Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MARK J. McKEON, Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
JEROME PRICE, Counsel for Defendant, ALVIN DICKSON.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for jury trial on October 20, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the jury trial until February 23, 2016, and to exclude time between October 20, 2015, and February 23, 2016.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The parties have been engaged in plea negotiations. It recently became apparent that this matter would not be resolved by plea, and that this matter would need to be resolved by jury trial.
b) The government's case agent is having surgery at the end of September 2015, and will be unavailable for approximately three weeks after that. The government requires the case agent to be available in the weeks just before trial to assist the government with its final trial preparation. In addition, the case agent is expected to be an essential witness at the trial. The unavailability of the case agent in the crucial weeks just before trial will impair the ability of the government to prepare for trial.
c) The parties have agreed that because of their respective trial schedules, the jury trial should be continued until February 23, 2016, to ensure continuity of counsel.
d) The government believes that the court has three other cases also set for jury trial on October 20, 2015.
e) The defendant does not object to the continuance.
f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 20, 2015 to February 23, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the government's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, and under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A), due to the unavailability of an essential witness.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
The Court finds good cause for a continuance due to the surgery of the agent. Time is excluded Speedy Trial Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.