Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:05CV186.
May 19, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Daniel Ray Unger, proceeding pro se, filed the above-styled lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on December 19, 2003. The case was transferred to this Court on May 24, 2005, and referred to the undersigned for all pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (document #81). Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (document #86). For the reasons assigned below, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be denied, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted and the lawsuit should be dismissed with prejudice.
Although the Order transferring this case to the Eastern District of Texas was entered in the District of Columbia on February 12, 2004, the case was not received and filed in this Court until May 24, 2005.
Background
This lawsuit concerns a traffic stop and detention that occurred on November 8, 2003 in Jacksonville, Texas. A Jacksonville police officer, Greg Compton, observed Plaintiff's son, Joshua Unger, driving a vehicle with an expired inspection sticker. Officer Compton activated the overhead lights on his patrol car and pulled over the vehicle driven by Joshua Unger. When Officer Compton approached the vehicle, he asked Joshua for his driver's license and proof of liability insurance. Joshua did not have either. Officer Compton then asked for his name and date of birth. Joshua provided Officer Compton with his name, but would not give him a date of birth. Joshua stated that he had religious reasons for refusing to provide a date of birth. Officer Compton again asked Joshua for his date of birth and informed Joshua that Texas law requires him to identify himself by stating his date of birth. When Joshua refused, Officer Compton asked Joshua to step out of the car and placed him under arrest for failure to identify, no driver's license, no insurance and an expired vehicle registration. Joshua was taken to the Jacksonville Municipal Jail Facility. He was eighteen years old at the time of his arrest.
Although he will not provide a date of birth, Plaintiff asserts that Joshua was born in 1985 and that he is currently twenty years old.
On that date, Municipal Court Judge Pete Menefee was notified of Joshua's arrest for the charges of failure to identify, expired motor vehicle registration, no driver's license and no proof of financial responsibility. Judge Menefee was told that Joshua refused to provide Officer Compton with his date of birth or sign his traffic citations. Plaintiff contacted Judge Menefee by telephone. Judge Menefee agreed to meet Plaintiff at the jail. Judge Menefee agreed to release Joshua if he would sign a notice of rescheduling, setting the matter for a preliminary pretrial hearing on December 10, 2003. Joshua signed the document and was released from the jail.
On December 2, 2003, four sworn complaints were filed charging Joshua with the offenses of "Fail to Identify," "Display Expired License Plates," "No Driver License," and "No Motor Vehicle Liability Ins." The complaints are signed by Municipal Court Clerk Margarita Meza. Plaintiff and Joshua appeared for the pretrial hearing on December 10, 2003. Steven Guy appeared as City Attorney and discussed options for resolution of the case with Plaintiff and Joshua. No agreement was reached. The case was called for trial on February 11, 2004. Joshua did not appear for trial.
Steven Guy is an attorney that was employed by the Norman, Thrall, Angle, Guy Daly, LLP Law Firm ("The Norman Law Firm") on the date of Joshua's pretrial hearing. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, the Norman Law Firm was employed by the City of Jacksonville to provide legal services as City Attorneys, including serving in the capacity of Municipal Prosecutor.
Following the pretrial hearing, but before the case was called for trial, Daniel Unger filed the above-styled lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In the original complaint, Plaintiff Daniel Unger states that he is proceeding as the "natural guardian" of Joshua Unger. The case was filed on December 19, 2003. Following a transfer order, the case was subsequently received in this district and division on May 24, 2005.
A First Amended Complaint was filed on October 11, 2005. The amended complaint states that the case is brought by "Daniel Ray Unger, natural guardian, and Joshua Paul Unger, Plaintiffs." The pleading is signed by both Daniel Unger and Joshua Unger. In the amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Joshua is entitled to relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he was subjected to an unlawful arrest and imprisonment. They allege that Joshua was maliciously prosecuted and denied his rights of free exercise of religion and due process. The defendants named in the amended complaint are Officer Compton, the City of Jacksonville, Texas, the State of Texas, Margarita Meza, Judge Menefee and Steven Guy. The claims against the State of Texas were dismissed with prejudice on October 14, 2005.
On January 13, 2006, Defendants Greg Compton, City of Jacksonville, Margarita Meza, Judge Menefee and Steven Guy filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendants argue that Daniel Unger lacks capacity and standing to maintain the claims. Defendants further assert that the complaint should be dismissed because the arrest of Joshua Unger was lawful and appropriate under Texas law and no constitutional deprivations occurred. Defendants finally submit that they are immune to suit because of sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, judicial immunity and official immunity. Plaintiffs filed a response on February 28, 2006, opposing Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs additionally filed their own motion for summary judgment on February 7, 2006, seeking judgment on each of their causes of action.
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the FED. R. CIV. P. provides that the Court may only grant a motion for summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). The moving party, however, "need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The movant's burden is only to point out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996). Once the moving party makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must look beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. Neither "conclusory allegations" nor "unsubstantiated assertions" will satisfy the nonmovant's burden. Id.
Summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence before the court, viewed as a whole, could lead to different factual findings and conclusions. Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court must look to the full record, including the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions. Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). Under this standard, fact questions are considered with deference to the nonmovant. Reid v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986). The Court resolves factual controversies for purposes of summary judgment in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d at 1075. The Court does not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. Wallace v. Texas Tech University, 80 F.3d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp, 37 F.3d at 1075).
An issue is "genuine" if the evidence supporting its resolution in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, together with any inference in such party's favor that the evidence allows, would be sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the party. St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987). A "material fact" is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
Discussion and Analysis
Daniel Unger's Claims
Defendants first argue that Daniel Unger lacks capacity and standing to maintain the claims asserted in this lawsuit on behalf of his son, Joshua Unger. While refusing to provide the exact date of Joshua's birth, Daniel Unger submits in his pleadings that Joshua was born in 1985 and is currently twenty years old. Joshua Unger testified at his deposition that he was eighteen years old on the date of his arrest. Daniel Unger submits that he is the "natural guardian" of Joshua and that Joshua is a minor until he is twenty-one years of age.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b), the capacity of an individual to sue or be sued in federal court is determined by the law of the state in which he lives. Joshua Unger, as of the filing of this lawsuit, was domiciled in Texas. Under Texas law, a person younger than eighteen years of age is under a legal disability. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 16.001. Joshua Unger attained the age of majority, eighteen years old, prior to the events giving rise to this lawsuit and prior to the filing of this lawsuit. Joshua Unger is not a minor under Texas law and he has the capacity to sue on his own behalf. Joshua's age, therefore, does not establish a basis for Daniel Unger to sue on Joshua's behalf. Daniel Unger has not established any other basis for acting on behalf of his son, Joshua Unger. The claims of Daniel Unger should be dismissed to the extent that he is proceeding on behalf of Joshua Unger.
Defendants additionally seek dismissal of Daniel Unger's claims to the extent that he is seeking relief on his own behalf pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants assert that Daniel Unger lacks standing to bring a claim pursuant to § 1983 based on the arrest of his son because he has not alleged a personal deprivation of constitutional rights.
Section 1983 states that every person who acts under color of state law to deprive another of constitutional rights shall be liable to the injured party. Section 1983 suits may, for example, be used to sue a state employee using or abusing power that is possessed by virtue of state law to violate a person's constitutional rights. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961); accord, Brown v. Miller, 631 F.2d 408, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1980). In this Circuit, before a plaintiff may maintain a civil rights suit, he must show an abuse of governmental power that rises to a constitutional level. Love v. King, 784 F.2d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 1986); Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981). A civil rights plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a federally protected right in order to set forth a prima facie case. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 900 (5th Cir. 1982).
In response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Daniel Unger claims that he suffered mental anguish and distress as a result of Joshua's arrest and detention. He also asserts that he was distressed when he was not immediately provided the name of the municipal judge handling Joshua's case.
Daniel Unger does not identify a constitutional right of his that was allegedly violated by Defendants. Plaintiff's reliance on Flores v. Cameron County, et al., 92 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that a parent may recover mental anguish damages for the violation of his child's civil rights is misplaced. Plaintiff omitted an important part of the sentence from the Flores case that is quoted in his response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The full reading of the sentence quoted by Plaintiff states, "[w]e have consistently held that a parent may recover damages analogous to state law wrongful death damages in a § 1983 action based on the violation of her child's civil rights." Flores, 92 F.3d at 271 (emphasis added). The Flores case involved a mother pursuing a § 1983 claim on behalf of her deceased minor son, as well as a personal claim for damages arising from the death of her son. Unlike the Flores case, this case does not involve a parent's claim for wrongful death-type damages arising from the death of a child. Plaintiff Daniel Unger has not stated a claim pursuant to § 1983.
Joshua Unger's Claims
As stated above, the Amended Complaint included claims asserted by Joshua Unger on his own behalf. Defendants argue that Officer Compton is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, that Judge Menefee, County Clerk Margarita Meza and City Attorney Steven Guy are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of judicial immunity, and that the City of Jacksonville and Officer Compton, to the extent claims are brought against him in his official capacity, are entitled to sovereign immunity.
Qualified Immunity
Officer Compton asserts the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is intended to shield government officials from liability for monetary damages for acts in the performance of discretionary functions that were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982); Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001). In deciding whether a plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to overcome the defense of qualified immunity asserted in a motion for summary judgment, a court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right and, if so, whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 198 (5th Cir. 1996). In other words, the doctrine of qualified immunity will protect "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986)). "[W]hen the defendant moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, it is the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that all reasonable officials similarly situated would have then known that the alleged acts of the defendants violated the United States Constitution." Thompson v. Upshur County, TX, 245 F.3d 447, 460 (5th Cir. 2001).
In evaluating Officer Compton's assertion that he is entitled to qualified immunity, the first step is to determine whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. Estep v. Dallas County, Texas, 310 F.3d 353, 363 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001)). "If the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff do not show a constitutional violation, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity." Id.
Joshua Unger alleges that he was unlawfully arrested and detained. He complains that Officer Compton arrested him without a warrant and detained him even though he was not suspected of a felony offense. He further asserts that Officer Compton did not have probable cause to arrest him for the offense of "failure to identify" because, according to Unger, a "person must have been lawfully arrested before he is required to give the information." Unger disputes virtually all facts related to his arrest and detention. Indeed, Unger disputes that the pickup truck he was driving was a "motor vehicle" or that he was a "driver." Instead, he submits that he "was directing the path of the automobile while traveling upon the roads of Texas."
Defendants submitted summary judgment evidence concerning Joshua's arrest and detention, including an affidavit from Officer Compton, a copy of the arrest report and a videotaped recording of Joshua's arrest and transportation to the jail. Officer Compton stopped the pickup truck driven by Joshua Unger because of an expired inspection sticker. Upon approaching Unger, he discovered an expired vehicle registration sticker. When asked to provide identification and proof of insurance, Unger responded that he did not have a driver's license or liability insurance. Unger provided Officer Compton with his name, but did not provide a date of birth. Officer Compton repeatedly asked Unger for his date of birth. When Unger did not comply, Officer Compton asked him to step out of the car. Unger was then placed under arrest for the offenses of Failure to Identify, No Driver's License, No Liability Insurance and Expired Registration. He was patted down, handcuffed and placed in Officer Compton's patrol car for transportation to the jail.
In Texas, a peace officer with probable cause can arrest an individual without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 14.01(b); Hafford v. State, 828 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex.App.-Ft Worth 1992, writ ref'd), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 931, 113 S.Ct. 1313 (1993); Adkins v. State, 764 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). Contrary to Unger's assertion, the offense does not have to be a felony offense for an officer to arrest an individual without a warrant. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge were sufficient to warrant a prudent man to believe that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense. Adkins, 764 S.W.2d at 785. Officer Compton is entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest if "a reasonable person in [his] position could have believed he had probable cause to arrest" Joshua Unger. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Goodson v. Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000).
Pursuant to Tex. Code Crim.Proc. Ann. Art. 14.01(a), a peace officer "or any other person" may arrest an offender without a warrant if the offense is a felony and is committed in that person's presence or within his view. A peace officer, however, "may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view." Tex. Code Crim.Proc. Ann. Art. 14.01(b).
Joshua Unger does not dispute that he did not have a valid driver's license when he was stopped by Officer Compton. Pursuant to Tex. Transp. Code § 521.457, it is an offense to operate a motor vehicle on a highway without a valid driver's license. A reasonable person in Officer Compton's position would have believed that Joshua Unger was committing an offense. Officer Compton had probable cause to arrest Joshua Unger for driving without a driver's license and it was not unlawful for him to proceed with the arrest without a warrant. Without showing that Officer Compton lacked probable cause for the arrest, Plaintiff fails to state a violation of a constitutional right and Officer Compton is entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest. Sorensen v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1998).
Claims for false arrest focus on the validity of the arrest itself, as opposed to each individual charged offense. Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995). As such, it is unnecessary to consider the validity of the remaining charges. "If there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails." Id.
Having determined that probable cause existed for Joshua Unger's arrest, his "seizure" or detention does not state a potential constitutional violation unless the arrest was "conducted in an extraordinary manner." Atwater v. City of Lago, 195 F.3d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1999) (cert.granted). Nothing unusual occurred during Joshua Unger's arrest and he has not alleged any special circumstances, such as a serious medical condition that should have been taken into consideration. Absent a showing that the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, Joshua Unger has not shown that an unreasonable seizure occurred, such that the Fourth Amendment would be implicated. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d at 313-314. Officer Compton is entitled to qualified immunity on Joshua Unger's unreasonable seizure claim.
It is not entirely clear from the pleadings whether Joshua Unger is pursuing a claim for excessive use of force during the arrest. There is a reference to Joshua Unger allegedly having his legs unnecessarily "kicked" apart when Officer Compton conducted the pat-down and handcuffed him. Out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned will address the issue of excessive force.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the core judicial inquiry in an excessive use of force claim is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). The Court additionally emphasized that a use of force claim has subjective and objective components. In other words, a court must consider whether an official acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" and if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively "harmful enough" to establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 8.
Several factors are important in making an assessment of the situation. The claimant must allege and prove there was an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." In deciding whether the use of force was wanton or unnecessary, a court may consider "the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of forceful response." Id. at 7. (internal quotation and citation omitted). The absence of a serious injury is relevant to but not dispositive of the excessive force claim. Id. The Fifth Circuit has instructed the courts in this circuit to consider these five factors in analyzing excessive use of force claims. Hudson v. McMillian, 962 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1992); Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court additionally emphasized that the concept of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment "draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 8 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court added the following caveat concerning the nature of the force used in a given situation:
That is not to say that every malevolent touch by [an official] gives rise to a federal cause of action. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033 ("Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights"). The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 9-10. The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this provision to mean there must always be some injury, albeit insignificant. Knight v. Caldwell, 970 F.2d 1430, 1432 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 926 (1993).
In this case, no injury is alleged by Joshua Unger. In addition, there has been no showing that Officer Compton used force during the arrest beyond what was necessary to handcuff Unger and pat him down to check for weapons. Plaintiff has not alleged or proven an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Due to Plaintiff's failure to show a violation of his constitutional rights, Officer Compton is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's excessive use of force claim.
Judicial Immunity
Joshua Unger asserts a claim against Judge Pete Menefee. Plaintiff alleges an "abuse of process." It is well established that judges are absolutely immune from liability for judicial acts, however erroneous the act and however evil the motive. Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 995 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing, inter alia, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105-07, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). Judges enjoy absolute immunity as a result of the special nature of their responsibilities. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2914, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). The rationale for providing such absolute immunity from lawsuits stems from the fact that, without protection from retaliatory suits, a judge would lose the independence so necessary for the judiciary to be respectable and useful. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). To overcome judicial absolute immunity, a plaintiff must show that the actions complained of were non-judicial in nature or that the actions were taken in a complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502. U.S. 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288 (1991). A judge's acts are "judicial in nature" if they are normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Id.
There has been no showing that Judge Menefee's acts were non-judicial in nature or that he acted with a complete absence of all jurisdiction. He is therefore entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Absolute immunity is properly viewed as immunity from suit altogether, as opposed to merely a defense to liability, and the claims against Judge Menefee should be dismissed. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-15 (1985).
Plaintiff additionally asserts a claim against the City Attorney, Steven Guy. Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for initiating a prosecution and presenting the State's case, to the extent that the prosecutor's actions are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976). Actions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process" includes all actions "which occur in the course of [the prosecutor's] role as an advocate for the State." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272, 113 S.Ct. 2506 (1993). All claims against Steven Guy concern his activities as a prosecutor initiating and/or presenting charges against Joshua Unger. He is entitled to absolute immunity and the claims against him should be dismissed.
The final individual defendant in this case is Municipal Court Clerk Margarita Meza. In her role as Clerk, Margarita Meza signed and filed four sworn complaints charging Joshua with the offenses of "Fail to Identify," "Display Expired License Plates," "No Driver License," and "No Motor Vehicle Liability Ins." Court clerks, as government employees in the judicial process, enjoy absolute immunity when performing quasi-judicial functions. See In re Foust, 310 F.3d 849, 855 (5th Cir. 2002); Thomas v. City of Dallas, 175 F.3d 358, 362 (5th Cir. 1999). The focus is on the nature of the function that was performed, as opposed to the title of the government official at issue. Id. (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 431). "Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process." Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040, 108 S.Ct. 2031 (1988). The acts taken by Margarita Meza in this case were non-discretionary in nature and she is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.
Sovereign Immunity
The City of Jacksonville and Officer Compton, in his official capacity, assert that they are entitled to sovereign immunity from any § 1983 claims. The Defendants correctly state that a federal claim against a municipal employee in his official capacity is the equivalent of a claim made against the municipality. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. ` (1978). Texas law additionally provides that a suit against a municipality arising out of the performance of its governmental duties is deemed to be a suit against the State of Texas for purposes of state sovereign immunity unless a special exception applies. Webb v. City of Dallas, Texas, 314 F.3d 787, 792 (5th Cir. 2002). Unless the municipality waives its immunity, the Eleventh Amendment bars the recovery of monetary damages for a claim against an official in his official capacity. Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff seeks relief against the City of Jacksonville pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is an exception to the State's sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 837 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1988). In Monell, however, the Supreme Court made it clear that municipalities cannot be sued under § 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability for the actions of its employees; rather, an official policy must have caused the employee to violate another's constitutional rights. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. In Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), the Fifth Circuit set forth the framework for determining municipal liability under § 1983:
A municipality is liable under § 1983 for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution or federal laws that is inflicted pursuant to official policy.
Official policy is:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.
Actions of officers or employees of a municipality do not render the municipality liable under § 1983 unless they execute official policy as above defined.
Joshua Unger has not shown a deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from an official policy or custom. Accordingly, he has not alleged facts stating a claim against the City of Jacksonville pursuant to § 1983.
To the extent Plaintiffs assert claims that they have been denied their constitutional rights of freedom of religion and "right of liberty to travel upon the public highways," these claims were previously dismissed from this lawsuit on October 14, 2005, when the Court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the State of Texas. The claims were dismissed because of the State of Texas' Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit. "Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity." Id. ( citing Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 472-473, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2945-2946 (1987)).
For the reasons assigned above, the undersigned finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
Recommendation
It is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (document #86) be denied, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (document #81) be granted and that the above-styled lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice.
Within ten (10) days after receipt of the magistrate judge's report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge.
A party's failure to file written objections to the findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this Report within ten days after service shall bar that party from de novo review by the district judge of those findings, conclusions and recommendations and, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted and adopted by the district court. Douglass v. United Services Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) ( en banc).