Opinion
December 4, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Bergerman, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated August 22, 1994, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated December 5, 1994, made upon reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated December 5, 1994, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, the branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment against the defendants Deborah L. Blankfort and Carsalon, Inc., is granted, and so much of the order dated August 22, 1994, as denied the branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment against the defendants Deborah L. Blankfort and Carsalon, Inc., is vacated; and it is further,
Ordered that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.
The plaintiff made a prima facie showing that it was entitled to a judgment of foreclosure as a matter of law against the defendants Deborah L. Blankfort (hereinafter Blankfort) and Carsalon, Inc. (hereinafter Carsalon) (see, Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851). The burden then shifted to Blankfort and Carsalon to establish the existence of material triable issues of fact which require a trial of the action (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562). Under the circumstances, the allegations of Blankfort and Carsalon concerning the execution of the loan documents were insufficient to defeat the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (see, Juliani v Juliani, 143 A.D.2d 72, 74; Columbus Trust Co. v Campolo, 110 A.D.2d 616, 617, affd 66 N.Y.2d 701). Sullivan, J.P., Thompson, Copertino, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.