Opinion
CR-20-02611-001-TUC-RM (JR)
10-18-2022
United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Kristene Estrada, Defendant.
ORDER
Honorable Rosemary Marquez, United States District Judge
On May 26, 2022, Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Rateau issued an Order of Commitment, finding that Defendant is not competent to stand trial and committing Defendant to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) to be hospitalized in a suitable facility for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future Defendant will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward. (Doc. 51; see also Doc. 55.) Pending before this Court is Defendant's Amended Objection (Doc. 60), to which the Government responded (Doc. 61).
Defendant filed both an Objection (Doc. 58) and an Amended Objection (Doc. 60) to Magistrate Judge Rateau's Order of Commitment. The Court will consider the Amended Objection to supersede the original Objection.
As the indictment in this case is sealed, the Court will not provide details of the charges against Defendant. (Doc. 6.)
Dr. Marisa Menchola, Ph.D., conducted a competency examination on March 18, 2022, and concluded that Defendant was not competent to stand trial but was restorable, with a “guarded” prognosis for restoration within the statutory timeframe. (Doc. 51; see also Doc. 47.)
Magistrate Judge Rateau held a competency hearing on May 25, 2022. (Doc. 55.) At the hearing, Defendant did not challenge the conclusions of Dr. Menchola, but she requested-as a work-around to inpatient restoration-that a competency determination be postponed pending out-of-custody restoration services and an additional competency evaluation performed by Dr. Leslie Dana-Kirby, conducted at the Federal Public Defender's expense. (Id.) The Government objected to Defendant's proposed workaround to inpatient hospitalization. (Id.) In her Order of Commitment, Magistrate Judge Rateau finds that in-patient treatment of Defendant is necessary and that restoration in a medical facility is “the only viable option under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)” since Defendant's competency is not in dispute. (Doc. 51 at 2.)
Defendant objected to the Order of Commitment (Doc. 60) and moved to stay the Order pending resolution of her Objection (Docs. 59, 63). This Court initially denied Defendant's request to stay the Order of Commitment (Doc. 64) but later granted reconsideration and stayed the Order of Commitment pending resolution of Defendant's Objection (Doc. 74). On August 30, 2022, Defendant filed a Supplement informing the Court that (1) she is working full-time and has stable housing; (2) her presence is critical at a September 23, 2022 hearing in Maricopa County regarding custody of her children; and (3) she has begun attending competency restoration classes with Dr. Dana-Kirby, at defense expense. (Doc. 76.)
II. Defendant's Objection
In her Amended Objection to Magistrate Judge Rateau's Order of Commitment, Defendant asks this Court to overrule Magistrate Judge Rateau's finding of incompetency and order Defendant to undergo an additional competency examination in conjunction with a competency-education component. (Doc. 60.) Defendant argues that 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) authorizes evaluation by more than one examiner, does not restrict the factors a court may consider in deciding whether to order additional evaluations, and does not prohibit an evaluation from occurring in conjunction with classes that may assist in restoration to competency. (Id. at 3.) Defendant argues that nothing in United States v. Quintero, 995 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2021), or any other Ninth Circuit precedent, limits the Court's discretion in deciding the number or nature of the examinations ordered to aid in its determination of competency. (Id. at 4.) Defendant further argues that postponing a competency finding pending a further evaluation and out-of-custody competency restoration services would alleviate constitutional concerns regarding automatic incarceration for competency evaluation and treatment, in addition to complying with American Bar Association standards that defendants be placed in the least restrictive setting appropriate to restore competency to proceed. (Id. at 4-6.)
The Government responded in opposition to Defendant's Objection. (Doc. 61.) The Government argues that Quintero forecloses Defendant's request because a district court does not have discretion to order outpatient competency restoration. (Id. at 3-4.) The Government argues that, given (1) the Quintero ruling that courts cannot order outpatient restoration and (2) the language of 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) that, upon a finding of incompetency, a court shall commit a defendant to the custody of the Attorney General, this Court lacks discretion to order Defendant to undergo a second competency evaluation. (Id. at 4.) The Government further contends that, even if the Court has such discretion, there is no basis upon which to order a second evaluation because (1) the defense did not contest Dr. Menchola's conclusion that Defendant is incompetent; (2) it was defense counsel who originally selected Dr. Menchola to evaluate Defendant for competency because she was found to be incompetent and non-restorable in a previous, unrelated state case; and (3) the defense does not argue that a second evaluation would have a different outcome than the first. (Id. at 4.) Thus, the Government contends that the requested second evaluation would be futile and would only have the effect of suspending this case for an indeterminate period of time. (Id. at 5.)
III. Standard of Review
A district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions” of a magistrate judge's “report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3) (“The district judge must consider de novo any objection to the magistrate judge's recommendation”).
IV. Applicable Law
The Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 17, 4241-47, governs pretrial competency evaluation and restoration. Section 4241 provides in relevant part:
If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering her mentally incompetent to the extent that she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against her or to assist properly in her defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility -
(1) For such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future, she will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; and
(2) For an additional reasonable period of time until -
(A) her mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within such additional period of time she will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; or
(B) the pending charges against her are disposed of according to law; whichever is earlier.18 U.S.C. 21 4241(d). 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) provides that:
Prior to the date of the hearing, the court may order that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant be
conducted, and that a psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the court, pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(b) and (c).18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) provides in relevant part that:
A psychiatric or psychological examination ordered pursuant to this chapter shall be conducted by a licensed or certified psychiatrist or psychologist, or, if the court finds it appropriate, by more than one such examiner.
In Quintero, the defendant filed a motion to determine competency and a neuropsychological evaluation concluded that she was incompetent and not restorable to competency. 995 F.3d at 1048-49. The magistrate judge then ordered a second evaluation, wherein the evaluator concluded that the defendant was incompetent but restorable. Id. The magistrate judge held a hearing with testimony from both evaluators and determined that the defendant was incompetent but likely restorable to competence. Id. The defendant objected to mandatory commitment and requested outpatient treatment. Id. The magistrate judge found commitment mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) and issued a commitment order. Id. The defendant objected to the order and the district court overruled the objection. Id.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals firmly rejected Quintero's argument that the district court had discretion under § 4241(d) to order outpatient competency restoration assessment and treatment. Id. at 1050. The Court stated that “[t]he statute is clear that upon finding a defendant mentally incompetent to stand trial, ‘the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General and that ‘[t]he Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility.'” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)). “The district court's responsibility is to make the appropriate determination that the defendant is mentally incompetent” and it has “no role in determining the suitable facility.” Id. The Court held that “§ 4241(d) mandates that district courts commit mentally incompetent defendants to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment, without discretion for the court to order a particular treatment setting.” Id. On the other hand, the Attorney General has discretion to choose outpatient treatment as the suitable facility. Id. at 1054.
V. Analysis
Defendant asks this Court to overrule Judge Rateau's finding of incompetency and order Defendant to undergo a second competency evaluation. However, Defendant offers no argument or evidence that she is competent to proceed. Defendant has not questioned Judge Rateau's basis for finding her incompetent, nor has she argued that the finding was in error. Rather, Defendant seeks to have a second competency evaluation performed so that she can have an opportunity to participate in out-of-custody competency restoration classes prior to a final competency determination. But even if this Court has discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) to order Defendant to undergo a second competency evaluation, it would do so only if there were some indication that Magistrate Judge Rateau's adoption of the conclusion of Dr. Menchola's initial evaluation was in error. There is not. Because Defendant's competency is not in dispute, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Rateau that commitment to the custody of the Attorney General is “the only viable option under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).” (Doc. 51 at 2.) Defendant's Objection will be overruled.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Objection (Doc. 58) and Amended Objection (Doc. 60) are overruled.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Rateau's Order of Commitment (Doc. 51) is affirmed. Within fourteen (14) days of the date this Order is issued, Judge Rateau shall set a status conference to arrange for Defendant's transportation to a suitable in-patient facility for competency restoration treatment.