Summary
holding that the Confrontation Clause under Section 26 has no application in a habeas corpus proceeding because such proceedings are not "criminal prosecutions"
Summary of this case from J.T. v. Hinds Cnty. Youth CourtOpinion
No. 30774.
October 30, 1933. Suggestion of Error Overruled December 11, 1933.
1. HABEAS CORPUS.
Constitutional provision entitling accused, in "criminal prosecutions," to be present and confronted by witnesses against him, held inapplicable to habeas corpus proceeding, since such proceedings are not "criminal prosecutions," but are civil proceedings (Constitution 1890, section 26).
2. HABEAS CORPUS.
On habeas corpus in extradition proceeding, evidence that there was no basis for criminal charge in courts of demanding state and that motive for prosecution was not bona fide held inadmissible.
3. EXTRADITION.
Complaint charging that accused committed grand theft in California by feloniously taking real property of value of twenty-five thousand dollars held, for extradition purposes, sufficiently to charge offense under California laws (Pen. Code Cal., sections 484, 487, 489, 951, 952).
4. HABEAS CORPUS.
On habeas corpus in extradition proceeding, courts of asylum state cannot pass on validity of criminal statutes of demanding state.
5. HABEAS CORPUS.
On habeas corpus, extradition warrant held sufficient to make out prima facie case entitling respondent to custody of alleged fugitive.
6. EXTRADITION.
Where alleged fugitive made no offer to prove that Governor issuing extradition warrant did not have before him essential facts required by federal extradition statutes, extradition warrant held sufficient to justify removal.
APPEAL from Circuit Court of Lauderdale County.
L.F. Easterling, of Jackson, and F.F. Mize, of Forest, for appellant.
In denying his application for a continuance and proceeding to try the cause in the absence of the appellant while he was home sick in bed and unable to be present in court, was not only an abuse of discretion, but the effect of the ruling of the court was to deprive appellant of the right guaranteed to him under the constitution and laws of the land.
Corbin v. State, 99 Miss. 486, 66 So. 43; Johnson v. State, 108 Miss. 709, 67 So. 177; Haggett v. State, 99 Miss. 844, 56 So. 172; Polk v. State, 64 So. 215.
Before a governor upon whom demand is made for the return of a fugitive can lawfully comply with it, it must appear to him that the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the state from whose justice he is alleged to have fled, and the plain inference is that the governor may refuse to surrender the fugitive unless he is so charged.
Barranger v. Baum, 68 A.S.R. 131; 11 R.C.L. 740, sec. 35; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 95, 24 Fed. 132; 60 A.S.R. 132; In re Tod, 12 S.D. 386, 76 A.S.R. 616; Ex parte Reggell, 114 U.S. 642, 5 Sup. Ct. 1148, 29 L.Ed. 250; Ex parte Edwards, 91 Miss. 621, 44 So. 829.
The copy of information presented to the governor of Mississippi did not substantially charge the appellant with a crime against the laws of the State of California.
Compton v. State of Alabama, 214 U.S. 1, 16 Ann. Cas. 1098; In re Fetter, 23 N.J.L. 320; Ex parte Morgan, 20 Fed. 298; Roberts v. Riley, 116 U.S. 80, 29 L.Ed. 549; Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, page 6741; Western Assur. Co. v. Altheimer, 25 S.W. 1067, 1069, 58 Ark. 565; Cheesman v. Hart, 42 Fed. 98, 99; Edgerton v. State, 70 S.W. 90; Line-berger v. Tidwell, 10 S.E. 758, 761, 104 N.C. 506; Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 118 Mass. 441.
It is our contention that the affidavit in question does not substantially charge a crime therein.
Peoples v. Harrington, 267 P. 942; Peoples v. Moore, 261 P. 740; People v. Locurto, 275 P. 462; 66 Cal. 10, 4 P. 772; 56 A.R. 73, note 469; Horton v. State, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 423; State v. Stewart, 9 N.D. 869; People v. Wasservogle, 77 Cal. 173, 19 P. 270; 25 A.S.R. 378, 381; Williams v. State, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1197; People v. Milan, 106 Cal. 320, 39 P. 604; People v. Lopigne, 10 Cal.App. 669, 103 P. 164; Ann. Cas. 1915B 90, 25 A.S.R. 384; 11 R.C.L. 842, sec. 22; People v. Bryant, 281 P. 405; People v. Potter, 265 P. 365; People v. Rabe, 202 Cal. 409, 418, 261 P. 303; People v. Folcey, 247 P. 916; People v. Campbell, 265 P. 364; People v. Lopez, 90 Cal. 569, 572, 27 P. 427; State of Tennessee v. W.J. Massee, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 785.
The whole proceeding is to be tested by the rules and reasons laid down by the supreme court of the United States and the federal courts construing these federal statutes.
Ex parte Owen (Okla.), Ann. Cas. 1916A, 522; Article 6 of the Constitution of the United States; Ex parte Hart, 63 Fed. 249, 11 C.C.A. 165, 28 L.R.A. 801; State v. Klinkenberg, 136 P. 692, Ann. Cas. 1915B 468; People ex rel. De Martini v. McLaughlin, Police Commissioner, 153 N.E. 853; Ex parte Brown, 259 P. 280; Ex parte Deal, 259 P. 282; Ex parte Hubbard, 160 S.E. 569.
Practically all of the cases dealing with extradition are collected in the notes under Title 18, section 662, U.S.C.A.
The executive warrant is insufficient to make prima facie case.
Section 662, U.S.C.A., Title 18; State v. Hackett, 33 S.W.2d 422.
It is obvious that the governor's warrant is fatally defective in that it fails to recite the jurisdictional facts required to be shown on the face of the warrant.
State v. Chase, 107 So. 541.
The appellant contends that the executive warrant, being the only authority for his detention, is insufficient under the constitution and laws of the United States; that in cases of habeas corpus where a prisoner is held under warrant, the warrant itself must show the necessary jurisdictional facts in order to make out a case of prima facie right to restrain the petitioner of his liberty.
Ex parte Devine, 74 Miss. 715, 22 So. 3; Ex parte Edwards, 44 So. 827, 91 Miss. 621; Grace v. Dogan, 117 So. 596; Appelyard v. Mass., 203 U.S. 222, 51 L.Ed. 161, 7 Ann. Cas. 1073; Ex parte Stanley, 25 Tex. App. 372[ 25 Tex.Crim. 372], 8 A.S.R. 440; Roberts v. Riley, 116 U.S. 80, 29 L.Ed. 544; Strauss Case, 197 U.S. 324, 49 L.Ed. 774; In re Mohr, 73 Ala. 503, 49 A.R. 63; Thacker v. State, 101 So. 636; Chase v. State, 113 So. 103; Godwin v. State, 78 So. 313; Ex parte Forbes, 85 So. 590; Ex parte Rice, 89 So. 894; Young v. State, 46 So. 508; Ex parte State, 83 Ala. 503; Title 18, U.S.C.A., section 662; State v. Taylor, 22 S.W.2d 222. W.D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for appellees.
A habeas corpus proceeding, in extradition, is not such a one, as that a hearing thereon, in the absence of the petitioner, deprives him of any constitutional right.
Section 26, Mississippi Constitution of 1890; Lipscomb v. State, 76 Miss. 223, 25 So. 158.
Habeas corpus proceedings are not criminal prosecutions. They are civil rather than criminal in their nature.
State v. Gordon, 105 Miss. 454, 62 So. 431; Edmonson v. Ramsey, 122 Miss. 450, 84 So. 455.
The federal courts, as well as the United States Supreme Court, do not consider the presence of the defendant necessary when issuing or denying the writ upon its original presentation and when the writ is issued or denied.
Murdock v. Pollock, 229 Fed. 392, 142 C.C.A. 512; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 28 L.Ed. 274; Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 29 L.Ed. 868; In re Lewis, 114 Fed. 963; Erickson v. Hodges, 179 Fed. 177, 102 C.C.A. 443; In re Jordan, 49 Fed. 238; Ex parte Farley, 40 Fed. 66.
In habeas corpus proceedings where interstate extradition is concerned there are only a comparatively few things that may be inquired into by the court. Standing prominently among those things that cannot be inquired into is the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.
Grace v. Dogan, 151 Miss. 267, 117 So. 596; Ex parte Edwards, 91 Miss. 261, 44 So. 827; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 29 L.Ed. 544; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 49 L.Ed. 515; Appelyard v. Mass., 203 U.S. 222, 51 L.Ed. 161; McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 52 L.Ed. 121; Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 59 L.Ed. 302; Beddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 62 L.Ed. 193; Glass v. Becker, 25 F.2d 929.
The copy of the information presented to the governor of Mississippi substantially charged appellant with a crime against the laws of California.
California Penal Code, sections 484, 489, 951 and 952; People v. Robinson, 290 P. 470; People v. Myers, 275 P. 219; People v. Plum, 275 P. 518; People v. Campbell, 265 P. 364.
The information in this case tracks the California statutes in charging the offense of grand theft. The statutes under which the information was drawn have been declared valid by the California court.
It is not for this court to say whether or not the statute of California is unconstitutional or invalid for any other reason. That is a matter for the California courts to decide.
Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 373; Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1, 8; Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S. 311, 313; Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 52 L.Ed. 113; Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 59 L.Ed. 302; In re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 49 L.Ed. 774.
The executive warrant was sufficient to make out a prima facie case, entitling the respondents to the custody of petitioner.
Grace v. Dogan, 151 Miss. 267, 117 So. 596; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 51 L.Ed. 161; Ex parte Edwards, 91 Miss. 621, 44 So. 827; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 49 L.Ed. 515; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 95; Hyatt v. Cockran, 118 U.S. 691.
Argued orally by L.F. Easterling, for appellant, and by W.D. Conn, Jr., for the state.
Appellant appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Lauderdale county sustaining a motion to quash his writ of habeas corpus and ordering him surrendered to the custody of E.P. Davis for delivery to the state of California on extradition warrant of the governor of this state. Appellant filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Lauderdale county alleging that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by E.P. Davis, agent of the state of California, and B.M. Stephens, sheriff of Lauderdale county.
The respondents, Davis and Stephens, in their answers, set up that appellant was in custody and restrained of his liberty by virtue of a warrant from the governor of this state, and made the warrant a part of their answers. The warrant of the governor was in the usual form. It was addressed to the sheriff of Lauderdale county, and in its preamble recited that the governor of California had made known to the governor of this state that appellant stood charged with having committed the crime of grand theft (two counts), and that it appeared that appellant had fled from justice and was found in the state of Mississippi where he had taken refuge, and the governor of California demanded of the governor of this state the arrest and delivery of appellant to E.P. Davis, who had been appointed by the governor of California as agent to receive appellant and convey him "to the jurisdictional limits where he stands charged," and concluded with this command: "Now, therefore, I, Sennett Conner, governor of the state of Mississippi, do by virtue of the power vested in me by the constitution and laws of this state, direct and require you to arrest the said Ralph B. Ullom and deliver him to the custody of the said Everette P. Davis, the agent appointed by the governor of the State of California to the end that he may be conveyed to the jurisdictional limits where he stands charged."
Appellant traversed the answers of the sheriff and Davis, whereupon respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition and quash the writ. Issue was joined on the motion to quash. Appellees thereupon introduced the original warrant of the governor and showed that appellant had been taken into custody by virtue of the warrant and was being restrained of his liberty thereunder; and that appellee E.P. Davis had been duly appointed by the governor of the state of California as agent to return appellant to that state. On cross-examination E.P. Davis produced a copy of the charge against appellant, which was made an exhibit to his evidence. Leaving off the style of the case, and the jurat of the officer before whom the charge was made, and the certificate of the officer verifying it as a copy, the charge follows:
"Personally appeared before me this 14th day of March, 1932, Mrs. Mary Wynn Carter of the county of Los Angeles, who being first duly sworn on oath, complains and says: That on or about the 16th day of February, 1931, at and in the county of Los Angeles, State of California, the crime of grand theft, a felony, was committed by Ralph B. Ullom, who at the time and place last aforesaid did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take certain real property of Mrs. Mary Wynn Carter, to-wit: Lot 51 of the Arlington tract, as per map recorded in book 9, page 14 of miscellaneous records in the office of the recorder of Los Angeles county, situate in the county of Los Angeles, state of California, of the value of twenty-five thousand ($25,000) dollars, lawful money of the United States and the real property of one Mrs. Mary Wynn Carter.
"Count 2. For a further and separate cause of complaint, being a different offense of the same class of crimes and offenses as the charge set forth in count one hereof, complainant further complains and says:
"That on or about the 16th day of February, 1931, at and in the county of Los Angeles, state of California, the crime of grand theft, a felony, was committed by Ralph B. Ullom, who at the time and place last aforesaid did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take certain real property, the property of Blanche B. Comstock, to-wit: Lot 52 of the Arlington tract, as per map recorded in book 9, page 14 of the miscellaneous records in the office of the recorder of Los Angeles county, situate in the county of Los Angeles, state of California, of the value of twenty-five thousand ($25,000) dollars, lawful money of the United States, and of the real property of one Blanche H. Comstock.
"All of which is contrary to the form and force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the state of California. Said complainant therefore prays that a warrant be issued for the arrest of the said Ralph B. Ullom, and that he may be dealt with according to law."
Appellant assigns and argues as error the action of the court in refusing to grant a continuance of the cause so that he could be present at the hearing. On the hearing appellant, through his attorneys, presented evidence that he was so ill he could not attend the trial. The court refused to continue the cause.
Section 26 of the Constitution, which provides, among other things, that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to be present and confronted by the witnesses against him, has no application to habeas corpus proceedings, because such proceedings are not criminal prosecutions; they are civil procedures. State v. Gordon, 105 Miss. 454, 62 So. 431; Edmonson v. Ramsey, 122 Miss. 450, 84 So. 455, 10 A.L.R. 380; Lipscomb v. State, 76 Miss. 223, 25 So. 158; Murdock v. Pollock, 229 Fed. 392, 143 C.C.A. 512; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152, 28 L.Ed. 274; Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868.
Johnson v. State, 108 Miss. 709, 67 So. 177, and Haggett v. State, 99 Miss. 844, 56 So. 172, relied on by appellant, are not in point. They were both distinctly criminal prosecutions. Appellant's attorneys stated that if he were present at the trial he would prove certain facts which would go to show that there was no basis for the criminal charge in the courts of California, and that the motive for the prosecution was not bona fide. Such evidence was not admissible. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 6 S.Ct. 291, 29 L.Ed. 544; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 25 S.Ct. 282, 49 L.Ed. 515; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161; McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 28 S.Ct. 58, 52 L.Ed. 121; Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 35 S.Ct. 137, 59 L.Ed. 302.
Appellant contends that the charge preferred against him, and presented to the governor of this state as a basis for the extradition warrant, charged no offense under the laws of the state of California. The charge was brought under section 484 of the California Penal Code, which is in this language: "Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor, or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft."
It will be observed that this statute groups together and denominates as theft the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretense, and names real estate as well as personal property among the subjects of the crime.
Section 487 of the Penal Code of that state defines "grand theft" as follows: When the money, labor, or real or personal property taken is of a value exceeding two hundred dollars. And under section 489 of the same Code the punishment for grand theft is imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than ten years.
Section 951 of the California Penal Code provides a simplified form of indictment, which follows: "An indictment or information may be in substantially the following form: The people of the state of California against A.B. In the superior court of the state of California, in and for the county of ____. The grand jury (or the district attorney) of the county of ____ hereby accuses A.B. of a felony (or misdemeanor), to-wit: (giving the name of the crime, as murder, burglary, etc.), in that on or about the ____ day of ____, 19__, in the county of ____, state of California, he (here insert statement of act or omission, as for example, `murdered C.D.')."
Section 952 of the same Code provides, among other things, that "in charging theft it shall be sufficient to allege that the defendant unlawfully took the labor or property of another."
These statutes, either directly or by implication, have been upheld by the Supreme Court of California. People v. Plum, 88 Cal.App. 575, 263 P. 862, 265 P. 322; People v. Robinson, 107 Cal.App. 211, 290 P. 470; People v. Myers, 206 Cal. 480, 275 P. 219; People v. Campbell, 89 Cal.App. 646, 265 P. 364. However, the courts of Mississippi are without authority to pass on the validity of the California statutes. This is a matter for the California courts alone. Munsey v. Clough, supra; Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S. 311, 313, 15 S.Ct. 116, 39 L.Ed. 164; Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 28 S.Ct. 714, 52 L.Ed. 1113. In the latter case the court held that to impose upon the courts in the trial of writs of habeas corpus the duty of critical examination of the laws of the state whose jurisdiction and criminal procedure they can have only general acquaintance with would be an intolerable burden calculated to lead to error in decision and fruitless miscarriages of justice.
Appellant argues that the extradition warrant was not sufficient to make out a prima facie case entitling Davis and the sheriff of Lauderdale county to the custody of him. There is no merit in this contention. Grace v. Dogan, 151 Miss. 267, 117 So. 596, 61 A.L.R. 709; Ex parte Edwards, 91 Miss. 621, 44 So. 827; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, supra; Munsey v. Clough, supra.
On the trial the appellant made no offer to prove that when the governor issued his extradition warrant he did not have all the essential facts before him required by the federal statutes governing extradition (18 U.S.C.A., sec. 651 et seq.), therefore, as said in the Munsey case, the warrant of the governor was sufficient to justify the removal.
Affirmed.