Opinion
No. 2D22-1686.
04-05-2023
Laura TYLER, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.
Keeley R. Karatinos of Karatinos Law, PLLC, Dade City, for Petitioner. Christie S. Utt , General Counsel, and Kathy A. Jimenez Morales , Chief Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
Keeley R. Karatinos of Karatinos Law, PLLC, Dade City, for Petitioner.
Christie S. Utt , General Counsel, and Kathy A. Jimenez Morales , Chief Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
SLEET, Judge.
Laura Tyler seeks second-tier certiorari review of the circuit court's April 25, 2022, Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of Certiorari as Moot. The first-tier petition sought review of the administrative order upholding her twelve-month driver license suspension under a citation for DUI. During the pendency of the first-tier certiorari proceeding, the suspension expired. The circuit court then dismissed the petition as moot, citing McLaughlin v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 128 So.3d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), and explaining that "because the suspension has expired, the issue of the validity of the suspension of the petitioner's driver license is moot."
Tyler now seeks second-tier certiorari review of the petition, arguing that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law and denied her due process in dismissing the order as moot. We agree because Tyler's "license suspension issue [i]s capable of repetition but evaded review and therefore [should be] considered ... on its merits." See Cornelio v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 2D22-1683, 357 So.3d 277, 279 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 24, 2023) (citing McLaughlin v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 2 So.3d 988, 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)). "In dismissing as moot [Tyler's] certiorari petition, the circuit court failed to apply the capable-of-repetition-but-evading-review exception to mootness [set forth in McLaughlin, 2 So. 3d at 990,] and denied [Tyler] the due process to which [s]he was entitled." See Cornelio, 357 So.3d at 279. Accordingly, we grant Tyler's petition and quash the circuit court's order. "Whether [Tyler's] first-tier petition will be granted or denied is not at issue here. The merits of [her] petition must first be addressed by the circuit court." See id.
Petition granted; order quashed.
VILLANTI and BLACK, JJ., Concur.