Opinion
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through the defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on September 22, 2015.
2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until October 20, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between September 22, 2015, and October 20, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., under Local Code T4.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, KATHERINE T. LYDON, Assistant United States Attorney, Sacramento, California, Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America.
BERNDT INGO BRAUER, Counsel for Defendant Jose Luis Anaya-Quezada.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes 156 pages of discovery, primarily taken from the defendant's immigration file. This discovery has been produced to counsel for the defendant.
b) Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to investigate his client's case. In particular, the defendant's counsel has ordered and desires time to review the police reports in his client's prior drug cases, which the defendant's counsel believes could have some relevance to these proceedings.
c) Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, consideration of potential resolutions, and consultation with his client, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to and joins the request for the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 22, 2015 to October 20, 2015 at 9:15 a.m., inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.