Opinion
1:17-CR-00189 EAW
2020-11-12
UNITED STATES of America, v. Timothy HALEY, Sr., Defendant.
Joseph M. Tripi, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, for, United States of America.
Joseph M. Tripi, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, for, United States of America.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
BACKGROUND
Defendant Timothy Haley, Sr. ("Haley") was indicted on October 4, 2017, and charged with participating in a conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. ("RICO"), in connection with the operation of the Kingsmen Motorcycle Club, and possession of firearms in furtherance of that conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2. (Dkt. 1). A little more than two months later, on December 20, 2017, Haley appeared before the undersigned and pleaded guilty to the RICO conspiracy. (Dkt. 47). The plea agreement calculated a recommended prison sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines of 21 to 27 months based on an offense level of 16 and criminal history category of I. (Dkt. 151 at ¶ 10). On April 17, 2019, the undersigned sentenced Haley to a three year probationary term, with eight months of home detention. (Dkt. 148). The Court agreed with the plea agreement's calculation as to the recommended prison sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, but granted a five-level downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, which lowered the offense level to 11 and the recommended prison sentence under the Guidelines to eight to 14 months. (Dkt. 155).
On October 10, 2020, Haley filed a motion for early termination of his probation. (Dkt. 158). In support of the motion, Haley cites to his satisfactory performance while on probation, his studying to be a minister, and his continued teaching of advanced cardiac life support, CPR, and COVID-19 first-aid practices. (Dkt. 158-1). Haley also contends that his supervising probation officer supports early termination of his probation. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21, Ex. A.).
At the Court's request, the probation office supervising Haley submitted a memorandum stating as follows: "Although the defendant has remained compliant with the conditions of his probation, based on the severity for the instant offense and his role for the criminal conduct as outlined in the presentence report, we would be in opposition of the defendant being granted an early termination of his probation." In addition, the government submitted a response in opposition to Haley's motion on October 27, 2020, contending in part:
The fact that [Haley] has apparently not used drugs; has paid his home monitoring fees; has had no contact with law enforcement; and has had no contact with Kingsmen is what's expected of him. The fact that he teaches CPR and related classes and is studying to be a minister is admirable, but not a reason to terminate probation. Moreover, while the defendant opined that U.S. Probation would support his request, they do not.
(Dkt. 160 at 2).
ANALYSIS
Section 3564(c) of Title 18 states in relevant part as follows:
The court, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, may, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the modification of probation, terminate a term of probation previously ordered and discharge the defendant ... at any time after the expiration of one year of probation in the case of a felony, if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant and the interest of justice.
18 U.S.C. § 3564(c). Thus, pursuant to the express terms of § 3564(c), at least one year of probation must have been served in the case of a felony, the applicable factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) must be considered, and the court must be satisfied that the early termination of probation "is warranted by the conduct of the defendant and the interest of justice." Id. "Simply complying with the terms of a probationary sentence and not reoffending does not generally constitute the type of extraordinary circumstances justifying early termination of probation." United States v. Finkelshtein , 339 F. Supp. 3d 135, 136 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) ; see , e.g. , United States v. Rusin , 105 F. Supp. 3d 291, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ("Early termination is not warranted where a defendant did nothing more than that which he was required to do by law."); United States v. Medina , 17 F. Supp. 2d 245, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("While [defendant's] ... post-incarceration conduct is apparently unblemished, this alone cannot be sufficient reason to terminate the supervised release since, if it were, the exception would swallow the rule.").
Here, Haley has served the necessary time on probation to qualify for an early termination. Furthermore, it is commendable that Haley appears to be taking positive steps in his life. However, the requested relief is neither warranted based on the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) nor is it in the interest of justice. Haley was intimately involved in a violent motorcycle club and served in a leadership capacity. His conduct easily could have justified a prison sentence. However, based on a consideration of all the § 3553(a) factors, the Court elected to impose a three-year probationary term. Haley's current conditions of probation are relatively lenient and the factors that he cites in support of his motion do not persuade the Court that his probation should be terminated. Therefore, Haley's motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion (Dkt. 158) is denied.
SO ORDERED.