Opinion
6:18-CR-06006 EAW
06-29-2020
UNITED STATES of America, v. Ralph C. BEATON, Defendant.
Melissa M. Marangola, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, for United States of America. Luciano L. Lama, Ithaca, NY, for Defendant.
Melissa M. Marangola, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, for United States of America.
Luciano L. Lama, Ithaca, NY, for Defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is a motion filed by defendant Ralph C. Beaton (hereinafter "Defendant") for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. 59). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is denied.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 24, 2017, Defendant was charged by criminal complaint with possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). (Dkt. 1). A plea hearing was scheduled before the undersigned for March 15, 2018 (Dkt. 16), but at that appearance, the plea did not go forward, and Defendant was taken into custody due to violations of pretrial release conditions (Dkt. 22). On June 21, 2018, Defendant again appeared before the undersigned, waived indictment, and pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). (Dkt. 31; Dkt. 32; Dkt. 33; Dkt. 34). The plea agreement contemplated a sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines of 57 to 71 months in prison. (Dkt. 33 at ¶ 14). The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") calculated a recommended prison sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines of 70 to 87 months, representing a two-level higher offense level than the plea agreement which had failed to take into account the number of images possessed. (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 66-67). On March 8, 2019, the undersigned sentenced Defendant to a below-Guidelines sentence of 48 months in prison, to be followed by ten years of supervised release. (Dkt. 54; Dkt. 56). On June 10, 2020, Defendant filed the pending motion for compassionate release. (Dkt. 59). Defendant contends that his request for release is justified by, among other reasons: the COVID-19 pandemic; his placement at Elkton Federal Correctional Institution ("Elkton FCI") which has well-documented struggles in trying to contain the spread of the virus; Defendant's medical conditions of being overweight and suffering from hypertension ; and his age of 71 years old. (Id. at 1-3).
On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared a National Emergency concerning COVID-19. Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (Mar. 13, 2020). According to the World Health Organization's website, as of June 29, 2020, there were 10,021,401 confirmed cases of COVID-19 worldwide, with 499,913 confirmed deaths. See WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard , World Health Org., https://covid19.who.int/ (last visited June 29, 2020).
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The Government filed is response in opposition on June 23, 2020. (Dkt. 61). The Government contends that Defendant has failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction in his sentence and that consideration of the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) mandates against reducing Defendant's sentence. ( Id. ).
In addition to the submissions of counsel, the United States Probation Office ("USPO") submitted a memorandum to the Court on June 22, 2020. (Dkt. 62). That memorandum noted Defendant's numerous violations while on pretrial release:
It is noteworthy that while on pretrial release, Mr. Beaton had numerous violations including visiting locations where minor child[ren] congregate without authorization, leaving his residence for appointments he failed to attend, failing to charge his GPS unit, and other violations which resulted in court action and pretrial detention.
(Id. at 1). The memorandum also noted that at his last physical examination on February 25, 2020, Defendant denied any physical concerns. (Id. at 2).
III. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
"A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except pursuant to statute." United States v. Gotti , 433 F. Supp. 3d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The compassionate release statute, as amended by the First Step Act, is such a statutory exception, and provides as follows:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that ... the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that ... extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Relief is appropriate pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) when the following conditions are met: (1) the exhaustion requirement of the statute is satisfied; (2) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction of the prison sentence; (3) the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support modification of the prison term; and (4) the reduction in the prison sentence is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statements.
The Government does not oppose Defendant's application on exhaustion grounds, as he has filed requests with the Warden at Elkton FCI for release and more than 30 days have elapsed since the Warden's receipt of those requests (which were denied). (Dkt. 59 at 4-22; Dkt. 61 at 1); see also United States v. Wen , 454 F. Supp. 3d 187, 192–94, No. 6:17-CR-06173 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) (as a claim-processing rule, § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional and thus subject to the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel). Thus, the exhaustion requirements of the statute do not operate to bar the Court's consideration of the motion.
With respect to the merits of Defendant's motion, as the Court previously acknowledged, the situation at Elkton FCI appears dire. See United States v. McIndoo , ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, No. 1:15-CR-00142 EAW, 2020 WL 2201970, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. May 6, 2020). According to the Bureau of Prison's ("BOP") own statistics, Elkton FCI presently has the second highest number of active positive cases among its inmate population of any BOP facility, and the fourth highest number of inmate deaths. See COVID-19: Coronavirus , Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited June 29, 2020). Moreover, the Government acknowledges that Defendant's age places him at higher risk for severe illness if he contracts the virus. (Dkt. 61 at 5).
However, based on the circumstances of this case, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant has established extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying a reduction in his sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, Application Note 1 (defining extraordinary and compelling reasons). Moreover, the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not warrant a reduction in Defendant's sentence. Defendant—a licensed dentist—engaged in serious criminal conduct. Moreover, he repeatedly violated the pretrial release conditions that were set in this case, ultimately resulting in his remand prior to his guilty plea. (See Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 22-24). The Court concluded, based on its consideration of all the § 3553(a) factors, that a below-Guidelines sentence was warranted in this case, but those factors do not support a further reduction in Defendant's sentence. The Court's assessment was that the sentence it imposed was sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the objectives of sentencing set forth at § 3553(a). Even with the developments related to COVID-19 since the sentence was imposed in this case, the § 3553(a) factors do not support reducing Defendant's sentence. Indeed, Defendant does not even address those factors in his pending motion. (Dkt. 59).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Dkt. 59) is denied.
SO ORDERED.