Opinion
23-CR-69 (JLS) (JJM)
04-22-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. STEPHEN P. GLOVER, SR., Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
JOHN L. SINATRA, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant Stephen P. Glover, Sr., is charged in a two-count indictment with possessing a firearm after a previous felony conviction and possessing methamphetamine. See Dkt. 22.
Glover moved, among other things, to: (1) suppress evidence seized as a result of a December 14, 2022 traffic stop by the Jamestown Police Department; (2) suppress any statements made at the time of, and after, his arrest; and (3) dismiss Count 1 of the indictment. See Dkt. 31, at 21-25. The Government responded. Dkt. 37. Glover did not reply.
At the February 7, 2024 oral argument, Glover acknowledged that all other aspects of his pre-trial motions had been resolved. See Dkt. 38.
All page references are to the numbering automatically generated by CM/ECF, which appears in the header of each page.
On February 7, 2024, Judge McCarthy issued a Report, Recommendation, and Order ("R&R"), recommending that this Court: (1) deny Glover's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the December 14, 2022 traffic stop; (2) deny Glover's motion to suppress any statements made during or after his arrest; and (3) deny Glover's motion to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment. See Dkt. 39.
United States Magistrate Judge Jeremiah J. McCarthy was designated to hear and determine, and report and recommend on, all pre-trial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). Dkt. 24.
Judge McCarthy also granted the Government's cross-motion for reciprocal discovery. See id. at 7. Because no party objected to that order, the Court does not address it here.
Glover first objects to the R&R's recommendation to deny his motion to suppress evidence. Dkt. 40, at 3-5. Specifically, he objects to the R&R's conclusions about the stop of the vehicle, arguing that (1) an affidavit from a person with knowledge is not necessary because no facts are disputed, and (2) the officer's prior knowledge that Glover's license was suspended was not a legally sufficient basis for the traffic stop. See id. He does not object to the R&R's conclusion regarding the search of the vehicle, or its recommendation regarding his motion to suppress statements. See id. Second, Glover objects to the R&R's recommendation to deny his motion to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment. See id. at 2. In particular, he argues that New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), rendered 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)-the statute under which he is charged in Count 1-unconstitutional. See Dkt. 40, at 2. The Government responded to Glover's objections. Dkt. 42. Glover did not reply.
On dispositive motions, a district court may accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations of a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). A district court must review de novo those portions of a magistrate judge's recommendation to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). But a district court need not review the recommendation of a magistrate judge to which no party objects. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985).
De novo review applies to Glover's objections-all of which relate to recommendations on his suppression motions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). This Court carefully reviewed Judge McCarthy's recommendations and the relevant record. Based on that review, the Court accepts and adopts Judge McCarthy's recommendations to deny Glover's motions,including the conclusion that Glover's suppression argument fails on the merits. See Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380-81 (2020).
The Court acknowledges the Government's argument that the Court should review Glover's objection to the R&R's motion-to-dismiss recommendation for clear error. See Dkt. 42, at 9; see also id. at 4-7. Because the Court's conclusion on this objection does not change based on the standard of review, the Court applies De novo review.
The Court notes an additional point as to Glover's motion to dismiss Count 1. To the extent that there might be some daylight between United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), on the one hand, and Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, on the other hand, with respect to felony convictions not involving public safety or a sufficient risk of danger-such as the underlying felony of food-stamp fraud in Range v. Attorney General United States of America, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023)-Glover's case does not present that fact pattern. Glover's underlying felony conviction is for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. Even if the Court were to apply the Third Circuit's analysis in Range (which it is not required to do), there is no basis to grant Glover's motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, and those in the R&R, the Court accepts and adopts the recommendations in the R&R (Dkt. 39) and denies Glover's motions to suppress and motion to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment (Dkt. 31).
SO ORDERED.