Opinion
23-6673
08-01-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LLOYD B. CARR, a/k/a Lloyd Carr, Defendant-Appellant.
Lloyd B. Carr, Appellant Pro Se.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: June 24, 2024
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (6:12-cr-00210-1)
Lloyd B. Carr, Appellant Pro Se.
Before WYNN and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lloyd B. Carr appeals the district court's order granting the Government's motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k) to adjust his restitution payment schedule. When a defendant is ordered to pay restitution, and a "'material change in the defendant's economic circumstances [] might affect the defendant's ability to pay restitution,'" the district "court is authorized to adjust the payment schedule 'as the interests of justice require.'" United States v. Grant, 715 F.3d 552, 554 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k)). We have reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion in the court's determination to modify Carr's restitution payment schedule based on a material change in his economic circumstances. See United States v. Sweatt, 85 F.4th 1240, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 2023) (stating standard of review).
On appeal, Carr also contends that the district court judge should have recused himself. Because Carr did not move the district court for recusal, we review his claim only for plain error. See United States v. Chastain, 979 F.3d 586, 594 (8th Cir. 2020) (stating standard of review). Carr fails to establish that recusal was required. See Belue v. Leventhal, 640 F.3d 567, 572-74 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing valid bases for bias or partiality motion); see also United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 530 (4th Cir. 2008) ("The presiding judge is not required to recuse himself simply because of unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous speculation." (cleaned up)).
Accordingly, we deny Carr's motions to appoint counsel, and we affirm the district court's order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED