defendant in her pleadings for a compassionate release, the Court has determined that no extraordinary and compelling reason for a compassionate release has been shown.
G. Sentencing Factors
The Court has concluded that defendant does not present extraordinary and compelling reasons for a compassionate release. Even assuming extraordinary and compelling reasons had been shown, section 3553(a) sentencing factors in this case would warrant against a compassionate release.
Section 3553(a) directs courts to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant's history and characteristics; the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; the need to deter criminal conduct; the need to protect the public; the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; the kinds of sentences and sentencing ranges established for defendants with similar characteristics under applicable United States Sentencing Guideline provisions and policy statements; any pertinent policy statement of the United States Sentencing Commission in effect on the date of sentencing and as amended; the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among similar defendants; and the need to provide restitution to the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
As noted by the undersigned judge at defendant's sentencing,
I think a variance is appropriate. The sentencing recommendation calls for 300 months, 25 years. I think that's excessive in light of the interests of justice as set forth in Section 3553(a). A variance is appropriate because this is a first-time offender, because although I don't think a new trial is appropriate, I don't think a directed verdict of not guilty is appropriate. I do think there was not the culpability that is found in most of these cases. I think Dr. Hamilton did violate the law, but was nonetheless not culpable in the sense that other defendants who have been prosecuted for similar offenses have been found culpable.(Docket Entry No. 242, p. 117.)
Based on the record as a whole and after weighing the sentencing factors, the Court substantially departed from the recommended 300-month sentence and determined that a sixty-month sentence was appropriate. Having now considered the record as a whole and after again weighing the appropriate sentencing factors, the Court is of the opinion that a sixty-month sentence remains appropriate. An additional reduction would not reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, or meet the need to deter criminal conduct and protect the public.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for a compassionate release (Docket Entry No. 339) is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.