Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, AVTAR BAINS, by and her each counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 17, 2015, at 9:00 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant AVTAR BAINS now moves to continue the status conference until October 8, 2015, at 9:00 a.m., and to exclude time between September 17, 2015, and October 15, 2015, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 7, 722 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form which includes FBI-302s, interview memoranda, the search warrants and affidavit, redacted transcripts of recorded conversations and telephone calls, business records from the Employment Development Department, and deposition transcripts from the prior civil case. The government has also made available for inspection and copying additional business records from the Employment Development Department. These records are voluminous.
b. Counsel for defendant AVTAR BAINS desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. The defense has also provided information to the government about the defendant's competency to stand trial, and the parties are working on a potential resolution.
DAVID D. FISCHER, LAW OFFICES OF DAVID D. FISCHER, APC, Sacramento, CA, Attorney for Defendant, AVTAR BAINS.
U.S. ATTORNEY, JARED C. DOLAN, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff.
c. Counsel for the defendant AVTAR BAINS believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 17, 2015, and October 8, 2015, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.