Opinion
CASE NO. 13-20850-CR-UNGARO/TORRES
01-14-2014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RAFAEL COMAS, Defendant.
ORDER ON GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CONCERNING JENCKS MATERIAL AT PRETRIAL DETENTION HEARING
AND EXPLAINING THE UNDERSIGNED'S PRESUMPTIVE PROCEDURE
Lyrics from Imagine Dragons' hit song "It's Time" provide the applicable approach to the Government's reconsideration motion of an order regarding the production of Jencks material at a pretrial detention hearing:
I'm just the same as I was
Now don't you understand
That I'm never changing who I am
From the album "Night Visions" (Interscope Records, 2012).
In its reconsideration motion, the Government asks me to reverse course on my decision that the Government was required to disclose Jencks material concerning the pretrial detention hearing testimony of DEA Special Agent Michael Friebel. [ECF Nos. 19; 30]. Despite being ordered to file a response and being afforded additional time to do so, Defendant Rafael Comas ("Comas") did not submit a response. [ECF Nos. 31; 36; 37].
As one court has noted, "[a] court need not beg a party to comply with its orders." Peters-Turnball v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, No. 96 CIV. 4914 (SAS), 1999 WL 959375, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1999).
After Comas failed to file his courtordered response, the Undersigned's law clerk contacted defense counsel, who advised that he had not made the required submission because he was in plea negotiations with the prosecutor and there was a chance that the case would be resolved without a trial. Nevertheless, defense counsel promised to file something, but he never did. The mere fact that a defense attorney is having plea discussions with the prosecutor does not mean that orders need not be followed or that deadlines can be ignored. Most federal criminal cases are resolved through a plea. In fact, 88.9% of all federal criminal cases filed in the United States in 2010 were terminated through a plea. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Thus, if the simple existence of plea discussions were sufficient justification to skip caserelated deadlines, then a substantial majority of federal criminal cases would involve defense lawyers and prosecutors who routinely failed to comply with deadlines.
Defense counsel could have filed another motion for a second enlargement of time if he anticipated a quick plea. Or he could have filed a motion to hold the briefing requirement in abeyance until negotiations were completed. Or he could have, at a minimum, contacted chambers by telephone and advised that a plea resolution was imminent. Or he could have filed the required memorandum. What he could not do, however, was cavalierly fail to comply with an order. As of today, the Undersigned's chambers has not been advised that a plea will in fact occur and the docket sheet does not reflect such a development either.
The Government acknowledges, as it must, that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(j) ("producing a statement") provides that Rule 26.2 -- which requires the Government and the defense, upon motion, to produce witness statements after the witness' direct examination -- applies to pretrial detention hearings under 18 U.S.C. § 3142. Nevertheless, the Government argues, without citing any decisional authority, that the Undersigned's analogy to Rule 12(h), which extends Rule 26.2 to pretrial detention hearings, is inappropriate. It contends that policy reasons -- the differing purposes between a suppression hearing and a pretrial detention hearing -- justify different results for pretrial detention hearings (i.e., no witness statements) and suppression hearings (i.e., witness statements).
The Undersigned is not persuaded by the Government's argument and therefore denies the reconsideration motion for the reasons outlined in this Order. This Order will also specify the Undersigned's procedure for the disclosure of Jencks material at pretrial detention hearings before the Undersigned.
I. BACKGROUND
At Defendant Comas' November 22, 2013 pretrial detention hearing, the Undersigned directed the Government to proceed by proffer and to then put on its witness for live testimony. The Government did so and called Agent Friebel. During Agent Friebel's testimony, Comas requested Agent Friebel's Jencks material. The Government objected because it contended that it did not call him as a witness. Moreover, the Government advised that it did not have the Jencks materials in court, in any event. Comas contended that Jencks materials had to be produced, regardless of which party technically called Agent Friebel as a witness. At the end of the pretrial detention hearing, the Undersigned granted the Government's pretrial detention request and directed both parties to brief the Jencks issue. The parties submitted the required memoranda. [ECF Nos. 17; 18].
In a written order, I granted Comas' request for Agent Friebel's Jencks material. [ECF No. 19]. In that order, I noted that, for all practical purposes, I called the witness because I established the procedure, and I analogized the scenario to a suppression hearing, where a law enforcement officer is considered a Government witness for Jencks purposes. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(h). I also noted that the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendment explain that the defendant is entitled to any statement of the officer in the Government's possession relating to the subject matter of the witness' testimony, "without regard to whether the officer was in fact called by the government or the defendant." Consequently, I allowed Comas to file a motion to reopen the pretrial detention hearing and to request reconsideration of the detention order if he were to conclude in good faith: that his cross-examination of Agent Friebel would have been significantly different had he had the Jencks material at the pretrial detention hearing; and that my ruling might have been different.
The Government provided the Jencks material. Comas, however, did not move to reopen the pretrial detention hearing. Nevertheless, the Government filed the instant motion to reconsider.
II. DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, the Undersigned notes that the Government is not disputing that Jencks is generally applicable to pretrial detention hearings. See United States v. Simpson, 360 F. App'x 537, 538 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming pretrial detention order and finding that defendant had not shown he was prejudiced by magistrate judge's denial of defendant's request for Jencks material). Going even further, the Government also does not dispute that if it calls the witness to testify at the pretrial detention hearing, then it must produce Jencks material. [ECF No. 18, p. 4]. What the Government is disputing is that if it proceeds on a proffer, but the presiding judge requests live testimony from a Government witness, then that witness should be deemed the court's witness or the defendant's witness, but not the Government's witness. Therefore, according to the Government, Jencks should not apply in these circumstances. [ECF No. 18, pp. 3-4]. The Undersigned disagrees.
The Bail Reform Act expressly and specifically permits a defendant to proceed by way of proffer, but is silent as to whether the Government may do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Cooper, No. CRIM. BEL-08-0239, 2008 WL 2331051, at *1 (D. Md. June 4, 2008). In this circuit, the Government, as well as the defense, "may proceed by proffering evidence subject to the discretion of the judicial officer presiding at the detention hearing." United States v. Gaviria, 828 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir. 1987). But "[i]t is the Court and not the government that determines whether proceeding by proffer is acceptable in a given detention hearing." United States v. Hammond, 44 F. Supp. 2d 743, 744 (D. Md. 1999) (emphasis supplied). And Gaviria does not stand for the rule that only proffers are permitted, nor does it preclude the presiding judicial officer from exercising discretion and requesting live testimony or adopting a procedure consistent with the statute.
Judges in this district and other districts employ a variety of procedures for pretrial detention hearings. Some judges permit the Government to proceed only by proffer. Some permit the Government to proffer while also requiring the Government to produce a live witness. Most significantly, some judges require the Government to produce Jencks material (if it exists) after the agent testifies, others do not (agreeing with the Government's theory that the Government did not call the witness). See also Cooper, 2008 WL 2331051, at *1-2 (noting that in the district of Maryland, courts generally permit the Government to proceed by proffer but occasionally require live testimony).
In my view, all of these approaches are permissible. There is no right or wrong procedure, as the presiding judge has broad discretion to craft an appropriate procedure.
Because a magistrate judge is not required to permit the Government to proceed by proffer and may instead require live testimony, the procedure which permits the Government to proceed by proffer is a courtesy which is provided to the Government in order to streamline the proceeding. See Cooper, 2008 WL 2331051, at *1 (noting that allowing the Government to proceed by proffer conserves public resources and the time of law enforcement). Magistrate judges could just as easily impose a no proffer/live testimony requirement. If that were to happen, then the Jencks material would be required because the Government did, in fact, call the witness. Therefore, the Undersigned does not believe that providing a courtesy to the Government transforms the witness to the court's witness or the defendant's witness, resulting in the non-production of Jencks material. Id. at *2-3 (noting that pretrial detention hearing was continued to allow Government to produce Jencks material where court, not Government, required live testimony).
III. THE UNDERSIGNED'S PROCEDURE
Under these circumstances, I exercise my discretion to permit the Government to proceed by proffer, subject to the general presumptive requirement that any Jencks material for the Government witness selected to testify be provided to the defense after the agent's detention hearing testimony (so that defense counsel can use it at that hearing for cross-examination limited to relevant issues, as opposed to free discovery). This requirement may be modified in specific cases, as outlined below.
The Undersigned's practice concerning pretrial detention hearings and Jencks material is as follows:
1. The Government can choose whether to initially proceed by proffer or by having an agent provide live testimony. If the Government chooses to proceed by proffer, then it must have a knowledgeable witness in court to testify after the proffer. But regardless of whether the Government begins by proffer or through live testimony, it will need to have that witness' Jencks material, if it exists, present in court and will need to provide it to the defense after the witness testifies.
2. This practice does not require the Government to create Jencks material for the hearing. If it exists, then it will be produced, and if it does not exist, then it cannot be produced.
3. Although the presumptive practice is that the Government will be required to provide Jencks material if it exists, the Undersigned will entertain the Government's request to not provide Jencks material on a case-by-case basis. For example, if a defendant has already been indicted and there are numerous recorded conversations in which the defendant is making inculpatory statements, then the Undersigned may well eliminate the Jencks requirement because the purported need to probe the strength of the case against that particular defendant is hardly compelling. However, the Government should not assume that the presumptive practice will be changed -- and the prosecutor must therefore have the Jencks material (assuming it exists) in court.
4. This procedure does not require the Government to always have the lead case agent testify at a pretrial detention hearing. The Government has the discretion to select an appropriate, knowledge witness. That witness may or may not be the case agent.
5. Regardless of whether the Government has the lead case agent or another law enforcement witness in court for the pretrial detention hearing, the case agent or witness must be personally familiar with the underlying factual scenario -- or must have taken steps to become familiar with the facts relevant to the limited-purpose detention hearing. Although this list is not designed to be mandatory or exclusive, the agent or witness could review reports, review transcripts, speak with other law enforcement agents, listen to taped conversations, and/or review evidence in order to be an adequate witness.
6. If the case agent or witness is not adequately familiar with the facts, then the Undersigned will, upon defense request, consider a continuance of the hearing so that the Government can locate an appropriate witness or take steps to convert the inadequate witness into an acceptable one.
7. If the Jencks material for the witness testifying at the pretrial detention hearing is voluminous, then the Undersigned will, upon defense request, consider a slight adjournment or even a continuance of the hearing, so that counsel has time to review the material.
8. Because (1) Jencks material is strictly limited to impeachment, United States v. Delgado, 56 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 1995), (2) the primary purpose of Jencks material is to enable a defendant to compare the witness' in-court testimony to his prior statements on the same subject, United States v. Denton, No. 11-14663, 2013 WL 4529525 (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2013), and (3) a detention hearing is not designed afford defendants a discovery device, Gaviria, 828 F.2d at 669, the defendant shall not copy, reproduce, or disseminate the Jencks material.
United States District Judge Ursula Ungaro has already provided this very protection in the instant case by granting the Government's Motion for a Protective Order Regulating Disclosure of Jencks material. [ECF No. 42].
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DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, January 14, 2014.
__________
Jonathan Goodman
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
The Honorable Ursula Ungaro
All Counsel of Record