Opinion
No. 34995
Decided May 29, 1957.
Insurance — Life and accident — Construction of policy — Coverage of children while en route between "home" and school — "Home" construed to mean "dwelling house."
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County.
This action was brought to recover death benefits under a group "School Child Accident Policy." The case was submitted to the trial court on a stipulation of facts which discloses the following:
Decedent was a student attending school and was covered by the policy in question. At 8:30 a.m., he was standing inside a garage near an automobile standing therein with the car door on the driver's side open. The garage was located on the premises where the insured lived. While decedent's father was attempting to start the car, it suddenly "shot backward" striking decedent with the door thereof, which incident resulted in his death. It was the intention of the father to start the car to drive decedent to school that morning. The school started at 9:00 a.m.
The policy in question covered the insured for injuries or loss of life as a result of accident sustained "while en route between the home and the school."
The Court of Common Pleas rendered judgment for defendant.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and ordered the cause remanded to that court with instructions to enter final judgment for plaintiff on the stipulation of facts.
The allowance of a motion to certify the record brings the cause to this court for review.
Messrs. Clair Clair, for appellee.
Messrs. Payne Hermann, for appellant.
The question presented is whether, at the time of the accident resulting in decedent's death, he was "en route between the home and the school" within the meaning of that term as used in the policy; or, more specifically, did the word, "home," include the dwelling house only, or did it include the garage located on the premises with the dwelling house?
Appellant contends that the "home" included the premises or geographic area known as "home," that the term, "en route," meant while on the journey or way between the premises, surrounding the house, and the school, and that, since, on the morning of the accident, decedent never left the immediate premises on which his residence was located, he was not within the geographical area covered by the policy.
With that contention the majority of this court is not in accord. As a general rule in Ohio, a genuine ambiguity in a contract or policy of insurance written by the insurer will be construed in favor of the insured or beneficiary. If the word, "home," as used in the policy, is ambiguous and susceptible of different meanings, that interpretation should be made which is most favorable to the insured. By giving such an interpretation to the policy herein, the word, "home," will be construed to mean "dwelling house," and decedent had left his home and was en route to school when the accident occurred.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
STEWART, BELL, TAFT, MATTHIAS and HERBERT, JJ., concur.
WEYGANDT, C.J., and ZIMMERMAN, J., dissent.
I am aware of and approve the general rule that a court in interpreting a policy of insurance prepared by the insurer should resolve any ambiguities therein in favor of the insured. The writer has applied that rule liberally for the benefit of the insured in a number of opinions he has written. For example, see Toms v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 146 Ohio St. 39, 63 N.E.2d 909; Kitt v. Home Indemnity Co., 153 Ohio St. 505, 92 N.E.2d 685; and American Policyholders Ins. Co. v. Michota, 156 Ohio St. 578, 103 N.E.2d 817, 35 A.L.R.(2d), 448.
Nevertheless, a policy of insurance is a contract and like any other contract must be given a reasonable construction in conformity with the intention of the parties as gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language used.
The policy of group insurance in issue is limited in coverage and affords protection, in the instance involved herein, only while a pupil is " en route between the home and the school."
Daniel Unger met his tragic death in the garage on the premises where he lived at a time when he was preparing to leave his home for school but before he was en route to his destination.
To me, there is no real ambiguity in the quoted language of the policy. By the plain import of the words chosen, the protection afforded is obviously from street and traffic hazards which might be encountered by the pupil after leaving home or school and during his journey between those two places.
In its usual and commonly understood meaning the word, "home," is broader and more comprehensive than the word, "House," and embraces the entire residence estate, including the land and buildings thereon or, as it is sometimes expressed, the dwelling house and its curtilage. DeMouy v. Jepson, 255 Ala. 337, 341, 51 So.2d 506, 510; Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. 40, 43, 36 A.2d 551, 553, 152 A.L.R., 933, 936; Ratzell v. State, 27 Okla. Cr. 340, 345, 228 P. 166, 168; Seismic Explorations, Inc., v. Dobray (Tex.Civ.App.), 169 S.W.2d 739, 744; In re Estate of Montgomery, 257 Wis. 223, 225, 42 N.W.2d (2d), 923, 924. For additional definitions, see, also, In re Niesen's Estate, 64 Ohio Law Abs., 485, 103 N.E.2d 24, and compare annotation, 38 A.L.R.(2d), 840 et seq.
The term, "en route," also has a universally recognized and commonly accepted meaning and connotes " during a journey" or " along the way." Ordinarily an incident happens en route when it occurs after departure from one place and during progress to another. It is difficult to comprehend how an individual can be between two places when he is at one of them.
Therefore, I am in agreement with the trial judge herein who entered judgment for the insurer and with the dissenting Court of Appeals judge who expressed the view in a dissenting opinion that the judgment below should be affirmed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.