Opinion
Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1974.
Sonheim & Helm, Dale H. Helm, Phillip A. Less, Arvada, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Johnson, Doty, Johnson & Summers, Bruce R. Johnson, Boulder, for defendants-appellees.
ENOCH, Judge.
This is an injunction action in which J. C. Milam, pastor of the United Pentecostal Church of Louisville; W. M. Parker, Jr., District Superintendent; and certain members of the church sought to enjoin other members of the church, defendants-appellees, from taking over the church property and discharging Milam as pastor of the church. Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying injunctive relief. We affirm. The United Pentecostal Church of Louisville, Colorado, is a non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of Colorado and affiliated with a national organization known as United Pentecostal Church International. The operation of the church is governed by a constitution and by-laws. Milam was appointed pastor of the Louisville congregation in 1971. On or about October 15, 1972, Milam disfellowshipped five persons from the church, some of whom were board members or trustees, and all of whom are named as defendants in this case. Apparently as a result of this action, certain members of the church, including defendants, held an informal meeting on October 24 and voted to remove Milam as pastor. Milam was informed of this action by letter but refused to acknowledge that he had been properly dismissed. Defendants then caused the locks on the church building to be changed, thereby preventing use of the facilities by the pastor or other members. The church was locked one Sunday only and since has been available to all members.
After hearing evidence on both sides of the controversy, the trial court ruled that the issue of the use of church property was moot and denied injunctive relief with regard to Milam's dismissal. One basis for this ruling was that plaintiffs had failed to establish that they had exhausted all remedies within the organizational framework of the church. We affirm the denial of injunctive relief on this ground.
The degree to which civil courts may intervene in disputes among members of religious organizations is strictly circumscribed by the First Amendment. Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658. The United States Supreme Court has defined the role of civil courts as follows:
The First Amendment applies to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213.
'In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.' Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131.
In order to effect this substantive rule of constitutional law, civil courts require that certain procedural steps be taken by parties seeking the aid of the court in suits of this nature. Before courts may intervene in religious controversies, it must be affirmatively demonstrated by the plaintiff that he has pursued all remedies within the organization which are available for resolution of the dispute. Depending on the structural framework of the particual church in question, these remedies may be purely local or may be regional and national. See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666; Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 1142. Colorado courts have long recognized this rule. Knauss v. Seventh-Day Adventist Ass'n, 117 Colo. 540, 190 P.2d 590; Horst v. Traudt, 43 Colo. 445, 96 P. 259.
In the case at hand, the trial court held that the government of the church was not purely local and that plaintiffs had not exhausted all means provided by the church constitution and by-laws for resolution of the controversy. Only a small portion of the constitution and bylaws, complete copies of which were exhibits in the trial court, are included in the record on appeal. Our task of determining whether there is evidence in those documents to support the trial court's ruling is therefore impeded by the incomplete record. However, that portion of the bylaws which is before us indicates that there may have been procedures available to Milam which he did not pursue prior to filing suit. In light of this evidence and of the presumption that the trial court's decision is correct, Cole v. Kyle, 141 Colo. 492, 348 P.2d 960, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and RULAND, J., concur.