Summary
finding that delivery of vehicle, by detailing company employee, to car dealership was necessary and incidental to detailing company's business, not to the garage operations of the dealership
Summary of this case from Lindsay v. Safeco Ins. Co. of AmericaOpinion
No. 87-0521-CV-W.
May 13, 1988.
Gardiner B. Davis, David A. Sosinski, David V. Kenner, Spencer, Fane, Britt Browne, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.
John L. Hayob, Michael D. Matteuzzi, Niewald, Waldeck, Norris Brown, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDERS
United Fire and Casualty Company (UFCC) has filed the above-styled action seeking a declaratory judgment against New Hampshire Insurance Company (NHIC). UFCC's complaint seeks a declaration that NHIC's insurance policy provided liability coverage for the personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident involving an auto owned by NHIC's insured, Royal Chevrolet, but operated at the time of the accident by an employee of UFCC's insured, J K Clean-Up Company (J K). In addition, UFCC is seeking indemnification from NHIC for the cost of defending two suits filed as the result of the above-noted accident and the cost of the settlements of those two suits.
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment along with a joint stipulation of facts. The stipulation of the parties is attached hereto as Appendix A and incorporated by this reference as our findings of fact.
The parties have also filed suggestions in support of their respective motions for summary judgment. For the reasons we now state, we find and conclude that summary judgment in favor of defendant NHIC should be granted.
I A.
NHIC contends that the "activity in question — the delivery by an employee of J K Clean-Up of an automobile owned by Royal Chevrolet following the `detailing' of that vehicle at J K's facility . . . is expressly excluded by the plain wording of IV.D.1.b(2) of the NHIC insurance policy." Defendant's Brief at 1. We agree.
This Court's construction of the policy at issue is governed by the general rules relating to the construction of insurance policies in Missouri. Under Missouri law plain and unambiguous language must be given its plain meaning. See, e.g., Jordan v. United Equitable Life Insurance, 486 S.W.2d 664, 666-67 (Mo.App. 1972). Missouri law also provides:
Exceptions to liability are to be construed to give the insured the protection which he reasonably has a right to expect. * * * These general rules do not, however, authorize a perversion of language or the exercise by the court of inventive powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity. Our function is to give force and effect to the contract as it is written, * * * and the contract should receive reasonable interpretations in order to accomplish the intention of the parties.Id.; see also McRaven v. F-Stop Photo Labs, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Mo.App. 1983).
The specific exclusionary clause which NHIC relies provides in pertinent part:
b. Anyone else is an insured while using with your permission a covered auto except:
. . . . .
(2) Someone using a covered auto while he or she is working in a business of selling, servicing, repairing or parking or storing autos unless the business is your garage operations.
IV.D.1.b(2). We find and conclude that this exclusionary clause unequivocally excludes coverage under the circumstances of this case.
The stipulated facts establish that at the time of the above-noted automobile accident, J K Clean-Up was in the business of performing detail work on automobiles, i.e., interior and exterior washing and polishing on motor vehicles. Stip. ¶ 2. At the request of Royal Chevrolet, J K periodically performed detail work on used cars owned by Royal Chevrolet. Stip. ¶ 4. As part of J K's service agreement with Royal Chevrolet, J K's employees were responsible for picking up automobiles which needed detail work at Royal Chevrolet's Harrisonville, Missouri dealership and returning the automobiles to Royal's dealership upon completion of the detailing work at J K's Kansas City, Missouri shop. Id. J K performed such pick up and delivery service each time it performed detailing work on Royal Chevrolet's automobiles. Id.
The stipulation of facts further establishes that an employee of J K, after completion of a detailing job at the J K shop, was returning an automobile owned by Royal Chevrolet to its Harrisonville dealership when the car struck the rear of a vehicle. Stip. ¶ 5.
In light of the above-stipulated facts, we find and conclude that Section IV.D.1.b.(2) unequivocally excludes coverage of the automobile in question. For the J K employee who was delivering Royal Chevrolet's automobile at the time of the accident was clearly performing a service in furtherance of J K's "business" of "servicing" automobiles.
B.
Plaintiff contends, however, that when J K's employee was returning Royal Chevrolet's vehicle after completion of the detailing work, he was engaged in Royal Chevrolet's "garage operations" within the meaning of the NHIC policy. (Emphasis added). Plaintiff therefore contends that the exclusion embodied in Section IV.D. 1.b(2) is not applicable. Plaintiff's Brief at 5. Plaintiff's contention is untenable.
Plaintiff relies on the last clause of § IV.D.1.b.(2) which provides that the exclusion set forth in b(2) is not applicable if the business of the permissive user of the auto is "your [Royal Chevrolet's] garage operations."
Garage operations are defined as "all operations necessary or incidental to a garage business." NHIC's Policy § I.F.
The facts of this case, specifically those set forth in part A of our opinion, establish that, contrary to plaintiff's contention, J K's delivery of Royal Chevrolet's automobiles to Royal's Harrisonville dealership was an activity necessary and incidental to J K's detailing business. See Weston v. Great Central Insurance Company, 514 S.W.2d 17, 22-24. (Mo.App. 1974). ("Both by custom and agreement, the delivery of the car, following repairs and service was necessary and incidental to the operations of the station"). Applying the clear and unambiguous language of Section IV.D. 1.b(2), we find and conclude that NHIC's policy does not extend coverage to the activity resulting in the car accident at issue.
Our construction and application of Section IV.D.1.b(2) to the circumstances underlying this case is consistent with the decisions by Missouri and other State courts which involved automobile policies excluding coverage of an automobile while being used by any person engaged in the business of repairing or servicing motor vehicles. See, e.g., Weston v. Great Central Insurance Company, 514 S.W.2d 17 (Mo.App. 1974); Humble Oil Refining Company v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 490 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.Civ.App. 1973); 6C J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4372 (1979 Supp. 1987). Those courts have uniformly applied the above-noted exclusion to accidents occurring while an automobile is being picked up or delivered by an automobile dealer or service station for purposes of repair or service. E.g., Weston, 514 S.W.2d at 24. Humble, 490 S.W.2d at 642. For those courts have found that such services are an integral and necessary part of the service station business. Weston, 514 S.W.2d at 24.
Plaintiff cites Dumas v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 181 So.2d 841 (La.App. 1965), as authority for its contention that delivery is not an essential part of the services provided by a service station. Defendant, however, accurately points out that the " Dumas decision has been criticized by a number of courts" and that "most of the court's opinion in Weston v. Great Central Insurance Co., 514 S.W.2d 17 (Mo.App. 1974), [cites] . . . authority which rejects the Dumas decision." Reply Brief at 4. We therefore find plaintiff's reliance on Dumas untenable.
In so holding, the above-noted courts have emphasized that their application of the standard exclusion noted above to delivery of an automobile back to the bailor is consistent "with the rule in most states . . . that the responsibility for the operation of a car in the course of its repair, extending to delivery, falls upon the bailee." Id. at 22.
Although plaintiff cites a plethora of cases in its suggestions in support, these cases are not directly on point and fail to support its contention that the detailing activities of J K, including delivery, constitute the garage operations of Royal Chevrolet within the meaning of NHIC's policy.
In summary, we find that J K's delivery of Royal's automobiles to Royal's Harrisonville dealership constitutes an integral and necessary part of J K's detailing business. We therefore find and conclude that Section IV.D.1.b(2) of NHIC's policy unequivocally excludes coverage under the circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED (1) that plaintiff UFCC's motion for summary judgment should be and the same is hereby denied. It is further
ORDERED (2) that defendant NHIC's motion for summary judgment should be and the same is hereby granted. It is further
ORDERED (3) that the Clerk of the Court shall enter final judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff in accordance with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
APPENDIX A STIPULATION OF FACTS
COME NOW plaintiff United Fire Casualty Company (hereinafter "UFCC") and defendant New Hampshire Insurance Company (hereinafter "NHIC"), by and through their undersigned attorneys, and stipulate and agree as follows:
1. Royal Ventures, Inc. d/b/a Royal Chevrolet-Oldsmobile (hereinafter "Royal Chevrolet") is an automobile dealership located in Harrisonville, Cass County, Missouri.
2. Joe Jackson, d/b/a J K Clean-up (hereinafter "J K Clean-Up"), in December, 1985, owned and operated a business in Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, which performed "detail work" on automobiles. Detail work involved washing, polishing, cleaning the interior and cleaning the motor of a vehicle.
3. In December, 1985, Robert J. Wheeler was employed by J K Clean-Up. Robert Wheeler's job duties included performing "detail work" and picking up and delivering cars before and after the "detail work" had been performed.
4. At the request of Royal Chevrolet, J K Clean-Up periodically performed detail work on used cars owned by Royal Chevrolet. When Royal Chevrolet wanted a used car detailed, an employee of Royal Chevrolet would call an employee of J K Clean-Up and inform such employee that Royal Chevrolet had a car that needed "detail work." An employee of J K Clean-Up would then drive to Royal Chevrolet, pick up the car and return it to J K Clean-Up where the car would be detailed. After detailing, an employee of J K Clean-Up would return the vehicle to Royal Chevrolet. J K Clean-Up was paid $60.00 per car for this service.
5. On December 2, 1985, Robert Wheeler was involved in an accident while working for J K Clean-Up as he was returning a 1978 Chevrolet Caprice, which was owned by Royal Chevrolet, from J K Clean-Up's facility in Kansas City, Missouri to Royal Chevrolet in Harrisonville, Missouri. More specifically, the accident occurred when Robert Wheeler negligently allowed the vehicle he was driving to strike the rear of a vehicle in which Linda Kelsay and Anne Grasher were passengers.
6. As a result of this accident, two lawsuits were filed, Grasher v. Wheeler, No. CV186-160CC, and Kelsay v. Wheeler, No. CV186-161CC, in the Circuit Court of Cass County, Missouri. Both lawsuits named Robert Wheeler, J K Clean-Up and Royal Chevrolet as defendants, however, prior to disposition, Royal Chevrolet was dismissed by plaintiffs from both lawsuits. Prior to trial, both suits were settled for a total of $11,000.00. UFCC paid $7,102.03 in its defense of the two lawsuits.
7. At the time of the accident, UFCC provided liability insurance coverage to J K Clean-Up pursuant to policy number GP 60-013 894. A true copy of this policy is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit 1 [deleted for publication purposes].
8. At the time of the accident, NHIC provided liability insurance coverage to Royal Chevrolet pursuant to policy number GP 899-17-40. A true copy of this policy is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit 2 [redacted for purposes of publication].
9. UFCC has demanded that NHIC indemnify it for the amount paid in settlement ($11,000) and in defense of the case ($7,102.03). NHIC, however, has refused to indemnify UFCC and continues to refuse to do so.