Summary
applying federal punitive damages standard to claim brought under the Administrative Code of the City of New York
Summary of this case from Farias v. Instructional Systems, Inc.Opinion
Argued September 25, 2000
October 23, 2000.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of Executive Law § 296 and the Administrative Code of the City of New York 8-107, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kramer, J.), dated January 10, 2000, as granted the plaintiff's motion for reargument of that branch of the defendants' prior motion which was to strike her demand for punitive damages, and upon reargument, denied that branch of the defendants' prior motion.
Samuel B. Mayer, Pleasantville, N.Y., for appellants.
Thomas Pietrantonio, P.C., Port Washington, N.Y., for respondent.
Before: LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., FRED T. SANTUCCI, WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, THOMAS R. SULLIVAN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar appealed from, with costs.
The Administrative Code of the City of New York (hereinafter the Code) clearly states that a person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice, which includes discharging an employee because of a disability, can bring a cause of action alleging unlawful discrimination with punitive damages as a remedy (see, Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-502). Even though the Court of Appeals has determined that such recovery is not available under the New York State Human Rights Laws (see, Thoreson v. Penthouse Int., 80 N.Y.2d 490), a city still retains the authority to give a plaintiff the ability to bring a cause of action alleging unlawful discrimination with punitive damages as a remedy (see, Hirschfeld v. Institutional Investor, 208 A.D.2d 380; Bracker v. Cohen, 204 A.D.2d 115). The Code does not set forth the proof that is necessary for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages . However, when local civil rights laws are silent with regard to legal standards, the courts tend to follow the guidelines established under Federal law (see, Ferrante v. American Lung Assn., 90 N.Y.2d 623). To recover punitive damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in a discriminatory practice with malice or reckless indifference to the Federally-protected rights of an aggrieved individual (see, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a[b][1]). Malice or reckless indifference has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as pertaining to the employer's knowledge that it may be acting in violation of Federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination (see, Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526). In applying this standard, the plaintiff offered evidence that raised a question of fact as to whether the defendants deliberately discharged her knowing that such discharge was in violation of City law (see, Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., supra; Connolly v. Biderman Indust. U.S.A., 56 F. Supp.2d 360). Thus, the Supreme Court properly reinstated the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.