Opinion
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, MARK J. McKEON, Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
DONALD M. RE, Counsel for Defendant, ARUNA KUMARI CHOPRA.
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE JURY TRIAL AND EXCLUDE TIME
ANTHONY W. ISHII, Senior District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for jury trial on August 25, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the trial confirmation hearing to February 1, 2016 at 10:00 a.m., and the jury trial until February 17, 2016, at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom 2 before the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, and to exclude time between August 25, 2015, and February 17, 2016, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). The parties further request that this matter also be set for a change-of-plea hearing on September 21, 2015, at 10:00 a.m.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The defendant filed a motion to continue the jury trial date on June 18, 2015, C.R. 44, in which it set out grounds to continue the jury trial to a date in December 2015. On June 29, 2015, the Court denied the Motion to Continue, without prejudice to either the parties presenting a stipulation to continue the jury trial date, or the defendant renewing the motion with additional facts, which could be submitted under seal. The Court noted, however, that setting the trial date in December would be disfavored because of the difficulties empaneling a jury for a complex case during the holiday period.
b) The government and the defense are actively engaged in plea negotiations and hope to be able to resolve this matter. The parties are committed to completing these negotiations by September 21, 2015, and request the court to set this matter down for a change-of-plea hearing on that date. The government has represented, and the defendant acknowledges and agrees, that in the event a plea agreement is not reached by September 21, 2015, the government will withdraw all plea offers, and commence actively preparing for trial. The defendant understands that if she wishes to plead guilty after that date, she will need to plead guilty to all charges in the indictment, without any agreement from the Government. In the event a plea agreement is not reached, the parties will endeavor to notify the court by no later than 12:00 noon on the Thursday before the hearing that the change-of-plea hearing can be removed from the calendar.
c) Counsel for defendant desires additional time for the reasons set forth in the defendant's Motion to Continue the Jury Trial, C.R. 44. The defense has been diligent in the investigation and preparation of this matter, but needs additional time to become adequately prepared for trial.
d) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e) The government does not object to the continuance.
f) In order to protect the rights of the alleged victims in this matter, the defendant has agreed not to seek a further continuance of the trial date, and the government has advised the defendant that it will not stipulate to any further continuances, and will oppose any continuances that are sought through a judicial motion.
g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 25, 2015 to February 17, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
i) Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.