Opinion
HHDCV176079916S
11-01-2017
Ultimate Nutrition, Inc. v. CPT Equity, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
08/21/2017 103.00 MOTION TO STRIKE
ORDER REGARDING:
Ingrid L. Moll, J.
The foregoing, having been considered by the Court, is hereby:
ORDER:
Before the court is defendant CPT Equity, LLC's motion to strike counts two and three, as well as paragraphs two and three in the prayer for relief, of the plaintiff Ultimate Nutrition, Inc.'s complaint dated June 23, 2017. (#103.00.) During a status conference held on October 13, 2017, the parties agreed that the court could take the motion on the papers. Having considered the parties' written submissions (##103.00, 104.00, 116.00, and 117.00), and for the reasons stated below, the court grants in part and denies in part the motion.
Counts two and three of the plaintiff's complaint are labeled " Specific Performance" and " Injunctive Relief, " respectively. Notwithstanding the absence of a choice-of-law provision in the lease at issue, the parties do not dispute that Florida substantive law governs the plaintiff's claims. (See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 5 (" Florida law applies in this case"); Plf.'s Mem. in Opp. at 6 (" While Florida law should govern the substantive issues involved, Connecticut law should be applied to all procedural issues, such as pleading and process.").) The parties also do not dispute that Florida substantive law does not recognize specific performance and injunctive relief as independent causes of action. See Cardinal Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Giles, 813 So.2d 262, 263 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2002) (" an injunction requiring specific performance of a lease is not available in Florida") (citing Mayor's Jewelers v. Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 685 So.2d 904 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App. 1996)); see also Pierson v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 619 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1288-89 (M.D.Fla. 2009) (dismissing standalone claim for injunction) (" an injunction is not a cause of action but a remedy . . . While Plaintiff may certainly request injunctive relief as a remedy where appropriate, there must be an underlying claim upon which to base the request"), aff'd, 451 Fed.Appx. 862 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Pronman v. Styles, No. 12-80674-CIV, 2015 WL 58629, at *11 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 5, 2015) (standalone claim for injunction seeks " a legal remedy" and is not " a separate cause of action"; request for injunction must be based upon a cause of action), modified on reconsideration, No. 12-80674-CIV, 2015 WL 11279831 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 16, 2015), aff'd, 645 Fed.Appx. 870 (11th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff contends that " in determining the availability of injunctive relief in a case where another State's laws apply to the substantive issues, Connecticut courts have held that Connecticut law governs." (Plf.'s Mem. in Opp. at 7.) The authorities on which plaintiff relies do not lend it support with respect to the issue at hand. None of the cases and none of the rules of practice on which plaintiff relies stands for the proposition that, as a matter of Connecticut procedural law, a plaintiff may plead specific performance and/or injunctive relief as an independent cause of action where the applicable substantive law does not recognize such a standalone claim.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, counts two and three of the plaintiff's complaint are stricken. Notwithstanding the foregoing, to the extent the defendant's motion seeks to strike paragraphs 2 and 3 of the prayer for relief, the court denies the motion as inadequately briefed. That is, there is no analysis as to whether the requested remedies in paragraphs 2 and 3 are available with respect to any count other than counts two and three. Accordingly, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the prayer for relief survive.
It is so ordered.
Copy mailed: Pullman & Comley, LLC; Howard Kohn Sprague & Fitzgerald; Anthony F. Cavanaugh, Esq.; OCR.