Opinion
No. CV02 39 55 59 S
February 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This litigation was initiated by The Annual Conference of the Unison Free Will Baptist Church, Inc. ("Annual Conference"); Reverend Robert Gay, who is the presiding bishop of The Annual Conference; and Joe E. Wells, who is a member and deacon of St. Luke Unison Free Will Baptist Church, Inc. ("St. Luke"), which is located in Bridgeport. They have sued St. Luke; James Eagles, who is a member and Senior Deacon of St. Luke; and Reverend Jesse Polite, who is the minister of the St. Luke congregation. After the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground the plaintiffs lack standing, the three original plaintiffs were joined by five intervening plaintiffs, Edward Spears, Beverly Anthony, Caleb Brown, Pearl Taylor, and Pauline Wells, who are members of St. Luke. The three original and five intervening plaintiffs want this court to enforce Bishop Gay's determination as to which of two factions at St. Luke may have the exclusive power to control the use of the St. Luke property.
At this preliminary stage of the court proceedings, the court is concerned with two matters: (1) whether the court should grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the claims brought by the three original plaintiffs and (2) whether this court should grant the plaintiffs' request that this court issue a temporary, mandatory injunction barring the defendant pastor of the local church from ministering to the church and barring those who support the defendant pastor from using the church property. The defendants do not challenge the standing of the five intervening plaintiffs. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is denied and the application for a temporary, mandatory injunction is also denied.
All those who support Reverend Polite have not been made parties to this lawsuit.
The evidence presented to this court shows that this dispute originated with a complaint about the conduct of Reverend Polite that was made in July of 2000 to the Annual Conference by a member of St. Luke. At the request of Bishop Gay, Reverend Polite met with Bishop Gay and members of the Annual Conference and discussed, but failed to resolve, the complaint. After a sequence of correspondence between Reverend Polite and the Annual Conference, the congregation of St. Luke discussed the congregation's withdrawing from the Annual Conference in light of the Annual Conference's failure to resolve the complaint to the satisfaction of the majority of the congregation. This discussion occurred at a duly noticed quarterly business meeting held on March 22, 2001. The plaintiffs and defendants differ in their interpretation of what occurred at the March 2001 meeting. The plaintiffs contend that a vote to withdraw was not taken, or, if a vote was taken, that it was done improperly. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the participants acted properly on a motion to withdraw and passed it with an acclamation of support for Reverend Polite.
The next significant event occurred at a St. Luke meeting held on February 14, 2002. Plaintiff Wells was disciplined, i.e. "silenced," by Reverend Polite during a discussion about church matters. This disciplinary action, according to Reverend Polite, meant that Deacon Wells was not to perform the duties of his positions, which were that of deacon and financial officer. Plaintiff Wells complained about this incident to Bishop Gay. By letter dated March 5, 2002, Bishop Gay notified Reverend Polite that his right to be a minister of the Annual Conference and the pastor of St. Luke was suspended. Thereafter, Deacon Wells notified Reverend Polite that there would be litigation.
In September of 2002, Bishop Gay, the Annual Conference, and Deacon Wells began this lawsuit. These plaintiffs make the following allegations in their amended complaint: In the first count, they allege that the Annual Conference is a general church that has a hierarchical relationship with churches that are members of the Annual Conference, that Bishop Gay is the highest executive and ecclesiastical authority in the Annual Conference, that St. Luke is a member church, that the Annual Conference is authorized to license pastors for member churches, that Reverend Polite received a license from the Annual Conference, that the Annual Conference disqualified Reverend Polite from being a minister of both the Annual Conference and St. Luke, and that Reverend Polite has continued to serve St. Luke as if he were an approved pastor of the Annual Conference. In the second count, the plaintiffs allege that defendant St. Luke has refused to accept and recognize the authority of the Annual Conference and Bishop Gay with respect to the termination of Reverend Polite's license and pastorship. In the third count, they allege that Reverend Polite discharged plaintiff Wells from his positions at St. Luke in violation of the rules, customs, usages, and traditions of the Annual Conference and that the dismissal caused Wells to suffer damage to his reputation. In the fourth count, they allege defendant Eagles is the senior deacon and head officer of St. Luke and that he has allowed Reverend Polite to continue as pastor. In the fifth count, they allege that the St. Luke congregation is divided with one faction supporting Reverend Polite and the other faction, the "adhering faction," following the laws, usages, traditions, customs and principles of the Annual Conference. For relief, the Annual Conference, Bishop Gay, and Deacon Wells want this court to bar Reverend Polite from ministering to any church that is a member of the Annual Conference, bar Reverend Polite from ministering to the congregation of St. Luke, reinstate plaintiff Wells to the positions that he previously held at St. Luke, and give to the adhering faction custody and possession of the property of St. Luke. None of the plaintiffs seek a monetary award.
I
The three defendants, St. Luke, Reverend Polite, and Senior Deacon Eagles, have moved to dismiss the complaint filed by plaintiffs Annual Conference, Bishop Gay, and Deacon Wells on the ground these plaintiffs lack standing because (1) the Annual Conference and Bishop Gay have not asserted an ownership or other interest in the St. Luke property and (2) the positions to which Deacon Wells seeks reinstatement are not paid positions. Since the defendants' motion presents a jurisdictional issue, it must be resolved before proceeding further with the case.
The defendants had also challenged the standing of the Annual Conference and Bishop Gay to assert a claim on behalf of Wells, who had not been named as a plaintiff in the summons despite the fact the complaint alleged that Wells had been improperly removed from his church positions. This defect, i.e. the failure to place Well's name on the summons sheet, was cured by the court's granting a motion to add Wells as a plaintiff.
The legal rules that this court must apply to this task have been frequently stated by our appellate courts. "The issue of standing implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes . . . standing by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests . . .
"Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is . . . aggrieved . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 460-61 (2004).
"A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide . . . Our Supreme Court has determined that when ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bailey v. Medical Examining Bd. For State, 75 Conn. 215, 219, 815 A.2d 281 (2003).
The plaintiffs allege, among other things, that Reverend Polite is acting as a minister of the plaintiff conference even though the conference suspended the license that it issued to him. These allegations, if true, demonstrate that the conference and Bishop Gay were harmed. With respect to Deacon Wells, his loss of office demonstrates that he has been harmed. The plaintiffs have shown the possibility that some legally protected interest has been adversely affected. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss their complaint is denied.
II
Before addressing the plaintiffs' application for a temporary injunction, this court must comment upon counsel's request that this court render a final decision. The court is prevented from doing so by the procedural status of this case. The pleadings are not closed. There are two operative complaints, one has been filed by the original plaintiffs and the other by the intervening plaintiffs. The only pleading that has been filed in response to the two complaints is the defendants' motion to dismiss one of the complaints. The fact that the parties have not closed the pleadings places a limitation on the power or jurisdiction of this court to issue a final decision. "The fact that the pleadings were not closed restricts the authority of the trial court to render permanent judgments on pending claims . . . None of these determinations [injunctions or declaratory judgments] can properly be made while the pleadings are still open . . . [A]lthough under certain circumstances a temporary injunction may be transformed into a permanent injunction with the consent of the parties . . . the trial court does not have authority to render `permanent judgments on pending claims' where the pleadings are not yet closed." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) Gattoni v. Zaccaro, 52 Conn. App. 274, 281, 727 A.2d 706 (1999). Because of this limitation, the court will only consider the plaintiffs' application for a temporary injunction.
III
All plaintiffs, the original three and the intervening five, request this court to issue a temporary injunction pending the final outcome of this case. Generally, there are four factors a court should consider when deciding upon an application for a temporary injunction: (1) whether the plaintiffs have no adequate legal remedy; (2) whether the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a temporary injunction; (3) whether the plaintiffs are likely to prevail at a final hearing; and (4) whether the balance of the equities favor the issuance of an injunction. See Waterbury Teachers Association v. Freedom of Information Commission, 230 Conn. 441, 445, 645 A.2d 978 (1994). In arguing this matter, the parties have focused on the third factor, i.e. whether the plaintiffs are likely to prevail at a final hearing. This court has concluded that the plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on the property issue and, accordingly, denies their application for a temporary injunction.
The crux of this case is a dispute over control of church property. The majority of those who are members of St. Luke want to use the church property to practice their faith, and they want Reverend Polite to be their pastor.
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, want Reverend Polite barred from the church. They claim that Bishop Gay and the Annual Conference have the right to determine how the church property can be used; they claim that Bishop Gay and the Annual Conference have issued an ecclesiastical decision that is binding on this court.
What is not at stake is the right of Reverend Polite to preach at other churches that are members of the Annual Conference. He is no longer a member of the Annual Conference and does not seek to preach at churches that are part of the conference.
This court has authority to decide church-property disputes but must not decide issues of religious doctrine and practice. "Civil courts have the general authority to resolve the question of church property ownership. The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes and in providing a civil forum where the ownership [and control] of church property can be determined conclusively. The first amendment to the United States constitution, however, severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. It therefore forbids civil courts from resolving church property disputes by inquiring into and resolving disputed issues of religious doctrine and practice." Trinity-St. Michael's Parish v. Episcopal Church, 224 Conn. 797, 800-01, 620 A.2d 1280 (1993) (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) "The first amendment . . . requires that civil courts defer to the highest court of [a] hierarchical church organization to resolve issues of religious doctrine or practice . . . but does not prevent the civil courts from exercising general authority to resolve church property disputes." New York Annual Conference v. Fisher, 182 Conn. 272, 283, 438 A.2d 62 (1980) (internal citations omitted).
Neither the Annual Conference nor Bishop Gay claim a legal or equitable interest in St. Luke's property. Moreover, there has been no evidence that the property was ever dedicated to the use of the Annual Conference or to a particular organization. Where church property, as in the present case, has not been dedicated by way of express trust to the general religious body or the local church, the court "must decide, without becoming entangled in religious controversy, what is the nature of the relationship between [the Annual Conference] and [St. Luke's Church]." New York Annual Conference v. Fisher, supra at 283. "Whether a civil court may inquire into church property disputes . . . depends entirely on whether the parties committed those questions to the exclusive province of a particular religious society. And this issue is not an exclusively ecclesiastical issue but rather one that properly may be submitted to a civil court for resolution . . . [N]o constitutional considerations bar civil courts from determining for themselves whether the local church, upon its affiliation with a hierarchical organization, meant to confer on the latter body the authority claimed." A.M. Adams and W.R. Hanlon, " Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment," 128 Univ.Penn.L.Rev. 1291, 1330 (1980).
The plaintiffs contend that the Annual Conference and its member churches constitute a hierarchical organization and that the polity of the organization gives to the presiding bishop the power to determine how a member church may use its property. The defendants, on the other hand, claim that St. Luke's ties to the Annual Conference were only on spiritual matters; that the St. Luke property was not acquired or held in trust for the Annual Conference; that St. Luke's is no longer a member of the Annual Conference; and that the authority to bar a minister from preaching at St. Luke only exists, in accordance with the bylaws of St. Luke, in the directors of St. Luke.
There are 240 to 250 persons who are members of St. Luke. They practice the faith of the Freewill Baptist denomination. One does not have to be a member of the Annual Conference to be a Freewill Baptist. There are many Freewill Baptist churches in the country.
"The Baptists comprise one of the largest and most diverse groupings of Christians in the United States. Technically, there are no such things as Baptist denominations, because Baptists are strongly congregational in polity: Each local congregation is independent of the others. However, Baptist churches are commonly grouped into larger associations for purposes of fellowship. National conventions have been established to carry on education and missionary work and to administer pension plans . . .
"Most state and regional conventions meet annually with delegates from all Baptist churches in a given area. These conventions receive reports, make recommendations, and help to raise national mission budgets: but they have no authority to enforce their decisions. Baptists have insisted on freedom of thought and expression in pulpit and pew. They have insisted, too, on the absolute autonomy of the local congregation; each church arranges its own worship and examines and baptizes its own members . . ." Frank S. Mead, Samuel S. Hill, Handbook of Denominations in the United States (Abington Press 11th Edition) p. 42.
The plaintiff conference, i.e. The Annual Conference of the Unison Freewill Baptist Church, Inc., was formed in 1972. The group of churches that came together and formed this conference had been members of another conference, The Unified Freewill Baptist Conference, which in turn was formed in 1964 when a group of Freewill Baptist churches left another conference, The United American Freewill Baptist Annual Convention. St. Luke had been a member of the Unified Freewill Conference and joined the plaintiff conference when it was formed in 1972.
St. Luke owns and occupies several parcels of land in Bridgeport that it purchased with financing from People's Bank. The Annual Conference has not contributed toward the purchases or assisted in the financing of the property and has no legal interest of record. Repayment of the People's Bank loan was guaranteed by Jesse Polite, Jr., Curtis Thompson, and James Eagles, who are members of St. Luke. The bank and Curtis Thompson are not parties to this litigation.
For a minister to be a pastor of a church that is a member of the plaintiff Annual Conference, the minister must be licensed by the Annual Conference. It is the member church, however, that selects its pastor. If a Freewill Baptist church is not a member of the plaintiff Annual Conference, the pastor of the church need not be licensed by the conference.
Section 4(b) of the Bylaws of St. Luke (Defendant's Ex. J) authorize the directors of St. Luke to "appoint and remove, employ and discharge . . . all officers, agents and employees of the corporation." Reverend Polite has been the church's pastor for twenty-five years. Neither the directors of St. Luke nor a majority of the congregation have voted to discharge him.
St. Luke has not participated, as a church, in the Annual Conference since September 2000, when the church last paid conference dues. The church has been omitted from the Annual Conference program since that date. The minutes of a St. Luke meeting held on November 29, 2001, confirm that "this ministry no longer belongs to the Conference."
Plaintiff Wells never received compensation for the positions that he has held at St. Luke. He has not suffered financial harm by his having been "silenced."
After reviewing the evidence, this court finds that neither Bishop Gay nor the Annual Conference have the absolute right to decide who may control, use and posses the St. Luke property. While Bishop Gay and the Annual Conference have the right to resolve matters of doctrine and practice, they do not have ultimate or complete power to decide disputes about the ownership of church property. "[T]he mere fact of some hierarchical connection with a general church does not preclude . . . [an associated] local church from retaining its right as a congregation to use and control church property." A.M. Adams and W.R. Hanlon, " Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment," 128 Univ.Penn.L.Rev. 1291, 1308 (1980). As the intervening plaintiffs acknowledge in their legal brief, the relationship between an individual church and a church conference may combine elements of both hierarchical and congregational policies. The history of St. Luke's affiliation with the plaintiff conference and the manner in which other churches have both joined and withdrawn from the conference show that member churches have always enjoyed a high degree of independence. All have the ability to leave the conference at will. However one may characterize the relationship between St. Luke and the Annual Conference, it is clear that St. Luke never placed its property under the control of the Annual Conference. See Independent Methodist Episcopal Church v. Davis, 137 Conn. 1, 74 A.2d 203 (1950) (local church retained control of its property even when it joined a general church whose polity was episcopal and whose hierarchy was developed in pyramidal pattern with the local church subject to the rule of the higher level). Accordingly, this court concludes that Bishop Gay and the Annual Conference have not issued a decision that this court must accept as final and binding.
"Baptist churches comprise self-governing congregations, and although these congregations join in denominational bodies for such purposes as the promotion of missionary programs, the bodies exercise no control over the member congregations. But the matter is not always so simple. The courts have a great difficulty in classifying certain churches." Note, "Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property," 75 Harvard L. Rev. 1142, 1159 (1962).
"It may be reasonably clear — although courts have not always thought so — that the affiliation of Baptist congregations in conventions does not create a hierarchical organization, or that the mere outward presbyterial form — i.e., a series of assemblies — does not necessarily import a functional hierarchy even where power to ordain ministers is vested in the assemblies. But in harder cases it might be better for the courts to eschew an analysis of obscure ecclesiastical rules and proceed directly to the next stage of inquiry: whether the local congregation is in fact controlled by a general church." Id. at 1160.
"A church may choose to affiliate with a separate hierarchical religious organization for certain purposes, consenting to the latter's `authority' to resolve questions of doctrine and practice for that association, and at the same time retain its autonomy and its right to prescribe the use and control of its property. When a church affiliates on these terms, the members remain free, in the event of a disagreement over doctrine or practice, simply to sever the local church's relationship with the hierarchical organization and withdraw itself and its property from that association, regardless of any purported adjudication of the question by the hierarchy." A.M. Adams and W.R. Hanlon, " Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment," 128 Univ.Penn.L.Rev. 1291, 1331-32 (1980).
Based upon the foregoing, this court concludes that the plaintiff's application for the issuance of a temporary injunction should be denied. While all the plaintiffs have standing to seek an adjudication of this controversy, they have not shown that Bishop Gay and the Annual Conference issued an ecclesiastical decision to which this court must give deference. Plaintiff Wells has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the issuance of an injunction as his positions were not paid positions.
THIM, J.