Summary
holding that a party executed a valid ratification when the document recited the caption of the case and provided that the party "ratifies said lawsuit and otherwise warrants that [it] will bring no other claim against the defendants therein"
Summary of this case from House of Europe Funding I Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.Opinion
96 Civ. 8193 (DFE)
March 18, 2004
OPINION AND ORDER
In this ancient marine cargo case, plaintiff Union Carbide Corporation ("Carbide") moved for summary judgment in November 2000. Judge Swain denied summary judgment on April 7, 2003. The case was reassigned to me on June 27, and I held a bench trial on October 28 and 29, 2003. Post-trial briefs were served by Carbide on January 21, 2004, by defendants on February 24, and by Carbide in reply on March 2. This opinion constitutes my findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. I found the testimony of William J. Lohan and John 0. Beadle to be entirely credible. Both were retired employees of Carbide who were knowledgeable about the relevant 1995 events. In 1995, Carbide was manufacturing mono-ethylene glycol (MEG) in western Canada. Lohan's job at Carbide involved chartering vessels to transport MEG from Vancouver to the Far East, where customers used MEG to make polyester fibers. (Tr. 46-48.) Beadle was Carbide's international distribution quality manager for ethylene glycol. (Tr. 151.)
2. As of July 7, 1994, Carbide and defendant Chembulk Trading Inc. entered into a Contract of Affreightment; Chembulk, as vessel owners, was to carry frequent multi-ton cargoes of "Ethylene Glycol Polyester Grade" (also known as fiber grade MEG) out of Port Vancouver. (Exh. 4.) The Contract provided that it could continue beyond one year, but only "if Chembulk can continue to meet the various requirements of [Carbide, including] product quality. . . ." (Id. p. 4.) The Contract noted: "Charterers' product is extremely sensitive to contamination." (Id. p. 9.) One of the vessels nominated by Chembulk was the M/T ENCOUNTER, which was managed by M.T.M. Ship Management Private Ltd. ("M.T.M." or "MTMM"). (Def. 56.1 Response, Docket #20, ¶ 3.)
3. Beadle trained M.T.M.'s ship captains in the proper methods to load and transport MEG. After polyester-grade MEG was loaded onto a ship, each tank had to be tested for various specifications, including an Ultraviolet ("UV") Transmittance of at least 80% at 220 nanometers. (Tr. 152-54, corroborated by Exh. 7.) Far Eastern manufacturers of polyester fibers would not accept a shipment of MEG unless, at the time of receipt, a new test showed that the UV Transmittance was at least 70%. (Tr. 166.) Beadle emphasized to M.T.M. that the UV Transmittance could easily deteriorate if, prior to loading, M.T.M. failed to clean the tanks carefully, removing all prior chemicals and also removing all cleaning agents. (Tr. 153.)
4. On October 29 and 30, 1995, in Vancouver, 11,698 metric tons of MEG were loaded into 11 tanks in the hold of the ENCOUNTER. Each of the 11 tanks was then given various tests by Inchcape Testing Services, whose report is Exh. 40. The UV Transmittance at 220 nanometers ranged from 85.2% to 89.0% for the 11 tanks. The tank that led to this lawsuit was the largest tank, Tank 5C (or 5 Center), which was loaded with 1,688 tons; it tested at 88.6%. (All of my references to "tons" refer to metric tons.)
5. All 11 tanks were listed, "with no segregation as to parcels," on each of ten bills of lading, which are Exh. 5. Three of the bills of lading were issued to Carbide; they covered a total of 3,700 tons, all to be unloaded in Hong Kong. Five of the bills of lading were issued to Mitsui and Co. (Canada) Ltd; they covered a total of 4,057 tons, all to be unloaded in Indonesia, mostly at the port of Merak. The two other bills of lading are of little relevance.
6. The Mitsui group of corporations had various relationships with Carbide. Mitsui and Co. (Canada) Ltd. owned a one-third interest in one of Carbide's two plants in western Canada. (Tr. 97-98.) Mitsui Co. (USA) Inc. was Carbide's distribution agent to sell wholesale quantities of MEG to customers in the Far East. (Tr. 102.) Carbide invoiced these shipments to Mitsui Co. (USA) Inc. at prices upwards of $770 per ton. (Exh. 6.) Mitsui also owned one of four insurance companies that wrote policies covering Mitsui with respect to cargo shipments. (Tr. 110-11.)
7. The ENCOUNTER unloaded the 3,700 tons in Hong Kong, all in good condition, even though approximately 810 of those tons came out of Tank 5C. The ENCOUNTER then unloaded more MEG at Keelung and Jakarta, none of it from Tank 5C. (Exhs. 48, 58.) Finally, it sailed to Merak, where it planned to discharge all of its remaining 4,065 tons, including the 879 tons that remained in Tank 5C. (Exh. 8, p. 441.) At Merak, Mitsui held four bills of lading for four different customers for a total of 3,071 tons, and a company called Tomen Corporation held one bill of lading for 1,000 tons for yet another customer. (Exh. 5.) At Merak, testing began on December 1, 1995. The UV testing at 220 nanometers showed that Tank 5C's contents scored in the range of 43% to 48%. This was woefully short of the 70% required by the customers (fiber manufacturers who were listed on the bills of lading). (Id., pp. 421, 428, 429; Exh. 97-G, p. 213.)
8. Mitsui refused to take delivery of the 879 tons in Tank 5C. The liability of Chembulk and M.T.M. was obvious. Grasping at straws, the master of the ENCOUNTER, Capt. Tokic Tonci, issued a Letter of Protest dated December 7, 1995 to Prointal Terminal:
On behalf of my owner, the charterers and the master of M.T. "ENCOUNTER" hereby protest against to your decision to refused discharging of Tank 5 Ctr.
According [to] the analysis from Jakarta (Indonesian Fiber Corporation) our composite (2C + 3C + 5W + 5C) have on-spec. result. ["5W" may be an abbreviation for 5 Wings; in context it clearly means Tanks 5P[ort] and 5S[tarboard]; see Exh. 8, p. 441.]
According [to] our experience we can discharge all tanks in same time and you [would] have in [a] shore tank [a] composite cargo with qlty on-spec. . . .
(Exh. 8, p. 436.)
9. In short, the defendants were proposing an irrevocable gamble — blend the 879 defective tons with the 3,186 good tons, and hope that the resulting blend would have a UV Transmittance of at least 70%. This hope was based on a composite sample that had blended small samples from five huge tanks (2C + 3C + 5P + 5S + 5C). The defendants' proposal was irresponsible unless its insurance underwriters were willing to cover the risk that the blending would ruin the additional 3,186 tons. M.T.M. realized this, and explicitly sought to learn whether its "underwriters will cover if a larger claim is made [as a result of blending]." (Exh. 97-I, p. 180.) I infer that the defendants' underwriters refused to cover such a risk. Certainly the defendants never offered to hold Carbide and Mitsui harmless. Accordingly, I find that the defendants' "blending" proposal was unreasonably risky.
10. Carbide's Lohan consulted with Carbide's Beadle, who said he suspected that Tank 5C was contaminated with paraxylene. It is undisputed that paraxylene had been carried in Tank 5C on the ENCOUNTER'S last trip previous to October 29, 1995. (Exh. 40, 6th pg.) It seems clear that M.T.M. failed to clean Tank 5C properly after that previous trip. Beadle advised that blending would probably create a bigger problem and increase the number of customers who would be adversely affected. (Tr. 61.)
11. At trial, Beadle explained in further detail why blending would have been foolishly risky. (a) Blending is a nonlinear calculation. (b) The guidelines of the International Organization for Standards prohibited blending of MEG. (c) Blending would irrevocably introduce the contaminant from the 879 tons into the 3,186 good tons. (d) To minimize the chance that blending would introduce additional contaminants, the blending would need to be done in a "perfect tank," being stainless steel or specially coated, and containing no nitrogen; there was no evidence that such a tank existed in Indonesia. (Tr. 158-60.)
12. Accordingly, Carbide and Mitsui rejected the idea of blending. Their decision was further justified after the fact by Carbide's Dr. John Robson in West Virginia, who received sealed samples from Tank 5C, tested them with gas chromatography, determined that they contained paraxylene, and calculated that 15.5 gallons of paraxylene had been in Tank 5C. (Tr. 156-57, 179-80.)
13. Beadle recommended that the 879 tons of defective MEG be sold as anti-freeze. There was no market for anti-freeze in tropical Indonesia, but there was a market for anti-freeze in Japan. There was no storage facility at Merak that could take the 879 tons from the ENCOUNTER and then reload it onto a different vessel. Carbide asked M.T.M. to have the ENCOUNTER take the 879 tons to Japan, but M.T.M. replied that the ENCOUNTER was committed to pick up a full cargo in Malaysia. After a few days of research, Carbide and Mitsui decided that there were two ways to get the 879 tons started toward Japan: Option A: have the ENCOUNTER take the MEG to a "mild" (non-stainless) steel tank elsewhere in Indonesia, but this risked creating rust, which would make the MEG unsaleable as anti-freeze; Option B: have the ENCOUNTER take the MEG to Port Kelang in Malaysia, where stainless steel tanks were available. (Tr. 61-64, 167-69.)
14. Carbide explained all of this to the defendants in telexes from Lohan and his assistant dated December 4 and 7, 1995. (Exh. 97-I, pp. 550-51, 579-82; Tr. 65-66.)
15. On December 8, Mitsui Co., Ltd. (the head office in Japan) faxed a Notice of Claim to M.T.M. for the contamination of the MEG. (Exh. C.) Technically, title to the MEG had passed to Mitsui in Vancouver. Nevertheless, Carbide was the seller, and it felt: "If the customers had a problem, they were ultimately looking to Union Carbide to make good on it. [Moreover,] [w]e were the charterers of the vessel. We had a responsibility as the charterer as far as any claims were concerned." (Tr. 114.) Accordingly, Carbide agreed to address Mitsui's problem in two ways: First, Carbide agreed to give Mitsui a free replacement of 879 tons of fiber grade MEG; this was then shipped, at Carbide's expense, from Vancouver bound for Merak prior to December 31. (Tr. 119-20; 142-43.) Second, Carbide agreed to pay for all the costs that would enable Mitsui to sell the contaminated MEG as anti-freeze (even though Mitsui had paid for fiber grade MEG). Carbide's Insurance Department consulted with Carbide's insurance underwriter (Marine Office of America Corporation, known as "MOAC"), which agreed to pay Carbide's reasonable costs and to litigate the claim against the defendants. (Tr. 70-72.)
16. With respect to Paragraph 13 supra, it appears that all parties agreed that Option B was preferable to Option A. In a December 8 telex, M.T.M. directed Port Kelang to arrange for storage space for the MEG in appropriate tanks with nitrogen blanketing. (Exh. 97-I, pp. 541, 117.) In another December 8 telex, M.T.M. sent Carbide a detailed listing of "costs associated with transporting MEGFG in 5C tank from Merak to Port Kelang." Including storage tank rental in Port Kelang, and M.T.M.'s "deviation costs" of $26,368, the total of these costs was $47,958. M.T.M. asked Carbide to pay promptly. (Exh. 20.) Carbide paid the entire amount to M.T.M. (Tr. 77.)
17. The ENCOUNTER transported the off-spec MEG to Port Kelang by December 11, 1995. The defendants' insurance company (Sheringham P I Services) retained a marine surveyor (Masterspec) to see if anyone in Malaysia was willing to purchase the off-spec MEG as a "mitigation option." (Exh. 97-I, p. 117.) Masterspec spoke with the three main importers of MEG in Malaysia; they declined to buy the off-spec MEG at any price, because they did not want the risk that it would pose to their machines and to their production of polyester fiber. (Exh. 97-E, p. 368.) Sheringham made one last effort to try to salvage the off-spec MEG; it purged a sample with nitrogen for 20 minutes, but this merely raised the UV Transmittance from 40.8% to 59.9%; on December 21, it concluded: "As for potential salvage buyer here [in Malaysia], the possibility is rather slim." (Exh. 91.) Masterspec was "advised to look for [a] user of antifreeze" in a non-tropical climate. (Exh. 97-I, p. 80.) Accordingly, on December 30, 1995, the off-spec MEG was loaded onto a ship called the M/T L STAR, bound for Japan. (Exh. 97-E, pp. 364.)
18. M.T.M. had arranged for the L STAR, which was owned by Heiwa Pacific Maritime Pte. Ltd. In a telex dated January 3, 1996, M.T.M. advised Carbide that the freight cost was $48,697.15; making a $200 error, M.T.M. directed Carbide to remit $48,497.15 to Heiwa. (Exh. 22, p. 1.) It is significant that M.T.M. directed that the payment come from Carbide rather than Mitsui. M.T.M. knew that Mitsui was the owner of the cargo, and that "Mitsui Co., Ltd., intend to import the product into Japan for use as anti-freeze grade." (Exh. 97-I, p. 56.) I find that M.T.M. was aware that Mitsui and Carbide had agreed that Carbide would make the payments and that Carbide would take over the task of prosecuting the claim for damages against the defendants.
19. On January 17, 1996, Chembulk billed Carbide for $183,443.74 in demurrage fees arising from delays in the Ports of Jakarta, Merak and Kelang. A substantial portion of those fees ($66,063) was due to the defendants' contamination, which caused delays in Merak and Kelang. Nevertheless, soon after a March 7, 1996 memo by Lohan, Carbide decided to pay the entire bill and to include the $66,063 as part of the insurance claim, first against MOAC and eventually against the defendants. (Tr. 72-74; Exh. 19.)
20. On April 3, 1996, Chembulk billed Carbide for $8,143.17 for pilotage, tugs and mooring in Port Kelang. Carbide paid soon after Lohan's May 13 approval. (Tr. 76-77; Exh. 18.) Earlier, in January, Carbide paid Inchcape Testing $617 for testing the MEG loaded onto the L STAR in Port Kelang. (Tr. 77-78; Exh. 21.)
21. The L STAR left Port Kelang and was bound for the port of Yokohama. It appears that Mitsui discovered that it would be difficult to sell all of the MEG at Yokohama, but that some of it could be sold at the port of Kawasaki. Therefore, Carbide paid the L STAR'S owner an extra $20,000 to make a extra stop at Kawasaki. (Exh. 22, p. 2.) Carbide paid the L STAR'S owner a total of $68,497.15 on January 22, 1996. (Exh. 23.) At Tr. 130, defense counsel pointed out that the check was written on the account of Union Carbide Chemicals and Plastics Company Inc.; I noted that I would assume this to be a subsidiary of plaintiff "[u]nless I hear otherwise." I find that plaintiff properly claims this as an out-of-pocket cost.
22. In January 1996, the L STAR delivered 500.741 metric tons (500,741 kilograms) of MEG to Yokohama. (Exh. 24, p. 1.) Mitsui was able to sell it on March 25, 1996 for 70 yen per kilogram, i.e., for 35,051,870 yen; divided by the March exchange rate of 106.91, this was equal to $327,863.34. (See Exh. E, p. 3; at Tr. 92, defense counsel offered this exhibit without limitation.)
23. Also in January 1996, the L STAR delivered the other 371.444 metric tons (371,444 kilograms) of MEG to Kawasaki. (Exh. 24, p. 4.) Mitsui was able to sell it on September 19, 1996 for a tentative price of 55 yen per kilogram, i.e., for 20,429,420 yen; divided by the September exchange rate of 110.78, this was equal to $184,414.33. (See Exh. E, p. 3.) At Tr. 215-16, defense counsel raised a question as to why Mitsui took so long to sell this second batch of MEG. I think the reason is that Japan has warm weather from April to September and thus there is little demand for anti-freeze.
24. Accordingly, it appears that Mitsui received a total gross price of $512,277.67 for the off-spec MEG. This was less than the wholesale price Mitsui had paid to Carbide; on Exh. 6, the lowest price per ton was $770; at 879 tons this was $676,830. The defendants are not being asked to pay for any portion of that difference (some $164,000).
25. For the storage at Yokohama (3 months) and Kawasaki (8 months), GATX billed Mitsui the equivalent of $90,492.95, plus $7,580.92 for a tank cleaning charge. (Exhs. 24, 25.) Carbide paid those bills sometime after August 1996. (Tr. 79-85.) I find these bills to be reasonable. At Port Kelang, the storage charges were the equivalent of $16,160 for the first month, and the defendants do not challenge the reasonableness of the Port Kelang storage fees. (Exh. 20, p. 2; Tr. 216.)
26. Finally, back in December 1995, Carbide paid the cost of shipping the replacement 880 tons of MEG from Vancouver to Merak. At $67.75 per ton, this cost was $59,620. (Tr. 85-87.)
27. To summarize, Carbide loaded fiber grade MEG in good condition into the hold of the ENCOUNTER. Due to the defendants' failure to clean Tank 5C properly before loading, the MEG in Tank 5C became contaminated during the voyage. Carbide incurred losses totaling $348,972.02. Carbide paid more than half of this total to these very defendants. (¶¶ 16, 19, 20, 26, supra.) Carbide paid about half of this total by January 1996, and all of it by December 1996.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
28. It is undisputed that Carbide's claim comes under our Court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and that the statute of limitations did not expire before December 1, 1996. On October 30, 1996, Carbide filed its complaint, and stated that the damages were in excess of $750,000. It now asks merely for $348,972.02 plus interest, its out-of-pocket damages.
29. It is undisputed that more than half of this amount was paid by Carbide directly to these defendants; to that extent, Carbide is merely seeking a refund. Nevertheless, the defendants' primary defense asserts that Carbide is not the real party in interest. They assert that the real party in interest is Mitsui.
30. Rule 17(a), F.R.Civ.P., says:
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. . . . No action shall be dismissed on the ground that its is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by . . . the real party in interest; and such ratification . . . shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
31. Mitsui Co. (USA) Inc. was the buyer of the MEG on the purchase orders. (Exh. 6.) It rejected the MEG in Merak, and Carbide accepted that rejection. Carbide rectified the situation by paying $348,972.02 for Mitsui's benefit. Mitsui has chosen not to ask for anything more. To make this unmistakably clear, Mitsui Co. (USA) Inc. signed a notarized two-page document on October 30, 2000. (Exh. 90.) In the document, Mitsui assigns to Carbide all of Mitsui's claims arising from the shipment in question. It recites the full caption and docket number of the case at bar, and also says: "Assignor [Mitsui] ratifies said lawsuit and otherwise warrants that Assignor will bring no other claim against the defendants therein." This amply satisfies the purpose of Rule 17(a). The Advisory Committee Notes say: "[T]he modern function of the rule in its negative aspect is simply to protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata."
32. Nevertheless, the defendants harp on the fact that Carbide sold the MEG to Mitsui "FOB Vancouver," and therefore title and risk of loss passed to Mitsui in Canada. (Tr. 100.)
33. Carbide's 1/21/04 Memorandum, p. 5 cites Marine Office of Am. Corp. v. Lilac Marine Corp., 296 F. Supp.2d 91, 100 (D. P.R. Nov. 13, 2003), a recent case which neatly sums up the law on this point:
As a result of said title transfer the consignee/buyer is ordinarily the party entitled to sue the carrier in case of any damage. However, the seller/shipper may also sue the carrier: (1) when he acts as the consignee's representative, if said action is ratified by the latter; (2) when the shipper acted as the buyer/consignee's agent in replacing and repairing the damaged cargo; or (3) when the goods are rejected by the buyer and the seller accepts that rejection. See, William Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd ed., BLAIS, Canada, 1988, p. 192; Prevor-Mayorsohn Caribbean, Inc. v. Puerto Rico. Marine Management, Inc., 620 F.2d at 4. See also, Armco Intern. Corp. v. Rederi A/B Disa, 151 F.2d 5, 9 (2nd Cir. 1945); Transmarine Corp. v. Levitt, 25 F.2d 275, 278 (2nd Cir. 1928).
34. Defendants' 2/24/04 Memorandum ignores the Lilac Marine case. Instead, at page 10, it cites a much older case from the same District, Gradmann Holler GmbH v. Continental Lines, S.A., 504 F. Supp. 785, 793-94 (D. P.R. 1980). However, the defendants have never responded to Carbide's critique of Gradmann:
Gradmann . . . was decided under Puerto Rican law, which had not adopted the Uniform Commercial Code but retained Spanish Civil law concepts of "title to sue." Such strict civil law restrictions are exactly what Section 2-722 of the Uniform Commercial Code was designed to eliminate. The issue was not appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, which would certainly have reversed [on this issue], as that Circuit . . . did in Prevor, which was also wrongly decided in the District Court of Puerto Rico. at nearly the same time.
(1/12/01 Carbide Reply Mem., p. 11, n. 1.) The First Circuit decided Prevor on April 11, 1980, more than four months prior to Gradmann. Clearly, on the issue for which defendants cite it, Gradmann is not good law. (I note that the Gradmann opinion proceeded to discuss liability and to rule for the defendants on the merits.)
35. In our District, Judge Chin has summarized the law on this point:
. . . One who acts to protect his own interests, whether or not he acts under a legal obligation, is not a "volunteer." New York Stock Exchange [Inc. v. Sloan], 1980 WL 1431 at *1 [S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1980]. Thus, a right of subrogation has been held to arise from an interest in avoiding litigation and settling a "fairly disputed obligation," . . . . Courts have found that "any reasonable economic interest . . . will satisfy the doctrine." Id.Junior Gallery, Ltd. v. Neptune Orient Line, Ltd., 1997 WL 26293 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1997). As a practical business matter, Mitsui could have asserted a claim, not only against the defendants, but also against Carbide, which chose the defendants to transport its product and trained them in how to clean the tanks. Carbide protected its own reasonable economic interests by making payments to minimize Mitsui's damages.
36. Finally, the defendants cite Alaska Russia Salmon Caviar Co. v. M/V Marit Maersk, 2000 WL 145124 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2000). In that case, Judge Cote emphasized: "There is no admissible evidence to suggest that . . . Poseidon or Seatech . . . have given up their own claims against Maersk." Id. at *4. By contrast, in the case at bar, Mitsui has provided a notarized document warranting that it will bring no other claim against the defendants. (Exh. 90.)
37. For all the reasons stated above, I rule that Carbide is the real party in interest.
38. Carbide has adequately proven each item of its damages. Its payments were reasonable, and avoided a total loss of the 880 tons of MEG, in which event the defendants would have been required to pay much more.
39. Only one of the defendants' damage arguments is worthy of discussion. They concede that Carbide paid $68,697.15 for the freight charges for the trip from Malaysia to Japan. But their 2/24/04 Memorandum, at pp. 21-23, now makes a point they did not make at trial. They assert that Carbide received $24,023.94 from Mitsui for those same freight charges. They cite to Exhs. F-10 and F-11, which are Carbide's invoices to Mitsui concerning the transportation of the contaminated MEG from Malaysia to Japan. The only testimony about these two invoices came at Tr. 115-23. I find that these were merely pro forma invoices, issued by Carbide "in order to facilitate the movement of the goods." (Tr. 116.) In its haste, Carbide wrote in the same price as if this were fiber grade MEG (31.5 cents per pound). Mitsui had already paid for this product, and it certainly did not pay for it again, contrary to the misleading appearances of these invoices. Similarly, these invoices list a freight charge of $24,023.94, but there is no evidence that Carbide received it. Accordingly, I deny the defendants' belated request that I deduct that amount from Carbide's damages.
40. Carbide has proven out-of-pocket losses of $348,972.02, for which all the defendants are jointly and severally liable.
41. "Allowance of pre-judgment interest in admiralty [actions] . . . should be granted in the absence of exceptional circumstances." Mitsui Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d 807, 823 (2d Cir. 1981). The trial court has discretion to choose the interest rate, including the adjusted prime rate, and to decide whether the interest should be compounded. Mentor Ins. Co. v. Brannkasse, 996 F.2d 506, 520 (2d Cir. 1993). I order pre-judgment interest at the adjusted prime rate, compounded annually. Carbide requests that the interest run from December 1, 1995, the date when the ENCOUNTER arrived in Merak. However, Carbide is seeking only its out-of-pocket payments. It made about half of those payments by January 1996, and the rest of them by December 1996. On the other hand, I think it is appropriate to give consideration to the enormous delay and expense imposed on Carbide by the defendants' specious arguments. I direct that the pre-judgment interest shall run from April 1, 1996.
42. On three days notice to the defendants, Carbide may submit a proposed Judgment to the Judgment Clerk, with a courtesy copy to me.
43. I have made handwritten corrections on the trial transcript. If there is an appeal, the parties should use the corrected transcript.